Butler takes a different view, and his position is worthy of scrutiny. His words are as fol- lows ἵ :—
‘There is a very strong presumption against common specu- lative truths and against the most ordinary facts, before the roof of them, which yet is overcome by almost any proof.
here is a presumption of millions to one, against the story of Cesar, or of any other man, For suppose a number of common facts so and so cireumstanced, of which one had no kind of proof, should happen to come into one’s thoughts, every one would, without any possible doubt, conclude them to be fa)se. And the like may be said of a single common fact. And from hence it appears, that the question of importance, as to the matter before us, is, concerning the degree of the peculiar pre- seuss supposed against miracles ; not whether there be any peculiar presumption at all against them. For, if there be the presumption of millions to one against the most common facts, what cam a small presumption, additional to this, amount to, though it be peculiar? It cannot be estimated, and is as nothing. The only material question is, whether there be any such presumption against miracles as to render them in any sort incredible.
Now, Mill pointed out very clearly { the con- fusion of which Butler is here guilty: it is that Butler does not distinguish between two different kinds of improbability, which may be called respec- tively improbability before the fact and improba- bility after the fact. The antecedent presumption against any ordinary occurrence taking place, which it comes into my head to imagine taking place, is immense ; but if a credible witness asserts
* e.g. by Mill, 1.6. p. 285 ff. t Analogy, ii. 2. 5 System of Logic, ii. 118.
MIRACLE
MIRACLE 387
that it has taken place, that improbability be- | of belief in a stupendous miracle, the resurrection
comes as nothing. This is the improbability before the fact. In fact, that any ordinary event should take place is improbable before testimony has been given, but not a whit improbable after testimony. But the case of miracles is quite dif- ferent: the presumption against a miracle is not merely a presumption against a specific event, but against that kind of event taking place. And this presumption remains, and must be allowed for even after testimony has been given. Butler really compares the improbability of miracles (which remains after testimony to their occur- rence has been given) with the improbability of the truth of a random guess (which vanishes after testimony to its accuracy has been brought for- ward); and this is to compare two things not fairly comparable at all.
6. The truth is, that when estimating the dif- ference between miracles and ordinary facts as matters of credit, we must not lose sight of our fundamental assumption of the existence and activity of supreme spiritual powers.
*A miracle,’ says Mozley, ‘is on one side of it not a fact of this world, but of the invisible world; the Divine interposition in it being a supernatural and mysterious act: and so the evi- dence for a miracle does not stand exactly on the same ground as the evidence of the witness-box, which only appeals to our common-sense as men of the world and actors in ordinary life, but it rau res a great religious assumption in our minds to begin with, without which no testimony in the case can avail; and consequently the acceptance of a miracle exercises more than the ordinary qualities of candour and fairness used in
estimating historical evidence generally, having, in the pre- vious admission of a Supernatural Power, first tried our faith.’ *
As we conceive the case, then, there must be, to certify the miracle—(a@) ἃ posteriort evidence greater in degree than would be required for ordi- nary matters of fact; (Ὁ) an ἃ priori conviction of the Divine power, and an a priori faith in the
Divine will to intervene. And this conclusion (to which we have been led on grounds of reason alone) receives remarkable confirmation from the circum- stances of our Lord’s miracles as recorded in the Gospels. The great miracle of the Resurrection was only witnessed by believers; there was no manifestation of the Risen Christ to the soldiers, to the priests, to Pilate (cf. Ac 1041). It is a question, indeed, which may fairly be raised, whether the recognition of the Risen Lord would have been possible for the faithless, and whether unbelievers would have perceived any exceptional appearance at all in the Garden, in the Upper Room, or on the Galilean mountain.t It is a question whether we have not here the supreme illustration of that strange limitation to the powers of the Incarnate Word described in the words, ‘He could do there no mighty work’ (Mk 6°). ‘He did there no mighty works because of their unbelief’ (Mt 13%). But, without entering into so difficult and sacred a field of inquiry, it is at least certain that miracles are not regarded in the Gospels as suflicient objectively in themselves to generate faith. ‘If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded if one rise from the dead’ (Lk 16%), is the general teach- ing of the Synoptics.
iii. THE EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF MIRACLES, — 4. We pass to the consideration of the evidential value of miracles, It is an ‘acknowledged histori- cal fact,’ as Butler says, ‘that Christianity offered itself to the world and demanded to be received upon the allegation . .. of miracles publicly wrought to attest the truth of it in such an age.’ The Christian Church was founded on the basis