was refused by A. with the unanimous approval of his people and their elders. To the arrogant menace of the Syrian, the king of Isr. replied in the proverbial phrase, 'Let not him who girds on the armour boast as he who puts it ott'.' Btnhadad at once ordered the engines of war (LXX ' lines of circumvallation ') to be placed against the city. But beyond this he took no further precaution, and resigned himself \vith careless ease to voluptuous carousal \vith his nobility and feudatory Kings. Meanwhile A. mustered his army of 7000 men, officered by 232 territorial commanders, and attacked the SjTians with crushing eti'ect (1 K 20'°'*'), inflicting a total overthrow. In the following spring the Syrian monarch again took the field with a well-appointed array of overwhelming superiority. The Syrians attributed their previous defeat to the fact that the God of Isr. was a God of the hills (where cavalry and chariots could not so well operate *). If they could draw the forces of A. into the valley near Aphek, all would be well. But the battle that followed utterly falsified their expectations. The Syrians were put to utter rout, and saved themselves by precipitate flight to Aphek. Benhadad and his followers went as suppliants to A., who judged it politic to receive them with friendliness. A treaty was concluded, in which the Syrian king conceded to Isr. special quarters(streets) in Damascus,! a privilege which corresponded with a similar right which Omri was compelled to con- cede to Syria in his own capital, Samaria.
With the defective Biblical records before us, it is not easy to explain the complaisant attitude of A. in the hour of his victory. But the key to the solution of the mystery is given to us in the Assyr. annals. From these we learn that about this time a new disturbing factor was beginning to appear in W. Asian politics. Ever since the time of baul the arena of Pal. foreign politics had been circum- scribed within the region of the Hittite, Syrian, and Can. borders, and the interference of Egypt had only been occasional. Since the days of Tiglath- pUeser I. (c. B.C. 1 100) the military power of Ass3-ria had been dormant. But during the time of Omri there were vivid signs that Assyria was at length awakening from its century long slumber, under the energetic rule of As4ur-nazir-pal. During the reign of his successor Shalmaneser (Sulmftnu- a.5aridu) II., who reigned from 860-825, it began to press more heavily on the lands near the Mediter. border, and to extend its boundaries towards the Hittite States. About the year 857 the power of this monarch threatened seriously the Pal. region. The king of Syria would be among the first to feel apprehension. The immediate ettect of Shalmaneser's advance was to put an end, at least for a time, to the wars between Syria and Ahab. And in the negotiations described in 1 K 20*'- " it is pretty certain that the advance of the Assyr. power from the N.E. formed a subject of conversa- tion between the two kings, and that Benhadad was glad, even upon disadvantageous terms, to get rid of a burdensome and exhausting war, in order that all his forces might be reserv'ed to confront the formidable Assyr. foe. The attack was de- livered in the year B.C. 854, when the battle of ^Carkar was fought. A considerable number of States, including Israel, but not including Judah, Edom, or Moab,t had united with Hadadezer
• We know that the Israelites also possessed chariotA In con- siderable nunil)er, from the express statement of the monoUth inscription of Shalmaneser II. lines 91, 92. Cf. 1 K 22.
♦ Ewald {r;M. d. V. Itr. iii. 488 n.) translates the Heb. by * places of aliode' (comparing the Arab, mahattah), i.e. perma- nent ambasa.'ulorial residence. But this explanation is ver>' far- fetched. LX.X renders i£o9ow , ' street*.' For other interpreta- tions see Thenius, ad loc.
J In the case of Moab, the reason adduced by Prof. Sayc« Is probably the ri^'ht one. Moab sent no contingent, because ChAt State was then in revolt against Israel {HCM p. a93).
AFTAK
AHAZ
53
( = Da<iidri = Benhadad) to resist the Assyrians. The account of the whole campaign may be read in the monolith in8cri|)tion quoted in Schrader's COT' i. 183 ff. In lines 91, 92 we read that A., king of Israel, sent a contingent of 2U()0 chariots and 10,000 men. The total defeat of the allied kings, though probably obtained with heavy loss to the Assyrians, sufliced to break up the alliance. A. now followed the short-sighted policy of isolation in presence of the formidable Assyr. power — a policy which in the following century Ephraim and Judali in turn pursued with baleful results. The consequence was a renewal of the wars between Syria and Israel, which had been for some years suspended. We may infer from the scriptural account that A. took the initiative by endeavour- ing to recover Ranioth-gilead from Syria. Pro- biibly the allied kings of Isr. and Jud. endeavoured to profit by the weakness of Syria after the over- whelming defeat sustained by the latter in the battle of Karkar. In 1 K 22 we have a vivid por- trayal of the dramatic scene between Micaiah, son of Imlah, and the prophets who prophesied in favour of immediate war with Syria (see Micaiah). For Micaiah the result was imprisonment as the penalty for his outspoken deliverance of the divine message. Undeterred by the gravity of his prophecy, A. and Jehoshaphat went forth at the head of their respective forces to battle. But A. resolved to secure his person against the Syrian archers by appearing in liis chariot divested of the ordinary insignia of royalty. This precaution, however, did not avail him against the chance arrow of a bowman, which penetrated between the joints of his breastplate. The king of Isr. slowly Died to death, and died about sunset. His body was conveyed to Samaria, where he was buried.