There is, then, a double right; — in the first place, that of a debt; in the second place, that of government. What is purely a debt may be forgiven; for that only takes place in those things which are of an indifierent right, the prosecution of which neither nature nor justice obliges. There is also a debt, though perhaps improperly so called, the right of which it is unlawful to renounce; but our sins, in respect of God, are not debts only nor properly, but metaphorically^ so called.
The right of government, moreover, is either natural or jjositive. The positive right of government, so to speak, is that which magis- trates have over their subjects; and he who affirms that they can recede wholly from this right must be either a madman or a fool. But this right, as far as pertains to its exercise in respect of the in-
' The debt of a sinner is not any valuable consideration due to him, as a debt is to a creditor, but due by him as a debt is by a debtor; and in consequence of the failure of payment, punishment becomes due to him, — i. e., is or may be inflicted in vindication of violated justice. But this is what he could not either claim or would wish to re- ceive Tk.
2 Sin is most accurately defined by our Westminster divines, in that inimitable com- pendiiun of sound doctrine, the Shorter Catechism, to be " any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of Grod." — Tb.
568 A DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PART II.
fliction of punishment, either tends to the good of the whole repubhc, as ill ordinary cases, or, as in some extraordinary cases, gives place to its hurt ; for it is j^ossible that even the exaction of punishment, in a certain condition of a state, may be hurtful. In such a situation of things, the ruler or magistrate has a power not to use his right of government in respect of particular crimes, or rather, he ought to use it in such a manner as is the most likely to attain the end ; for he is bound to regard principally the good of the whole, and the safety of the people ought to be his supreme law. But he who afiirms that, in ordinary cases, a magistrate may renounce his right, when that renunciation cannot but turn out to the hurt of the public good, is a stranger to all right. The same person may also affirm that parents may renounce their right over their children, so as not to take any care at all about them ; and that they might do so law- fully,— that is, consistently with honour and decency. Yea, this is not a cessation from the 'prosecution of right, but from the performance of a duty ; for the right of government supposes a duty: " For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to tlie evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same : for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid ; for he beareth not the sword in vain : for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.''^ The question is not what magis- trates do, but what, as the guardians and protectors of the law, they ought to do. See Ps. ci. 8.
There is also a natural right of government; such is the divine right over the creatures. The right, I say, of God over rational creatures is natural to him ; therefore immutable, indispensable, and which cannot by any means be derogated. Thence, too, the debt of our obedience is natural and indispensable; nor is there any other kind of obligation to punishment. God, from the very nature of the thing, has dominion over us; and our subjection to him is either by obedience or a vicarious punishment, which comes in place of any omission or transgression on our part, as Crellitis himself acknow- ledges. Those, then, who say that it is free to God to use this right or not, as he pleaseth, may as well say that it is free to God to be our God and Lord or not; for the demand of obedience and the exaction of punishment equally belong to God. But the Judge of the universe exercises his right ; and his perpetual right, whence sin- ners are accounted worthy of death, he cannot but preserve unim- paired and entire.
The remaining objections, which are interspersed here and there in that book of his " Concerning God," against the vindicatory justice of God, cither fall in with those which have been mentioned from
' Rom. xiii. 3, 4.
OPINION OF SOCINUS CONSIDERED. 669
the Racovian Catechism, or shall be reduced to the order of those which follow.
We think proper, by way of conclusion, to annex some conces- sions of Crellius. " There is," says he, " a certain regard to honour, with which God himself cannot dispense.''^ Every transgression, then, of that regard hath a punishment coeval with itself, which, from the justice of God, must necessarily be inflicted. " Yea," says he, " neither the holiness nor majesty of God permits that his com- mands should, in any respect, be violated with impunity."^ But the holiness of God is natural to him; an essential, then, and necessary attribute of God requires the punishment of sinners. But he him- self farther adds, " It is unwoithy of God to let the wickedness of obstinate sinners pass unpunished; for this is the first and per- petual effect of divine severity, not to pardon those who do not re- pent."^ But we know for certain that all sinners would contitme obstinate to all eternity, unless God be pleased, for Christ's sake, to renew them by his omnipotent grace to repentance. Crellius, then, grants that it is unworthy of God to let the sins of those pass un- punished for whom Christ hath not made satisfaction. He again testifies, also, that God hates and abhors all sin;* and grants that the mode of conducting the punishment of sin is derived from the divine justice.^ But the thing itself is from that same Being from whom the mode or manner of it is derived. If the mode of punish- ment be from divine justice, the punishment itself can flow from no other source.