But perhaps I do not conceive his mind aright ; peradventure his mind is, that if I do maintain the satisfaction of Christ to procure the end aimed at, ipso facto, as solutio ejusde^n would have done, then to profess himself my adversary. But, —
1. This is not here expressed nor intimated.
2. It is nothing at all to me who place the matter of the satisfaction of Christ in solutione ejusdem.
3. About the end of satisfaction in the place opposed I speak not, but only of the nature of the penalty undergone, whereby it was made.
4. To the thing itself, I desire to inquire, —
(1.) What ]\Ir B. intends by solutio ejusdem in the business in hand? Doth he not maintain it to be the oifender's own undergoing the penalty of the law ? What end, I pray, doth this obtain ipso facto? Can it be any other but the glory of God's justice in the everlasting destruction of the creature? How, then, can it possibly be supposed to attain the end spoken of ipso ficto ? If this be the only meaning of solutio ejusdem, in this sense, the end of it is distant from the end of satisfaction <w; oupxvis itfr a,vo yccioc;. By the laying the penalty on Christ, that God intended the freedom of those for whom he underwent that penalty, I sup- pose cannot be doubted ; but in inflicting it on the offenders themselves, that he hath any such aim, wants an Origen to assert.
(2.) Whether the penalty due to one may not be undergone by another? and if so, whether it be not the same penalty, the idem, or no ? In things real I gave an instance before. If a man pay twenty pounds for another who owed it, doth not he pay the idem in the obligation ? And may not this hold in things per- sonal also ?
Of the satisfaction of Christ procuring its end ipso facto, I mean in its own kind, — for the death of Christ must be considered as meritorious as well as satis- foctory, if the deliverance be attended as the end of it, — I shall speak afterward in its proper place. The present conti'oversy is no more but this : —
Whether Christ underwent the penalty threatened unto us, or some other thing accepted instead thereof, by a new constitution ? or, which is all one, whether, in laying our iniquities upon Christ, the law of G od was relaxed only as to the per- sons suffering, or also as to the penalty suffered? that is, whether Chi'ist paid the idem in the obligation, or tantundem ?
To suppose that the idem of the obligation is not only the penalty itself, but also the offender's own suffering that penalty, and then to inquire whether Christ un- derwent the idem, is to cause an easy enemy to triumph in his dejection.
That the law was relaxed as to the person suffering, I positively assert ; but as to the penalty itself, that is not mentioned. Of these two things alone, then, must be our inquiry : —
1. Whether Christ, in making satisfaction, underwent that penalty that was threatened to the offenders themselves ?
2. Whether the penalty, though undergone by another, be not the idem of the obligation ?
Of both these, after the clearing of the residue of Mr Baxter's exceptions. Nextly, he requireth what I intend by " gracious acceptance," or rather giveth in
NATURE OF THE PAYMENT MADE BY CHRIST. 441
his own sense of it in these words, pp. 138, 139 [266, 267] : — " So also God's graci- ous acceptance is either his accepting less in value than was due, and so remitting the rest without payment. This I plead not for. Or else it is his accepting of a re- fiisable pajinent, which, though equal in value, yet he may choose to accept accord- ing to the tenor of the obligation. This is gracious acceptance, which Grotius maintaineth, and so do I." Thus far he.
Now, neither is this any more to the business I have in hand ; for, —
1. The value of any satisfaction in this business ariseth not from the innate worth of the things whereby it is made, but purely from God's free constitution of them to such an end. A distinction cannot be allowed of more or less value in the things appointed of God for the same end ; all their value ariseth merely from that appointment ; they have so much as he ascribeth to them, and no more. Now, neither idem nor tantundeni is here satisfactory, but by virtue of divine constitu- tion. Only, in tantundem I require a peculiar acceptance, to make it equivalent to idem in this business, — that is, as to satisfaction ; or, if you please, an acceptance of that which is not idem, to make it tantundem. So that this gracious acceptance is not an accepting of that which is less in value than what is in the obligation, but a free constitution appointing another thing to the end, which before was not appomted.
2. He supposeth me (if in so many mistakes of his T mistake him not) to deny all gracious acceptance where the idem is paid; [which], in the present case, is to assert it necessary, because not paid per eundem ; yea, and that other person not procured by the debtor, but graciously assigned by the creditor.