The philosopher Aristotle, long ago, as is well known, hath di- vided justice into universal and particular. Concerning the former, he says that he might compare it to the celebrated saying, " In justice every virtue is summarily comprehended," Ethic, ad Nicom., lib. V. cap. 1, 2; and he affirms that it in no wise differs from virtue in general, unless in respect of its relation to another being.
But he says that particular justice is a part thereof under the same
' Eurip. in Cyclop., verse 350.
2 A slight alteration seems needed to elicit the real meaning, — " than to folly, in ascribing," etc. Owen is speaking of "the audacity of these triflers" "in ascribing" unworthy attributes to God. — Ed.
3 Diogen. Laert. in Protag., Ep. iii. 12.
* " Cur bonis mala tiant, cum sit providentia.'"- — Sen.
■' " Illos qui nullum esse Deum dixei-unt non modo philosophos, setl ne homines quidera e.sse dixerim, qui brutis simillimi solo corpore constiterunt, nihil omnino cernentes animo, sed ad sensum corporis cuncta referentes, qui nihil putabunt esse, nisi quod oculis tucbuntur." — Lactan. de plur., lib, i., etc. cap. 8. " Quia rationem mali non in- tellexerunt, et natura ejus abscondiia fuit, duo principia bonum et malum finxit tota ethnicorum (ante natum Marcionem) antiquitas." — Vid. Vos. de Idol., lib. i. cap. 5. VOL. X. 32
498 A DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PART I.
name, which lie again distinguishes into distributive and commuta- tive} The schoohnen,^ too, agreeing with liim (which is rather sur- prising), divide the divine justice into vmiversal and particular; for that excellence, say they, is spoken of God and man by way of analogy.^ Nor is it like that bird mentioned by Homer, which goes by a double name, by one among mortals, by another among the immortals, —
" The gods call it Clialcis, but men Cumindis," Horn. ; —
but is understood as existing in God principally, as in the first analo- gised* being. Nor do later divines dissent from them; nay, all of them who have made the divine attributes the subject of their con- templations have, by their unanimous voice, approved of this dis- tinction, and given their suffrages in its favour.^
But, farther, they assert that particular justice, in respect of its exercise, consists either in luliat is said or in what is done. That which is displayed in things said, in commands, is equity; in decla- rations, truth ;— both which the holy Scriptures" do sometimes point out under the title of Divine Justice. But the justice which respects things done is either that of government, or jurisdiction or judg- ment ; and this, again, they affirm to be either remunerative or cor- rective, but that corrective is either castigatory or vindicatory. With the last member of this last distinction I begin this work ; and yet, indeed, although the most learned of our divines, in later ages, have assented to this distribution of divine justice into these various significations, it seems proper to me to proceed in a manner some- what different, and more suited to our puri^ose.
1 say, then, that the justice of God may be considered in a twofold manner: — First, Absolutely, and in itself. Secondly, In respect of its egress and exercise.
First, Thojustice of Got}, absolutely considered, is the universal rec^i- tude and perfection of the divine nature; for such is the divine nature antecedent to all acts of his will and suppositions of objects towards which it might operate. This excellence is most universal ; nor, fi^m its own nature, as an excellence, can it belong'' to any other being.
Secondly, It is to be viewed with respect to its egress and exer- cise. And thus, in the order of nature, it is considered as conse-
' That -which relates to fair exchange. — Tk.
2 Lombard., lib. iv. dist. 46 ; Thom. ii. 2, ti. 51 ; Tesant. in Thorn , 2. a. ti. 58, ar. 4 ; Siiarez. Kelec. de Just. Div. ; Hom. Iliad, g. 291.
3 Analojry means a resemblance between tilings with legard to some qualities or cir- cumstances, properties or effects, though not in all. — Tu.
♦ Tliat is, tlie fust being whose perfections have been exjilaincd by analogy, or by tracing a rescnil)lance between these perfections and something like thom in ourselves, in kind or sort, though differing infinitely with respect to manner and degree. — 'J'r.
0 Zanch. de Nat. Dei., lib. i. ; Ames. Cas. Consc, lib. v. cap. 2; Ariuin. I'i.-put., part iv. thes. 15; Voet. Dis. de Jure et Just. Mares; Ilyd. Socin., lib. i. c. 25, etc.
« Kom. i. 17, iii. 21; Ezra ix. 15; Neh. ix. 8; Deut. iv. 8; Ps. cxix. 7: lleb. vi. 10; 2 Tim. iv. 8; 2 Thesa i. 6. " Or, have a respect to any other being. — Tr.
GENERAL VIEW OF DIVINE JUSTICE. 499
quent, or at least as concomitant, to some acts of the divine will, assigning or appointing to it a proper object. Hence, that rectitude, which ill itself is an absolute property of the divine nature, is con- sidered as a relative and hyj)othetical ^ attribute, and has a certain habitude to its proper objects.
That is to say, this rectitude, or universal justice, has certain egresses towards objects out of itself, in consequence of the divine will, and in a manner agreeable to the rule of his supreme right and wisdom, — namely, when some object of justice is supposed and ap- pointed (which object must necessarily depend on the mere good pleasure of God, because it was possible it might never have existed at all, God, notwithstanding, continuing just and righteous to all eternity). And these egresses are twofold :—