B5i< A DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PART I.
was no sin ; which," says he, " may serve as a proof that this fire may not burn what is consumable, when applied to it."
But, in my opinion, this very learned man was never more un- happy in extricating himself; for, first, he acknowledges God to be " a consuming fire," though " a rational and intelligent one, not a natural and insensible one." But the comparison was made between the events of the operations, not the modes of operating. Nobody ever said that God acts without sense, or from absolute necessity and principles of nature, without any concomitant liberty. But although he acts by will and understanding, we have said that his nature as necessarily requires him to punish any sin committed, as natural and insensible fire burns the combustible matter that is applied to it. But the learned gentleman does not deny this; nay, he even confirms it, granting that with respect to sin God " is a consuming fire," though only " an intelligent and rational one."
I am son'y that this very learned author should have used the ex- pression, that " this fire burnt something not consumable," when he punished his most holy and well-beloved Son; for God did not punish Christ as his most holy Son, but as our mediator and the surety of the covenant, " whom he made sin for us, though he knew no sin." Surely, " he laid upon him our sins," before " the chastise- ment of our peace was upon him." But in this sense he was very susceptible of the effects of this fire, — namely, when considered as bearing the guilt of all our sins; and therefore it was that by fire the Lord did plead with him.^ Therefore, what this very learned man asserts in the third place falls to the ground; for the conclusion from such a very false supposition must necessarily be false. We go on to the third argument.
CHAPTER VII.
The third argument — The non-punishment of sin is contrary to the glory of God's justice — Likewise of his holiness and dominion — A fourth argument — The necessity of a satisfaction being made by the death of Christ — No necessai'y cause or cogent reason for the death of Christ, according to the adversaries — The objection refuted — The use of sacrifices — The end of the first part of the dissertation.
III. Our third argument is this: It is absolutely necessary that God should preserve his glory entire to all eternity ; but sin being sup- in allusion to the metaphor which represents God as a consuming fire. I'hc Son of God, then, was not, strictly and properly speakine;, coiisuniable, or suscei^tible of tiiis fire, — that is, he was by no means the object of divine anger or punishment, considered as the Son of God, and without any relation to nmukinil, — but, on the contrary, was the beloved of his Father, with whom he was always well pleased. But he was liable to the effect of this fire, — that is, of God's vindicatory justice,— as our representative and federal head. And every sinner is consumable by this fire; that is, is properly and naturally the object of divine wrath and punishment Tu. ' Lsa. Lsvi. IG.
ARGUMENTS — FROM THE DIVINE GLORY. 555
posed, without the infliction of the punishment due to it he cannot preserve his glory free from violation : therefore, it is necessary that he should punish it. Concerning the major proposition^ there is no dis- pute ; for all acknowledge, not only that it is necessary to God that he should preserve his glory, but that this is incumbent on him by a necessity of nature, for he cannot but love himself He is Jehovah, and will not give his glory to another.^ The truth of the assumption is no less clear; for the very nature of the thing itself proclaims that the glory of justice or of holiness, and dominion, could not otherwise be preserved and secured than by the punishment of sin. For, —
First, The glory of God is displayed in doing the things that are just; but in omitting these it is impaired, not less than in doing the things that are contrary. " He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the LoRD."^ " Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?"* or what is just? But " it is a righteous" or just " thing with God to re- compense tribulation" to the disobedient, and to punish those who, on account of sin, are " worthy of death."^ Suppose, then, that God should let the disobedient, whom it is a just thing for him to punish, go unpunished, and that those who are worthy of death should never be required to die, but that he should clear the guilty and the wicked, although he hath declared them to be an abomination to him, where is the glory of his justice? That it is most evident that God thus punishes because he is just, we have proved before. " Is God un- righteous," or unjust, "who taketh vengeance? God forbid: for then how shall God judge the world ?" And he is "righteous," or just, "be- cause he hath given them blood to drink, who were worthy of it,"^ and would be so far unjust were he not to inflict punishment on those deserving it.