Our opponent thus proceeds : — " If that justice be inherent in God, — that is, if there be any property in God which is altogether inclined expressly to punish any sins of mankind whatsoever, whether penitent or impenitent, — he neither spares nor can spare any one; for as to what your teachers in the church have devised, that accord- ing to this justice he can punish sin, even though the sinner should not be punished, that is quite inconsistent with this and every other kind of justice."
Our opponent again idly fancies that we are hard pressed by this conclusion. We grant, yea, we solemnly believe and declare, that be- cause of his justice God can never spare any sinner, unless he ex- pressly punish his sins in another. But he artfully and shrewdly endeavours to load our opinion with prejudice, insinuating " that God then could not even spare the penitent," But we believe all repentance of sin to be founded in the satisfaction and blood of Christ; for "him hath God exalted with his right hand to be a Prince and a Saviour, for to give repentance to Israel, and forgiveness of sins."^ God, then, both can spare the penitent, and, according to the promises of the gospel, most certainly will spare them, — those, namely, for whose sins satisfaction hath been made through the blood of Christ, " who gave himself a ransom for them;" but that to punish sin, without the delinquents being punished, is neither con- trary to this nor to any other kind of justice, absolutely considered, through divine help, shall be demonstrated in its proper place.
Hitherto our opponent hath discovered nothing but mere fancies, vain repetitions, absurd allegations, and a shameful ignorance of the argument. He thus proceeds: "But should you say, that by the same reasoning it may be proved that mercy is not inherent in God; fur if it were, he could never inflict punishment on any, as mercy is
1 Acts V. 31.
VOL. X. S7
578 A DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PART II.
nothing else but to pardon those who have offended ; — I will answer, as I have slightly noticed before, that it is very true that mercy, so far as it is opposed to that justice, that is, to severity and venge- ance, is not inherent in God, but is the effect of his will. When, then, the sacred Scriptures testify that God is merciful, they mean nothing more than that God very often and very easily pardoneth sin, if, at least, they speak of this mercy ; for there is another kind of divine mercy, of which, according to the old translation, mention is frequently made in the sacred writings, which ought rather to be called goodness, and hath a more extensive signification, for it comprehends the whole divine beneficence, whether it be exercised in the pardon of sin or in communication of any other kind of benefit to mankind."
It hath been shown already that it is not proved by such reason- ing as this that justice is not inherent in God; nor from the force of such an argument will it easily appear that the divine mercy suffers any degradation. What he supposes, in the first place, is altogether without foundation, namely, " That the divine mercy is nothing else than to forgive offenders;" whereas in this an external effect of that mercy only is shown, which is itself an essential property of the divine nature, for he pardoneth sins because he is merciful. The supposition, also, is groundless, " That if mercy were inherent in God he could never inflict punishment on any;" for to inflict punishment on the impenitent, and those for whose sins the divine justice hath in no manner been satisfied, is not opposite to mercy. For mercy in God is not a sympathy or condolence with the mise- ries of others, with an inclination of assisting them, — a virtue which ofttimes borders near upon vice, — but is that supreme perfection of the divine nature whereby it is naturally disposed to assist the miser- able, and which, the proper suppositions^ being made, and the glory of his other perfections preserved, he willingly exerciseth, and is in- clined to exercise. But this is not " opposed to the justice of God ;" neither is it an "effect of his free will" (which expression, concerning the exercise of justice, our opponent foolishly wrests to the virtue itself), but a natural attribute of the Deity. What he adds concern- ing a twofold mercy of God are idle fancies: for the sparing mercy of which we are discoursing by no means differs from that benignity, gi-ace, or goodness of God, of which he makes mention; for that very benignity, with respect to the special egresses which it hath towards miserable sinners, from the free-will of God, is that very mercy itself That assertion of his, too, must also be noticed by the way, — namel}'-, '' That God very easily pardoneth sin;" which as it is a very precious truth if a regard be had to the oblation and satisfaction of his Son, so, simply spoken of him who hath tlireatcned death to every trans- gression, and whose right it is that sinners should be worthy of death, > That is, the existence and misery of a rational creature lieing snprosed. — Tr.