' Complacency,' as the word is commonly used, means a state of being jjleased or prr.atitind, and is synonymous with 'pleasure,' 'gratilii .itinn,' ' s;itis- faction.' The appropriateness of mh li ;i wcid in the department of Biblical theolut^y i^ .sii,:^;.;estrd by what we know to be its recognized use in the sphere of ethics. Complacency, as a mental state, arises when there is perceived in the object con- templated some quality or qualities which call fortli a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction. The object may be something without, upon wliich the mind can rest with pleasure, or it may be in the mind itself, when, in seasons of reflexion, thought turned inwards upon itself is in a condition of perfect harmony, finding in itself no jarring ele- ment. The mind or soul is self-complacent when it is at peace with itself, satisfied that all is as it ought to be, no disturbing or self-accusing thoughts arising. Again, the mind is said to regard with complacency any outward object, animate or in- animate, which suggests thoughts of order and beauty, as when it is affected with pleasure or contentment by the contemplation of the beauty of nature, of a fair landscape, or of the harmony of earth and sky. The word applies also to rela- tions between intelligent beings, as between friends, between husband and wife, parent and child, brothers and sisters, when one is satisfied with the character, or state of health, or conduct, or prosperity of the object of his affection or interest. Complacency arises in the mind wlien one's efibrts in any direction are successful, and the object aimed at is attained. The artist, or the composer in prose, poetry, or music, regards his work with complacency when he has succeeded in giving ade- qua,te expression to his ideas, the workman when he is successful in his workmanship, the merchant or tradesman when his enterprise accomplishes the end at which he aims, the philanthropist when his ettorts for the material or moral or spiritual well- beinf' of the objects of his interest are rewarded, and lie sees tlie fruits of his labours in the happi- ness and the gratitude of his fellows.
In ethics, complacency is considered as one of the forms of love, and as such is distinguished from benevolence. 'The distinction is well put by Kdwards in his 'Dissertation concerning the Mature of True Virtw' {Works, ed. London, 1834, vol. 1. pp. 123-125) :
• Love is commonly distinguished into love of benevolence and love of complacence. Love ot benmoleme is that affection or propensity of the heart to any being which causes it to
; to its wellbeing, or disposes it to desire and take pleasure
happiness. And if I mistake not, it is agreeable to the
an opinion that beauty in the object is not always the
)und of this propensity, but that there may be a disposition
the welfare of those that are not considered as beautiful,
less mere existence be accounted a beauty. And benevolence
be the ground both of their existence and of their beauty, rather than the foundation ot God's benevolence ; as it is supposed that it is God's goodness which moved Him to give them both being and beauty. So that, if all virtue primarily consists in that affection of heart to being which is exercised in benevolence, or an inclination to its good, then God's virtue is so extended as to include a propensity not only to being actu- ally existing, and actually beautiful, but to possible being, so as to incline Him to give a being beauty and happiness.
' What is commonly called love of cotnplacence, presupposes beauty. For it is no other than delight in beauty, or com- placence in the person or being beloved for his beauty. . . . When any one under the influence of general benevolence sees another being possessed of the like general benevolence, this attaches his heart to hinn and draws forth greater love to him than merely his having existence ; because so far as the being beloved has love to the being in general, so tar his own being is, as it were, enlarged, extends to, and in some sort comprehends, being in general, and therefore he that is governed by love to being in general must of necessity have complacence in him, and the greater degree of benevolence to him, as it were out of gratitude to him for his love to general existence, that his own heart is extended and united to, and so looks on its interest as its own. It is because his heart is thus united to being in general that he looks on a benevolent propensity to being in general, wherever he sees it, as the beauty ot the being in whom It is ; an excellency that renders him worthy of esteem, com- placence, and the greater goodwill. . . . This spiritual beauty, which is but a secondary ground ot virtuous benevolence, is the ground, not only of benevolence but complacence, and is the primary ground ot the latter ; that is, when the complacence is truly virtuous. Love to us in particular, and kindness received, may be a secondary ground, but this is the primary objective foundation of it. . . . He that has true virtue, consisting in benevolence to being in general and in benevolence to virtiiolts being, must necessarily have a supreme love to God, both of benevolence and complacence.'