1. A second act presupposes a first, and a constant manner of operating proves a hal^it ; a sign also expresses the thing signified. Because God doeth good to all, wo believe him to be good, and en- dowed with supreme goodness ; for how could he so constantly and uniformly do good, unless he himself were good? Yea, from second acts the holy Scriptures sometimes teach the first ; as, for instance, that God is the living God, because he giveth life to all, — that he is good, because he doeth good. Why may we not also say that he is just, endowed with that justice of which we are treating, because " God perverteth not judgment, neither doth the Almighty pervert justice," but "the Lord is righteous, and upright are his judgments?"' A constant, then, and uniform course of just operation in punishing 1 Or ransom. — Tu. " Job viii. 3; Ps. cxix. 137.
ARGUMENTS — FROM THE DEATH OF CHRIST. 559
sin proves punitory justice to be essentially inherent in God. From his law, which is the sign^ of the divine will, the same is evident; for the nature of the thing signified is, that it resembles the sign appointed for the purpose of expressing it. That the same thing may be said of the anger, fury, and severity of God hath been shown above, Rom. i. 18.
2. It is not the part of a just judge, of his mere good pleasure, to let the wicked pass unpunished : " He that justifieth the wicked is an abomination to the Lord,'" and, " Woe to them that call evil good!" But God is a just judge. " But one who is not liable to render a reason," you will say, "and who is by no means subject to a law." But the nature of God is a law to itself He cannot lie, because he himself is truth; nor act unjustly, because he is just. Such as God is by nature, such is he in the acts of his will.
o. The argument, from the ionmutable difference of things in themselves is of very considerable weight; for that which is sin, be- cause it destroys that subjection of the creature which is due to the Creator, cannot, even by the omnipotence of God, be made to be not sin. To hate the supreme good implies a contradiction. But if, from the nature of the thing, sin be sin, in relation to the supreme perfection of God, from the nature of the thing, too, is its punish- ment. Yea, God hath ordered children to obey their parents, because this is right.^
4. The adversaries acknowledge " That God cannot save the im- penitent and obstinately wicked without injury to the glory, and holiness, and perfection of his nature." Why so? "The justice of God," say they, " will not suffer it." But what kind of justice is that, I ask, which can regard certain modes and relations of trans- gression or sin, and will not regard the transgression or sin itself?
5. God punishes sin either because he simply wills it, or because it is just that sin should be punished. If because he simply wills it, then the will of God is the alone cause of the perdition of a sinful creature. But he himself testifies to the contrary, — namely, that man's ruin is of himself: " O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thine help."^ Again; justice does not require that the things which God doeth of his mere good pleasure should come to pass, more than that they should not come to pass. But if it be not more just that sins should be punished than that they should not be punished, it is certain that the non-punishment or free pardon of sin is more agreeable to the goodness, grace, love, and compassion of God than the infliction of punishment; how, then, comes it to pass that, disregarding these attributes, he should freely will that which no essential property of his nature requires? If, then, sin be
' That is, ■which showeth what the divine will is. — Tn.
' In the original, "just." — Tr. s Hos. xiii. 9.
SCO A DISSEKTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PART I.
sin because God wills it, if the transgression of the law deserve punish- ment because God wills it, and the punishment be at length inflicted because God wills it, the order of things, or the condition which they are in by virtue of their respect and relation to the dominion and perfection of God, requiring no such thing, why, pray, should we either hate or abhor sin, when the bare will of God alone is to be considered, both in respect of the decree, which supposes that there is nothing in sin, and which implies no change of the state of things, and also in respect of its execution? But if God punish sin because, by virtue of his natural justice, it is just that it should be punished, then it is unjust not to punish it. But is God unjust? God forbid! I am truly ashamed of those divines who have nothing more com- monly in their mouths, both in their disputations and discourses to the people, than " that God might by other means have provided for the safety and honour of his justice, but that that way by the blood of his Son was more proper and becoming." So said Augustine of old. But what then ? Of that absolute power which they dream of, by which he might, without any intervening sacrifice, forgive sins, not the least syllable is mentioned in the whole sacred writings ; nor am I afraid to affirm that a more convenient device to weaken our faith, love, and gratitude, cannot be invented. Away, then, with such speculations, which teach that the mystery of the love of God the Father, of the blood of Jesus Christ, of the grace of the Holy Spirit, are either indifferent, or at least were not necessary, for pro- curing and bestowing salvation and eternal glory on miserable sin- ners. But it is manifest that by such artifices Socinians endeavour to overthrow the whole healing and heavenly doctrine of the gospel. " My soul, come not thou into their secret ! " But that God should institute so many typical expiatory sacrifices, and attended with so great labour and cost, with a sanction of severe punishments upon delinquents, with this view only, to communicate instruction, and to serve to lead us to Christ, though they could in no wise take away the guilt of sin;^ that he should appoint his own Son, not only to death, but to a bloody, ignominious, accursed death, to be inflicted with such shame and disgrace as hath not been purged away through so many generations that have passed since that death, even to the present time; that Jehovah himself should have been pleased to bruise him, to put him to grief; that he made his own sword to awake against him, and forsook him;^ — that God, I say, should have done these and such like things, without being induced to it by any necessary cause, let those who can, comprehend and explain.