DESIRE
449.
necessary to atiirm. to man are not lim sents to him. W'i are included not o: to perceptiiin, l)ul, ; formed by Iniin 'n aoliieveineiil oi l he the imagin.-Uidii, ;u are not merely wl
luid i«nvniU'il l.y tlie life, ii'lloxicin of iiiuii. Objects jiresented to the senses, but what is presented to man as constituted by the experience of the race, by the education of the individual, by the results of art, science, poetry,
philosophy, and theology, — in short, by all the wide interest with which man has invested the world of his experience. Appetites have their re- spective objects, though even the appetite of a rational being has something which transcends sense, and even into apjietite may enter that ele- ment of infinity with which a rational being invests all his objects.
Coming more closely to the subject, we take a description of Desire from Professor Mackenzie : ' In the case of what is strictly called desire, there is not merely the consciousivss of an object, with an accompanying feeling of ]ilcii irr -iinl pain, but also a recognition of tiii^ i.l,|..i ;i-: :i, ^dod, or as an element in a more or 1.--. rlr.uh .Iclined end' {Manual of Ethics-', p. 4li). Tluce ukMiients appear in this description. There is, lirst, the conscious- ness of an object ; there is, second, the feeling of pleasure and of pain ; and there is, third, the recog- nition of the object as a good, or as an element in a delined end. If all these elements are involved in Desire, then Desire can be experienced only by beings who li\'e a rellcctive life. They must be conMicmslwini;s ; they must have the consciousness of .111 ol.jiMl, 1111(1 b(^ alile to associate that object wilh |ilr.isiirr ;inil pain ; and they must be able to rcllec't on (lie <i!)ject, and judge it to be a good, or an element in a defined end. It may be well to have a term the meaning of which is such as has been defined by Professor Mackenzie ; but is Desire such a term? " Is it so in the ordinary use of lan- guage, or is it so in the accepted use of psycho- logical writers ? What of those writers who define the gotxl in terms of pleasure and of pain ? If we were to accept the definition of the term Desire as it is set forth by Professor Mackenzie, we should be constrained to say that the presence of Desire always involves the action of reflective judgment, the presence of ideas or trains of ideas to conscious- ness, and a comparison of possible processes which might lead to the acconijilislnnent of a wished-for end. As a consequence, wesliould be compelled to shut out from the region of Doiir iiol only all the lower forms of life, but al-ci .ill ili.i^' people who do not live a reflective lile. Ii ■• > m . i In n, I li:il the definition of Desire .ui\en l.y I'loie.sor Mac- kenzie is an ideal one. It descrilies Desire as it is felt by a fully developed, reflective consciousness, a consciousness in possession of trains of ideas, and of the world as built up of such mental attain- ments and experiences. Along tlie whole course of mental growth, from the first beginnings of conscious life up to the complete attainment of self-mastery. Desire may be considered to be pre- sent, and to aftbrd a ground of action. As a defini- tion of life must include all living things, so a definition of Desire must include every feeling which in common language can lay claim to be a desire. There is an element of desire in every case in which there is subjective selection, or rejection of one object and the preference of another. In The simplest mental experienee, oven in those in
si (ll.
ron-
le :n .,hl:ill.e ot pam Or e, 1 here is I he germ of esiilt. ill iileasure attract
attention. Movements which procure the removal of pain, and become inseparably associated with that result, are elements in the making of a world, and that world grows into the world of Desire. It may be that reactions against the environment correspond to stages in the growth of mind, so that we might properly ascribe Desire to movements for the attainment of objects of which the organism is aware through the senses ; but it is not neces- sary for us to enter into the discussion of that topic. As Dr. Ward says, ' Provided the cravings of appetite are felt, any signs of the presence of pleasurable objects prompt to movements for their enjoyment or appropriation. In these last cases we have action determined by perceptions. The cases in which the subject is incited to action by ideas as distinct from perceptions, require a more detailed consideration ; such are the facts mainly covered by the term "desire"' (art. 'Psychology,' Enci/c. Jji-it." vol. XX. p. 73 f.).
Without entering on the question as to whether action can be determined by perceptions, or the further question as to whether there can be per- ceptions apart from something like ideation, we are disposed to contend that where there is aware- ness of an object, and a movement towards the appropriation of it, there must be the rudiments of Desire. It is not necessary, however, to discuss the matter, for it is not to be questioned that by ideas, and trains of ideas, and ideas, as Ih'. Wardf points out, ' sufficiently self-sustaining to form trains that are not wholly shaped by the circumstances of the present — entirely new possibilities of action are opened np ' (p. 74). Ideas anil trains of ideas form elements in shaping a world of desire. It is not possible to mark ott' the area where these properly begin, any more than we can delimit the sphere of intellection, and say where it begins. But for our purpose it is sufficient that the presence of reflective thought does mark a terminus ; on one side there is mental action of a simpler sort, and on the other side the fulness of a reflective life. But apparently there is desire on both sides.