The thought of ' election ' has formed so promi- nent a feature in all the most important attempts that have been made in We.stem Christendom for the last 1500 years to provide a complete and formulated scheme of Christian doctrine, that it is peculiarly hard for us to approach the considera- tion of the original meaning of the term in Holy Scripture without distracting associations. And yet the effort is worth making. The only hope of any further progress in the elucidation of the prob- lem, the only prospect of extricating its discussion from the deadlock at which it has arrived, lies in a careful reconsideration of the scriptural premisses on which the whole argument has been based.
The questions that require examination fall naturally into three divisions, i. The questions touching the author of election— who chooses the fleet? What can we know of His character? What are the grounds of His choice so far as He ha.-( vouchsafed to reveal them ? iL The questions touching the jiersons of the elect — who are they ? and for wliat end are they chosen ? iii. The ques- tion behmging to the effect of election— wliat influence does the fact that they have been chosen by God exert over the elect ?
i. On the first i)art of this question there is no diflference of opinion. Every theory of election is based on the fact, constantly emphasized in Holy Scrijiture, that election is the immediate work of God. It is His act as dire'-tjy as creation is.
In fact, God's purpo.se in creation. His eternal purpose (r; TrpoOeaa Turn aiuivuv, Eph 3"), is revealed in Holy Scripture as working to its end by the method of election. It is in St. Paul's language KaT iKKoxV TpdSeffis, Ro 9". The two thoughts are in reality inseparable. We can understand, there- fore, how it is that St. Paul should say that God chose His elect before the foundation of the world in His Son (Eph I*). He is only expressing the truth that underlies our Lord's words when He says, ' To sit on my right hand and on my left hand is not mine to give, but it is for them for whom it hath been prepared of my Father' (Mt 20^). Our first conclusion then, the one lixed point in the whole discussion, is this : God is the author of election. He Himself chooses His own elect.
When we go on to ask on what grounds His election is based, by what considerations, in accord- ance with what law His choice is determined, we find ourselves at once on debatable ground. To some minds, indeed, the question put in this form seems foolish, not to say irreverent. It involves in their judgment a pitiable blindness in regard to the inexorable limits of human knowledge. In the spirit, sometimes in the very words of Zophar the Naamatliite (Job 11'), they ask, 'Canst thou by searching find out God ? canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection ? ' ' The main facts of the divine government may, indeed, be known, but the reasons which underlie them, the motives which prompt them, are unfathomable ; only an uncnastened curiosity can seek to intrude into such secrets.' To some minds, again, the question involves an assumption inconsistent with one of their primary philosophical or theological postulates. It seems to them inconsistent with the reality of the divine freedom, which in this connexion is only another name for the divine omnipotence, to suppose that God should acknow- ledge any law as regulating His choice.
If either of these objections is well grounded, further discussion of the question is, of course, precluded. We must therefore begin by defining the position we are prepared to take up with regard to them. Let us consider the second objec- tion first. No doubt, if in its ultimate analysis our conception of God resolves itself into a con- ception of abstract omnipotence, or of an absolutely sovereign will, and if omnipotence means the power to do antjthinq, and if no will can be ab- solutely sovereign which is not as free to do wrong as to do right, it is meaningless if not profane to inqtiire into the laws wliich regulate the clioice of God. An abstract omnipotence must be inscrut- able. M'e cannot even begin to understand the action of a will in this sense 'absolute.' Rut if goodness, and not power, lies at the heart of our conception of God, then we shall not be ashamed to confess that for us, in Westcott's magnificept phrase, 'Truth and jitstice define omnipotence.' And we shall not shrink from pressing to the full the human analogy which is present, though latent, every time we use the word ' will ' in relation to God. We shall contend tliat the action of the divine will, like the action of the human will, of which it is the archetype, must be at once deter- mined by, and reveal, the character which lies behind it. We shall maintain the paradox, if paradox it be, that the will of God is free, only because, by the blessed necessity of His being, He cannot will anything but that which is perfectly holy and righteous and good. And we shall claim every revelation that He has given us of His character as a revelation of the principles which regulate His choice, the laws of His election.