13. The event of things, in the disagreement of the wisest men about the dictates of reason, utterly everts this opinion. The law of nature, whatever it be, must in itself be one, uniform, unalterable, the same in and unto all; for by these properties it differs from all other laws. But if it have no higher nor more noble original to be resolved into but mere human reason, it will be found, if not in all things, yet in most, fluctuating and uncertain. For about what is agreeable to reason in things moral, and what is not, there have been differences innumerable from time immemorial, and that amongst them who searched most diligently after them, and boasted themselves to be wise upon their self-pleasing discoveries. This gave the greatest occasion unto the two hundred and eighty-eight sects of philosophers, as Austin reports them out of Varro, who was “ disertissimus nepotum Romuli,” lib. xix. de Civit. Dei. Yea, and some of the most learned and contemplative authors did not only mistake in many instances what natural light required, but also asserted things in direct opposition unto what is judged so to be. The saying produced out of Empedocles by Aristotle, before men- tioned, is to prove that the killing of any living creature is openly against the universally prevailing law of nature. Others maintained such things to be natural as the most did abominate. Incest in the nearest instances, with sodomy, were asserted lawful by the Magi, and some of the most learned Greeks, as Zeno and Chrysippus. And it was the judgment of Theodorus that a wise man ought xa?
SECT. 13.] OF THE CAUSES OF THE SABBATH. 341
aherew re nad worryedesv, xa? icpoovrgoes sv xourpei, undev yap rodrwy Dios aisypov sivas, as Hesychius Illustrius reports in his life. He thought that neither theft, nor adultery, nor sacrilege, had any thing evil or filthy in them in their own nature, so that a wise man ought to have respect unto them, according to circumstances and occasions. Plato’s promiscuous use of wives was confirmed by law at Sparta. And Archelaus at once determined xa) 7d dixasoy sivas, xed +d aiorgpdy ov pice: dAXG véuw, as Diogenes in his life, who likewise reports the same of Aristippus and Carneades. Naturally they thought nothing just or unjust, good or evil, but by virtue of some arbitrary law. And there are yet those in the world, partakers of human nature in common with us all, who know no other rule of their actions towards others but power, as the cannibals, and those Indians who suppose they may justly spoil all that are afraid of them. Yea some, who of late have pretended a severe inquisition into these things, seem to incline unto an opinion that power and self-advantage are the tule of men’s conversation among themselves in this world. So it was the principle of Brennus, in his time the terror of Europe, that there was no other law of nature but that the “ weaker should obey the stronger.” And the commander of the Gauls who besieged the Roman Capitol, when he was on a composition to depart upon the giving to him such a weight of gold, threw his sword and helmet into the scale against it, giving no other reason for what he did but “Vez victis.” Neither will another rule which they had of assign- ing things to the law of nature hold firm, namely, a general usage of mankind from time immemorial. This Antigone pleads in Sophocles for her burying of Polynices, ’Ayriy. 456 :— Ob yap v1 viv ye xox bis GAD ati rors Zh cadre xoudels oldev bE drou ’Pavy-—
“ This (right) arose not to-day nor yesterday, but was in force ever of old, nor doth any man know from whence it arose.” For all nations, from beyond the records of the original of things, had consented unto practices directly contrary to the light of nature, as is now acknowledged. And hence were all the disputes of old about the nature, bounds, and ends of good and evil, duty and vice, honest and filthy, just and unjust, that could never be determined, This Plato observing, affirms in his Phzdo, “That if any one name either silver or iron, presently all men agree what it is that is in- tended; but if they speak of that which is just and good, presently we are at variance with others and among ourselves.” So great uncertainty is there in human reason, under its best natural im- provements, in its judgment of what doth or doth not belong to the principles and condition of our nature, so far is it from being com- prehensive of the whole law thereof.
342 OF THE CAUSES OF THE SABBATH. [EXERO. III.
14. When, therefore, we plead any thing to belong unto or to proceed from the law of nature, it is no impeachment of our asser- tion to say that it doth not appear so to the common reason of mankind, or that right reason hath not found it out or discovered it, provided it contain nothing repugnant thereunto; for it will never be universally agreed what doth so appear to the common reason of all, nor what is, hath been, or may be discovered thereby. And although it should be true, which some say, that moral and natural duties depend on and have their formal reason from the nature of God and man, yet it doth not thence follow that we do, or may, by the sole light of nature, know what doth so arise, with the due bounds and just consequences of it. But there is, as we shall see, something yet further required in and unto the law of nature, which is the adequate rule of all such duties. I shall not, therefore, en- deavour to prove that the mere dictates of reason do evince a sacred hebdomadal rest, as knowing that the law of nature, unto which we say it doth belong, doth not absolutely consist in them; nor did they ever since the fall, steadily and universally, as acted in men possessed of reason, either comprehend or express all that belongs thereunto.