"Egbey dARGAous, tres 0b Dlaen tocly ta’ wirois-—
« They devour one another, because they have no right or law amongst them.’’ Hence the prophet complaining of force and violence amongst men, with a neglect of right, justice, and equity, says, “Men are as the fishes of the sea, as the creeping things, that have no ruler over them,” Hab.i.14. They devour one another, without regard to rule or right; as he in Varro,—
« Natura humanis omnia sunt paria.
Qui pote plus, urget; pisces ut sepe minutos
Magnw’ comest, ut aves enecat accipiter.” Most learned men, therefore, conclude that there is no such thing as “jus,” or “lex naturz,” among irrational creatures, and consequently nothing of good or evil in their actions. But the consent of men in the dictates of reason is esteemed the law of nature. So Cicero, Tuse. i. cap. xii, “Omni in re consensio omnium gentium lex nature putanda est ;’—“ The common consent of all nations in any thing is to be thought the law of nature.” And Aristotle also, Rhet. lib. i. cap. xiv., calls it »éuov xowéy, “a common law, unwritten,” pertaining unto all, whose description he adds: Kody 62, rd xar& pbow> dors yeep 8 ucey- revovrai ri wdvres Duos xowly Oincsoy 7 aoimdy noel pmdsuie nomavia spds
SECT. 11, 12.] OF THE CAUSES OF THE SABBATH. 339
arAGOUS, xGV 7H, wide ovvd,nxy-—“ That which is common is according to nature; for there is somewhat which all men think, and this is common right or injustice by nature, although there should be neither society nor compact between them.” And this he confirms out of Empedocles, that it is that od ric? wiv dixcsov, rio} 8: 09 dixosov,—* not which is just to some, and unjust to others.” "ADAG 0 wry rhvrwy vopswor, dice ris sipuuedovros Albipos ivextus réraras Dice 77s awAirOU abyns-— An But it is right amongst all, spread out with immense light by the broad ruling yy” The like he affirms in his Ethics, lib. v. cap. vii, defining it to be that which ravrasod rijv adray eocer Sbvamuvy, mal od 7G dds H uf,— “that which hath always, or everywhere, the same force or power, and doth not seem or not seem so to be” [and not because it has been so decreed or not]. This his expositors affirm to be rupd ror TAsioros, xai ddiaPbpors nal nare dow exouow,—< amongst the most of men who live according to the light of nature, with the princi- ples of it uncorrupted.” This xard picw is the same with pera Adéyou, “according to the dictates of reason.” So Adyos 6 épdés, “right reason,” is the same with many as “jus nature,” or “naturale.” Tully in his first de Legib., cap. xii., pursues this at large. “ Est unum jus,” saith he, “quo devincta est hominum societas, et quod lex con- stituit una, Que lex est recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi;” —“ There is one common right, which is the bond of human society, and which depends on one law. And this law is the right reason of forbidding and commanding.” This, then, is generally received,— namely, that the law of nature consists in the dictates of reason, which men sober, and otherwise uncorrupted, do assent unto and / agree in. But there are sundry things which will not allow us to acquiesce in this description of it; for,—
12. First, the law of nature is a constant and perfect law. It must be so, because it is the fountain and rule of all other laws what- ever; for they are but deductions from it and applications of it.
_ Now, unto a complete law it is required, not only that it be instruc- tive, but also that it have a binding force, or be coactive; that is, it doth not only teach, guide, and direct what is to be done, persuading
__ by the reason of the things themselves which it requires, but also it
_ must have authority to exact obedience, so far as that those who are under the power of it can give themselves no dispensation from its observance. But thus it is not with these dictates of reason. They _gono further than direction and persuasion ; and these always have, and always will have, a respect unto occasions, emergencies, and cir- cumstances. When these fall under any alterations, they will put reason on new considerations of what it ought to determine with re- spect unto them; and this the nature of a universal law will not
340 OF THE CAUSES OF THE SABBATH. [EXERC. III.
admit. Whatever, then, men determine by reason, they may alter on new considerations, such as occasioned their original determina- tion. I do not extend this unto all instances of natural light, but to some only; which sufficeth to demonstrate that the unalterable law of nature doth not consist in these dictates of reason only. Suppose men do coalesce into any civil society on the mere dictates of reason that it is meet and best for them so to do, if this be the supreme reason thereof, no obligation ariseth from thence to preserve the society so entered into but what is liable unto a dissolution from contrary considerations. If it be said that reason dictates and com- mands in the name of God, whence an indissoluble obligation attends it, it will be answered, that this introduceth a new respect, which is not formally included in the nature of reason itself. Let a man in- deed use and improve his own reason without prejudice,—let him collect what resolutions, determinations, instructions, laws, have pro- ceeded from the reason of other men,—it will both exceedingly ad- vance his understanding, and enable him to judge of many things that are congruous to the light and law of nature; but to suppose the law of nature to consist in a system or collection of such instances and observations is altogether unwarrantable.