' Snarcz's Lectures of the Justice of Gml. 2 Sect. 5. s Or quality. Tb.
* That is, inducing to, or chiiwing forth, the act of punishing. — Tr.
' In the original, " Iiniiio ctiani ex condigno," " And that, too, of condiguity." — Eft
DISTINCTIONS RESPECTING JUSTICE. 503
derstancl any thing else by divine justice than the power and readi- ness of God to do all things rightly and becomingly, according to the rule of his wisdom, goodness, truth, mercy, and clemency. Hence the above-mentioned sophists agree that justice, taken precisely and in itself, and abstracting it from all human imperfections, simply means perfection without intrinsic imperfection ; for it is not a virtue that rules the jmssions, but directs their operations.
Hence it presides, as it were, in all the divine decrees, actions, works, and words, of whatsoever kind they be. There is no egress of the divine will, no work or exercise of providence, though imme- diately and distinctly breathing clemency, mercy, anger, truth, or wisdom, but in respect thereof God is eminently said to be just, and to execute justice. Hence, Isa. li. 6, he is said to be just in bring- ing salvation ; Rom. iii. 25, 26, just in pardoning sin; Rev.xvi.5,6, just in avenging and punishing sin; E.om. iii. 5, 6, just in all the exercises of his supreme right and dominion. Job xxxiv. 12-14; Rom. ix. 14, 15, 18, he is just in sparing according to his mercy; just in punishing according to his anger and wrath. In a word, whatsoever, by reason of his right, he doeth or worketh "according to the counsel of his will," whatever proceeds from his faithfulness, mercy, grace, love, clemency, anger, and even from his fury, is said to be done by, through, and because of his justice, as the perfection inducing to, or the cause effecting and procuring, such operations. It is evident, then, that justice, universally taken, denotes the highest rectitude of the divine nature, and a power and promptitude of doing all things in a manner becoming and agreeable to his wisdom, good- ness, and right.
The more solemn egresses of this justice, to which all particular acts may be easily reduced, have been already pointed out; but equity in legislation, fidelity and truth in threatenings and promises annexed to it, in which God is often said to be just, and to exe- cute justice, I think may be passed over, as being too remote from our purpose. But as it appears that some light may be thrown on this subject which we are now treating of, from the consideration of the relation of rectitude and divine wisdom, that is, of universal justice, to government and judgment, we must say a few words on that head.
But rectitude of government, to which that justice analogically corresponds, is that which philosophers and civilians unanimously agree to be the highest excellence, though they have variously de- scribed it. Aristotle calls it " a habit by which men are capable of doing just things, and by which they both will and do just things;"^ attributing to it aptitude, will, and action. Cicero calls it " an affec- tion of the mind, giving to every one his due;"^ understanding by • Ethics, book v. chap. 1. ' De Finibns.
504 A DISSEBTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PART L
" afifection" not any passion of the mind, but a habit. The civilians understand by it " a constant and perpetual will, assigning to every one his due." The propriety of their definition we leave to them- selves. That "constant and perpetual will" of theirs is the same as the"habit"of the philosophers; which, whether it be the proper genus' of this virtue, let logicians determine. Again; as they constantly attribute three acts to right, which is the object of justice, — namely, '■ to live honestly, to hurt nobody, and to give every one his due," — how comes it to pass that they define justice by one act, when doubt- less it respects all right? therefore it is, they say, that to give every one his due is not of the same extent in the definition of justice and in the description of the acts of right.
But let them both unite in their sentiments as they please, neither the "habit" or "affection" of the philosophers, nor the "living honestly and hurting nobody" of the civilians, can be a^ssigued to God ; for in ascribing the perfection of excellencies to him, we exclude the ratio of habit or quality, properly so called, and every material and im- perfect mode of operation. He must be a mortal man, and subject to a law, to whom these things apply.
Moreover, those (I speak of our own countrymen) who divide this justice of government into commutative and distributive rob God entirely of the commutative, which consists in a mutual giving and receiving. For, " Who hath first given to him ?" " "Who maketh thee to differ from another?" " He giveth not account of any of his matters." But distributive, which belongs to him as the supreme governor of all things, who renders to every one his due, is proper to himself alone. This we have above asserted to be the ju.stice of government or judgment. Of this justice of government frequent mention is made in the sacred writings. It is that perfection of the Divine Being vAereby he directs all his actions in (joverning and administering created things, according to the rule of his rectitude and vjisdom. But this excellence, or habitude for action, in no wise differs from universal justice, unless in respect of its relation to another beinjf. But what is a law to us, in the administration of things, in God is his right, in conjunction with his most wise and just will; for God, as it is said, is a law unto liimself To this justice are these passages to be refeiTed, Zeph. iiL 5 ; 2 Chron. xiL 6 ; Ps. vil 9 ; Jer. xii. 1 ; 2 Tim. iv. 8, with almost innumerable others. But in all the effects and egresses of this justice God is justified, not from the rea.son of things, but from his dominion and supreme right. Thus, Job xiv. 14, xxxiii. 12, xxxiv. 12-15. And this is the first egress of the divine rectitude in works.