128 'VINDICIiE EVANGELIC^.
even all that he pleaseth, are future} The creation itself, and all things that have had a being since, were so future before their creation. Had they not some time been future, they had never been. Whatever is, was to be before it was. All things that shall be to the end of the world are now future. How things which were only possible, in relation to the power of God, come to be future, and in what respect, shall be briefly mentioned. These things God knoweth also. His science of them is called of vision. He sees them as things which, in their proper order, shall exist. In a word, " scientia visionis," and "simplicis intelligentise," may be considered in a threefold relation ; that is, "in ordine ad objectum, mensuram, modum:" — (1.) " Scientia visionis" hath for its object things past, present, and to come, — whatsoever had, hath, or will have, actual being. The measure of this knowledge is his will ; because the will and decree of God only make those things future which were but pos- sible before : therefore we say, " Scientia visionis fundatur in volun- tate." For the manner of it, it is called " Scientia libera, quia funda- tur in voluntate," as necessarily presupposing a free act of the divine will, which makes things future, and so objects of this kind of knowledge. (2.) As for that " scientia " which we call " simplicis intelligentise," the object of it is possible ; the measure of it omnipo- tency, for by it he knows all he can do ; and for the manner of it, it is " scientia necessaria, quia non fundatur in voluntate, sed potes- tate " (say the schoolmen), seeing by it he knows not what he will, but what he can do. Of that late figment of a middle science in God, arising neither from the infinite perfection of his OAvn being, as that of simple intelligence, nor yet attending \\i&free purpose and decree, as that of vision, but from a consideration of the second causes that are to produce the things foreknown, in their kind, order, and dependence, I am not now to treat. And with the for- mer kind of knowledge it is, or rather in the former way (the know- ledge of God being simply one and the same) is it, that we affirm him to know the things that are future, of what sort soever, or all things before they come to pass.
3. The things inquired after are commonly called contingent. Contingencies are of two sorts : — (1.) Such as are only so ; (2.) Such as are also free.
(1.) Such as are only so are contingent only in their effects: such is the falling of a stone from a house, and the killing of a man thereby. The effect itself was contingent, nothing ihore ; the cause necessary, the stone, being loosed from what detained it upon the house, by its own weight necessarily falling to the ground. (2.) That which is so contingent as to be also free, is contingent both in respect of the
' "Ad banc legem animus noster aptandus est, banc sequatur, liuic parcat, et qute- cunque fiunt, debuisse fieri jutet." — Senec. Ep. 108.
OF god's prescience or foreknowledge. ] 29
effect and of its causes also. Such was the soldier's piercing of the side of Christ. The effect was contingent, — such a thing might have been done or not ; and the cause also, for they chose to do it who did it, and in respect of their own elective faculty might not have chosen it. That a man shall write, or ride, or speak to another per- son to-morrow, the agent being free, is contingent both as to the cause and to the effect. About these is our principal inquiry; and to the knowledge of God which he is said to have of them is the opposition most expressly made by Mr B. Let this, then, be our conclusion: —
God perfectly knows all the free actions of men before they are wrought by them.^ All things that will be done or shall be to all eternity, though in their own natures contingent and wrought by agents free in their working, are known to him from eternity.
Some previous observations will make way for the clear proof and demonstration of this truth. Then, —
1. God certainly knows everything that is to be known ; that is, everything that is scihile. If there be in the nature of things an impossibility to be known, they cannot be known by the divine understanding. If any thing be scihile, or may be known, the not knowing of it is his imperfection who knows it not. To God this cannot be ascribed (namely, that he should not know what is to be known) without the destruction of his perfection. He shall not be my God who is not infinitely perfect. He who wants any thing to make him blessed in himself can never make the fruition of himself the blessedness of others.
2. Every thing that hath a determinate cause is scihile, may be known, though future, by him that perfectly knows that cause which doth so determine the thing to be known unto existence. Now, con- tingent things, the free actions of men that yet are not, but in respect of themselves may or may not be, have such a determinate cause of their existence as that mentioned. It is true, in respect of their immediate causes, as the wills of men, they are contingent, and may be or not be ; but that they have such a cause as before spoken of is evident from the light of this consideration : in their own time and order they are. Now, whatever is at any time was future ; before it was, it was to be. If it had not been future, it had not now been. Its present performance is sufficient demonstration of the futurition it had before. I ask, then, whence it came to be future, — that that action was rather to be than a thousand others that were as possible as it ? for instance, that the side of Christ should be pierced with