But he again affirms, in the same chapter, "That the justice of God is twofold : that one kind he always uses when he punishes aban- donedly wicked and obstinate sinners, sometimes, according to his law; the other kind, when he punishes sinners neither obstinate nor altogether desperate, but whose repentance is not expected." And of both these kinds of justice he brings some proofs from Scripture.
That punitory justice is one alone and individual, we affirm; but that it is variously exercised, on account of the difference of the ob- jects about which it is employed, we acknowledge ; — but this by no means proves it to be twofold ; for he ought not, among men, to be said to be endowed with a twofold justice who renders different re- compenses to those who merit differently. But his whole treatise, from beginning to end, is disgi'acefully built on a mistaken and falsely- assumed principle ; for he supposes that " every sin shall not receive its just recompense of reward" from divine justice, but that God punishes some sins, and can punish others only if he please. From an exceeding desire to exclude all consideration of the satisfaction of Christ entirely in the matter of inflicting punishment for sins, he
572 A DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PART IL
stumbled against this stone : for God most certainly will finally punish the impenitent to all eternity, because he is just, and because there is no sacrifice for their sins; nor is it less true that God casts out and destroys mayy who are strangers to the covenant of grace, not waiting for their repentance, but that he effectually leads others to repent- ance;— not because he exerciseth a twofold justice, but because his justice hath been satisfied for the sins of the latter by Christ, whereas it is not so with regard to the former. See E.om. iii. 24, 25. But because he would not acknowledge the foundation for that distinction, which may be seen in the acts or exercises of the divine justice con- cerning sinners, to be laid in the blood of Christ, he hath feigned a twofold justice, and a twofold mercy opposed to it, of which there is not the most distant mention made in the sacred Scriptures, and which ought not by any means to be ascribed to the divine nature, which is in itself most simple.
But coming to himself again, he denies that in the sacred writings there is any mention at all made of any kind of justice that is opposed to mercy. We, indeed, have never said that justice is opposed to mercy ; but as it clearly appears that it is his wish to deny to God the whole of that kind of justice whence, in punishing sins, he is said, or may be said, to be just (which punishment is an effect different from the pardon of sin that flows from mercy), we choose not to contend about words. Let us see, then, what kind of arguments he produces to support his robbing God of this essential attribute. He says, " that the word 'justice,' when applied to God in the sacred writings, is never opposed to 'mercy,' but chiefly, and for the most part, means rectitude and equity."
It hath been already several times shown that justice and mercy are not opposite. We have likewise demonstrated, by many proofs ad- duced before, that the rectitude or supreme perfection of the divine nature is often called "justice" in Scripture; but this, I am sure, is by no means of advantage, but of much hurt, to the cause of Socinianism. Let him proceed, then.
" But that," says he, " which is opposed to ' mercy ' is not named 'justice' by the sacred writers, but is called ' severity,' or 'anger,' or ' fury,' or ' vengeance,' or by some such name."
But our opponent avails himself nothing by this assertion; for that which is false proves nothing. By that which, he says, is opposed to mercy, he understands that virtue in God by which he punishes sins and sinners according as they deserve. But that this is never called " justice " in Scripture, or that God is not thence said to be "just," is so manifestly false that nobody would dare to afiirm it but one determined to say any thing in support of a bad cause. Let the reader but consult the passages adduced on this head in the third cliapter, and he will be astonished at the impudence of the man. But
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all are agreed that anger, fury, and words denoting such troubled affections, ought not properly to be ascribed to God, but only in re- spect of their effects, — though analogically and reductively^ they be- long to corrective justice, — because, in exercising his judgments, God. is said to use them, but they do not denote any perfection inherent in God any farther than they can be reduced to justice, but only a certain mode of certain divine actions; for God doth not punish sins because he is angry, but because he is just, although in the punish- ment of them, according to our conception of things, he discovers anger.
He next proceeds to produce some passages, in order to prove that the justice of God in the sacred writings, — namely, that universal justice which we have before described, — is often used for the infinite rectitude of the divine nature (what nobody ever denied), where, in mentioning the justice of faithfulness and remunerative justice, agree- ably to his faithfulness, which always hath respect to the covenant of grace ratified and established in the blood of Christ, God is said to pardon sins, and to reward those that believe, according to his justice ; and thence he concludes, " that a justice opposed to mercy, by whicli God must punish sin, is not inherent in God." " For what," says he, " is more agreeable to the divine nature, and consequently more equitable and just, than to do good to the wretched and despised race of mankind, though unworthy, and freely to make them par- takers of his glory?"