" The sons of circumcision may receive Tlie wondrous tale, whicli I shall ne'er believe."
Francis' Horace.
For " God hates all workers of iniquity," Ps. v. 5. He calls it " The abominable thing that he hateth," Jer. xliv. 4. Besides these, other passages of Scripture testify that God hates sin, and that he cannot but hate it : " Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity," Hab. i. 13. On account of the purity of God's eyes, — that is, of his holiness, an attribute which none hath ever ventured to deny, — he " cannot look on iniquity ;" that is, he cannot but hate it. " Thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness," says the psalmist, Ps. v. 4, 5, — that is, " Thou art a God who hatest all wickedness;" — for " evil shall not dwell with thee, and the foolish shall not stand in thy sight; thou hatest all workers of ini(]uity." Is it a free act of the divine will that he here describes, which might or might not be executed without any injury to the holiness, purity, and justice of God; or the divine nature itself, as averse to, hating and punishing every sin? Why shall not the fool- ish stand in God's sight? Is it because he freely wills to punish them, or because our God to all workers of iniquity is a consuming fire? Not that the nature of God can Avax hot at the sijiht of sin, in
ARGUMENTS — ON THE SUPPOSITION OF SIN. 551
a natural manner, as fire dotli after the combustible materials have been applied to it; but that punishment as naturally follows sin as its consequence, on account of the pressing demand of justice, as fire consumes the fuel that is applied to it.
But it is not without good reason that God, who is love, so often tes- tifies in the holy Scriptures his hatred and abomination of sin : " The wicked, and him that loveth violence, his soul hateth," Ps. xi. 5. Speak- ing of sinners, Lev. xxvi. 30, he says, " My soul shall abhor you." He calls sin " That abominable thing," 1 Kings xxi. 26; Ps. xiv. 1; Deut. xvi. 22. There is nothing that God hates but sin ; and because of sin only other things are liable to his hatred. In what sense passions and affections are ascribed to God, and what he would have us to vmder- stand by such a description of his nature and attributes, is known to everybody. But of all the affections of human nature, hatred is the most restless and turbulent, and to the person who is under its influ- ence, and who can neither divest himself of it nor give a satisfactory vent to its motions, the most tormenting and vexatious ; for as it takes its rise from a disagreement with and dislike of its object, so that its object is always viewed as repugnant and oifensive, no wonder that it should rouse the most vehement commotions and bitterest sensations. But God, who enjoys eternal and infinite happiness and glory, as he is far removed from any sucli perturbations, and placed far beyond all variableness or shadow of change, would not assume this affection so often, for our instruction, unless he meant clearly to point out to us this supreme, immutable, and constant purpose of punishing sin, — as that monster whose property it is to be the object of God's hatred, that is, of the hatred of infinite goodness, — to be natural and essential to him.
The learned Twisse answers, " I cannot agree that God by nature equally punishes and hates sin, unless you mean that hatred in the Deity to respect his will as appointing a punishment for sin ; in which sense I acknowledge it to be true that God equally, from nature and necessity, punishes and hates sin. But I deny it to be necessary that he should either so hate sin or punish it. If hatred be understood to mean God's displeasure, I maintain that it is not equally natural to God to punish sin and to hate it; for we main- tain it to be necessary that every sin should displease God, but it is not necessary that God should punish every sin." The sum of the answer is this: God's hatred of sin is taken either for his will of punishing it, and so is not natural to God; or for his displeasure on account of sin, and so is natural to him : but it does not thence follov/ that God necessarily punishes every sin, and that he can let no sin pass unpunished.
But, first, this learned gentleman denies what has been proved; nor does he deign to advance a word to invalidate the proof. He denies that God naturally hates sin, hatred being taken for the will
552 A DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PAPvT I.
of punishing: but this we have before demonstrated, both from Scrip- ture and sound reason. It would be easy indeed to elude the force of any argument in this manner. Afterward, he acknowledges that every sin must necessarily be displeasing to God. This, then, depends not on the free will of God, but on his nature. It belongs, then, immutably to God, and it is altogether impossible that it should not displease him. This, tlien, is supposed, that sin is always displeasing to God, but that God may or may not punish it, but pardon the sin and cherish the sinner, though his sin eternally displease him; for that depends upon his nature, which is eternally immutable. Nor is it possible that what hath been sin should ever be any thing but sin. From this natural displeasure, then, with sin, we may with propriety argue to its necessary punishment; otherwise, what meaneth that despair- ing exclamation of alarmed hypocrites, " Who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire? who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings?"^