1. The death of Christ, as it is a cause of pardon, is not once mentioned in any of my answers. There is a wide difference (in consideration) between God's impu- tation of sin to Christ, and the death of Christ as the meritorious cause of pardon. So that this is pura ignoratio elenchi.
2. Take pardon in the large sense I intimated, and so the death of Christ is not the meritorious cause of the whole, but only of that particular in it wherein it is commonly supposed solely to consist; of which before.
But in what sense, and upon what grounds, I extended gracious condonation of sin unto that compass here mentioned, I have now expressed. Let it stand or fall as it suits the judgment of the reader; the weight of my answer depends not on it at all.
My second answer to that objection I gave in these words : —
2. " That remission, grace, and pardon, which is in God for sinners, is not opposed to Christ's merits and satisfaction, but ours. lie pardoneth all to us, but he spared not his only Son ; he bated him not one farthing."
To this Mr B., thus expressing it, "But it is of grace to us, though not to Christ," answereth, " Doth not that clearly intimate that Christ was not in the oliligation, that the law doth threaten every man personally, or else it had been no favour to accept it of another?"
(1.) It is marvellous to me, that a learned man should voluntarily choose an ad- versary to himself, and yet consider the very leaves which he undertakes to con- fute with so much contempt or oscitancy as to labour to prove against him what he positively asserts terminis ierminantibiis. That Christ was not in the obligation, that he was put in as a surety by his own consent, God by his sove- reignty dispensing with the law as to that, yet as a creditor exacting of him the due debt of the law, is the main intendment of the place Mr Baxter here con- sidereth.
(2.) Grant all that here is said, how doth it prove that Christ underwent not the very penalty of the law? Is it because he was not primarily in the obligation ? He was put in as a surety, to be the object of its execution. Is it because the law doth threaten every man personally ? Christ underwent really what was threat- ened to others, as shall be proved. But it is not then of favour to accept it. But this is the to KfivofUMov. And thus to set it down is but a petition roZ Iv apxv-
(3.) How doth this elude the force of my answer? I see it not at all.
446 OF THE DEATH OF CHRIST,
After this I gave a third answer to the former objection, manifesting how the freedom of pardon may consist with Christ's satisfaction, in these words: —
3. " The freedom, then, of pardon hath not its foundation in any defect of the merit or satisfaction of Christ, but in three other things: —
(1.) " The will of God freely appointing the satisfaction of Christ, John iii. IG; Rom. V. 8 ; 1 John iv. 9.
(2.) "In a gracious acceptation of that decreed satisfaction in our steads; so many, no more.
(3.) " In a free application of the death of Christ unto us. Remission, then, excludes not a full satisfaction by the solution of the very thing in the obligation, but only the solution or satisfaction of him to whom pardon and remission is granted."
It being the freedom of pardon that is denied, upon the supposals of such a satisfaction as I assert, I demonstrate from whence that freedom doth accrue unto it, notwithstanding a supposal of such a satisfaction: not that pardon consisteth in the three things there recounted, but that it hath its freedom fi-om them ; that is, supposing those three things, notwithstanding the intervention of payment made by Christ, it cannot be but remission of sin unto us be a free and gracious act.
To all this Mr B. opposeth divers things ; for, —
1 . " Imputation of righteousness," saith he, " is not any part of pardon, but a necessary antecedent.
2. ".The same may be said of God's acceptation.
3. " Its application is a large phrase, and may be meant of several acts, but of which here I know not."
In a word, this mistake is very great. I affirm the freedom of a pardon to de- pend on those things. He answereth that pardon doth not consist in these things. It is the freedom of pardon, whence it is, — not the nature of pardon, wherein it is, that we have under consideration.
" But," saith he, " how can he call it a ' gracious acceptation,' a ' gracious imputa- tion,' a ' free application,' if it were the same thing the law requireth that was paid?
" To pay all, according to the full exaction of the obligation, needeth no favour to procure acceptance, imputation, or application. Can justice refuse to accept of such a payment ? or can it require any more ? "
1. Though I know not directly what it is he means by saying, " I call it," yet I pass it over.