' Vide Didac. Alvarez, de Auxiliis Gratis, lib. iii. disput. 25, Aquinat. part. 2, qutest. 112, art. 3, E. 1. Part, quaest. 19, art. 8, ad 3.
' Crell. de Vera Rclig. lib. i. cap. xxiv. Smalc. ad Franz, disput. 12.
' " In has angustias Cicero coarctat animum religiosum, ut unum eligat e duobus, — aut esse aliquid in nostra voluntate, aut esse praescientiam futurorum : quoniam utrumque arbitratur esse non posse, .=cd si alterum confirmatui', alterura tolli : si elegerinius prasscientiam futuronim, tolli voluntatis arbitrium : si elegerimus volun- tatis arbitrium, tolli prtescientiam futurorum. Ipse itaque ut vir magnus et doctus, et vitae humanse plurimum et peritissime consulens, ex his duobus elegit liberum vo- luntatis arbitrium. Quod ut confirmaretur, negavit prgescientiam futurorum, atque ita dum vult facere liberos, facit sacrilcgos. Eeligiosus autem animus uti-umque eligit, utrumque confitetur, et fide pietatis utrumque confirmat. Quomodo inquit : Nam si est prsescicntia futurorum, sequuntur ilia omnia, quae connexa sunt, donee eo perveni- atur, ut nihil sit in nostra voluntate. Porro, si est aliquid in nostra voluntate, eisdcm recursis gradibus eo pervenitur, ut non sit prtescientia futurorum. Nam per ilia omnia sic recurritur. Si est voluntatis arbitrium, non omnia fato fiunt. Si non omnia fate fiunt, non est omnium certus ordo causarum. Si ccrtus causarum ordo non est : nco
] 32 VINDICIyE EVANGELIC^.
against any that shall close with him in this attempt, under the name of a "mere Christian," will not be less just than that of Augus- tine. For mine own part, I am fully resolved that all the liberty and freedom that, as creatures, we are capable of is eminently con- sistent with God's absolute decrees and infallible foreknowledge ; and if I should hesitate in the apprehension thereof, I had rather ten thousand times deny our wills to be free than God to be omni- scient, the sovereign disposer of all men, their actions, and concern- ments, or say that any thing comes to pass without, against, or con- trary to the counsel of his will. But we know, through the good- ness of God, that these things have their consistency, and that God may have preserved to him the glory of his infinite perfection, and the will of man not at all be abridged of its due and proper liberty.
These things being premised, the proof and demonstration of the truth proposed lies ready at hand in the ensuing particulars : —
1. He who knoivs all things knows the things that are future, though contingent.^ In saying they are things future and contingent, you grant them to be among the number of things, as you do those which you call things past ; but that God knows all things hath already been abundantly confirmed out of Scripture. Let the reader look back on some of the many texts and places by which I gave answer to the query about the foreknowledge of God, and he will j5nd abundantly enough for his satisfaction, if he be of those that would be satisfied, and dares not carelessly make bold to trample upon the perfections of God. Take some few of them to a review : 1 John iii. 20, " God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things." Even we know things past and present. If God knows only things of the same kind, his knowledge may be greater than ours by many degrees, but you cannot say his understanding is in- finite ; there is not, on that supposition, an infinite distance between his knowledge and ours, but they stand in some measurable propor- tion. Heb. iv. 13, "All things are naked and opened unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do." "Not that which is to come, not the free actions of men that are future," saith Mr B. But to distinguish thus when the Scripture doth not distinguish, and that to the great dishonour of God, is not to interpret the word, but to deny it. Acts
rerura certus est ordo prcescicnti Deo, quie fieri non possunt nisi prtecedentibus, et efficientibus causis. Si rerum ordo prsescienti Deo certus non est, non omnia sic veni- unt, ut ea ventura prsescivit. Porro, si non omnia sic eveniunt ut ab illo eventura prtescita sunt, non est, inquit in Deo proescientia futurorum. Nos adversus istos sacrileges ausus, et impios, et Deum dicimus omnia scire antequam fiant ; et voluntate nos facere, quicquid a nobis non nisi volentibus fieri sentimus et novimus." — August, de Civit Dei, lib. v. cap. ix.
I " Causam quare Deus futura contingentia prsesciat damus banc, quod sit infinita ipsius intellectus perfectio omnia cognoscentis. Et sicut Deus cognoscit praeterita secundum esse quod habuerunt, ita etiara cognoscit futura secundum illnd esse quod habitura sunt." — Dan. Clasen. Theol. Natural, cap. xxii. p. 128.
OF god's pkescience or foreknowledge. 133
XV, 18, " Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world." I ask, whether God hath any thing to do in the free actions of men ? For instance, had he any thing to do in the send- ing of Joseph into Egypt, his exaltation there, and the entertainment of his father's household afterward by him in his greatness and power ? all which were brought about by innumerable contingencies and free actions of men. If he had not, why should we any longer depend on him, or regard him in the several transactions and con- cernments of our lives ?