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externalism held the field, and that more and more, as the one thing needful. J a A conspicuous example of legalistic Judaism is furnished in connexion with the observance of the Sabbath (see vol. iv. p. 320"). No fewer than 39 species of servile work are forbidden on that day, and each of these includes numerous par- ticulars. To observe scrupulously the prescribed rules about food is viewed as morally meritorious (Dn 28%, Jth 8° ete.). From the days of Noah downwards, the eating of blood seems to have been considered criminal. In Enoch 4° the giants are depicted as dreadful cannibals because guilty of this enormity. The Book of Jubilees also attaches much importance to this prohibition. ‘Eat no blood whatever . . . that thou mayest be preserved from all evil’ (21 38*-), This appears to be a superstitious gloss upon the biblical statement, ‘the blood is the life’ (Lv 1744). At all events, it shows us that an ethical significance was given to mere externalities having none. Almsgiving is represented as purging away all sin (To 12° 141), This error as to the value of good works passed over into Christianity with Jewish Christians, and formed the subject of St. Paul’s great controversy. In the special religious conditions of the Jews this mechanical and minute system of ethics was per- haps inevitable. It seems to be a law of religious history that all written tradition gives rise to an oral tradition, and that the latter always claims to dominate conscience ; especially is this the case where, as in Mosaism, written tradition is at once a religion and a revelation (Nicolas, Des Doctrines Religueuses des Juifs, p. 381). Church history shows that even (official) Christianity has not always refrained from lording it over the con- science in matters of detail not included within the scope of the Divine commandments. Closely connected with the value attached to good works was the exclusiveness which distinguished the Pal. Jews of this period. It was no longer their birth only that marked them off from other nations; in virtue of their observance of the Law they occu- pied a position of superiority over ‘sinners of the Gentiles’ (Gal 25), The strength of this feeling is reflected in the jealousy afterwards shown by Jewish Christians towards their brethren of pagan extraction, and in the demand that all such should at least perform the obligations of proselytes. The misapprehension as to the nature of sin on the part of orthodox Judaism led naturally to a wrong view regarding absolution from sin. In this connexion there was apparently no thought of a moral re- newal of the heart. To judge from the attitude of later Rabbinism, it was all a question of calcula- tion. Sin could be atoned for by counterbalancing good works; and if a man’s good deeds exceeded his evil deeds, then he was both morally good, and would stand in the judgment. But evidence is not wanting that in the Judaism of the period room was found for the conception that a soul may reach & point in sin which constitutes a state of moral banishment from God. According to Jubilees (26% $1), Esau committed ‘a sin unto death’ in re- nouncing the yoke of his brother, while 2 (4) Es 7* speaks of ‘works that bring death,’ i.e. for which, on earth at least, there is no forgiveness. With regard to retribution, the Pal. Apocrypha strongly maintain that a holy life will bring happiness, and that the wicked will meet with misfortune and punishment (Sir 35" 281), The writers mostly confine their view to the present life. Tobit joins with Sirach in laying great stress on almsgiving as a means of securing the Divine favour, but only, it would seem, with reference to this life ; though in one passage he speaks of death as more profitable for him than life, and desires to be released from distress that he may ‘go to the
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE
everlasting place’ (3°). Future retribution, how- ever, is also taught (Jth 161”, 2 Mac 74, 2 (4) Es fox)
(2) The moral ideas of the Alexandrian Jews reflect a different and, in one respect at least, more scriptural atmosphere. Moral worth is de- termined, not by the measure of obedience to positive prescription but: by the inner purpose of the heart. The spirit of the Law is not subordi- nated to the letter. Morality is a quality of soul (Wis 14 6), and has its roots in fellowship with God (15°), Wisdom, which has its source in the four cardinal (Platonic) virtues—soberness, under- standing, righteousness, and courage (8’)—corre- sponds somewhat strikingly to what St. Paul desig- nates faith. ‘To be acquainted with thee is perfect righteousness, and to know thy dominion is the root of immortality’ (15%). According to Philo, religious reverence is the source of virtue, and the perfect bee is the disinterested love of the good for its own sake.
But, if the Alexandrian ethics coincides with OT teaching in the place which it assigns to the heart’s intention, it deviates from the scriptural position in virtually setting aside the practice of the Mosaic law. In Wisdom sacrifice is mentioned only inci- dentally, while stress is laid upon the importance of prayer (16%), and upon the word of God as the true nourishment of the soul (1676). Philo expressly teaches that God takes no pleasure in sacrifices, but is pleased only with purity of heart (de Victim. Offer. 3). The virtuous soul is His temple, and its homage the true offering. So far he may be said to anticipate the spirit of Christianity. But in opposing the mechanical morality of the Pal. schools the Alexandrians fell into an unhealthy spiritualism. The writer of Wisdom shows a dis- tinct leaning towards asceticism. In his view the body is the enemy of the soul, upon which it acts as a heavy drag (9"), and celibacy is better than the anxious lot of him whose children are only too likely to be given to wickedness (3% 4). Philo goes still further, and allegorically reduces all the positive precepts of the OT to the one idea of over- coming sense by the life of the spirit. It is the duty of the wise man to loosen the bonds that bind the spirit to the material frame in which it is im- prisoned (de Migrat. Abr. 1). Although the appli- cation of this general principle frequently coincides with OT precepts, it amounts to a rejection of the positive teaching of revelation. That there is no fundamental agreement is shown by the difference between the Philonic and OT conceptions of sin. According to OT revelation, the sinner’s restora- tion may be effected by his penitent return to God ; in Philo’s system there is no healing for the soul that has deliberately sinned. Neither does the Alexandrian theosophist acknowledge any degrees of heinousness in sin, seeing that he attaches no importance to the outward act, but takes account only of the freedom and decision with which the sin is committed. This writer’s ascetic bias is so far corrected by his declaration that the care of the soul and devotion to God should not render us oblivious to our duties towards our fellow-men (de Decal. 22). :