But among the ancients the Stoics, and in modern times Kant, have judged difterently. They ex- clude the emotions, and measure moral worth by the degree to which duty, and duty alone, is the motive of action. No man is good unless he obeys the law, simply' bfiau^c it is the law. Duty for duty's sake is th^-ir watrhword. 'The sage,' says Seneca.t 'will sucd.ur, will do good, for he is born to assist his iVllnw, to labour for the welfare of mankind ; but he will feel no pity. ... It is only diseased eyes that grow moist in beholding tears in other eyes, as it is no true sympathy, but only weakness of nerves, that leads some to laugh when others laugh, or to yawn when others yawn.' ICantt argues in a similar way, but with greater depth and sincerity, that philanthropic action has true moral worth only if done by a man whose temijerament is cold and indifferent to the suft'er- ings of others, not from inclination, but from duty, simply because he respects the law under which he stands. Further, the moral judgment is directed not to what is done, but to what the a^ent in- tended to do, to what he has willed and taken every means in his power to bring about. But even this needs qualihcation. Kant holds that we must leave out of account the content of what is willed, and simply inquire whether the law is
♦ The word ' dul.v ' occurs onl.v once in the Gospels, when Jesus describes as unprofitable servants those who have only done what it was their duty to do (Lk IT'O). The word in the orig. is e9ii\cu, a verb which is twice used in Jn (131* 197) to express the idea of tuiu'titn^ss or moral obli^tion (EV 'ougrht'),
morr ns;i;Ti-n-;'-- : - ' >■■ -• For examplcs of this use of
iu Ml II" i-n, ,u \ I, M,3 see Mt 2323 2527, Lk 121:1
Isi I t I I < ti ^f? and c^£|Aai see Crenier
""'J S,"n. ,. -■. ' :. ' -I Jnll»5.
DUTY
obeyed just because it is the law. And so we reach the bare conception of duty for duty's sake, and tiiid the moral law reduced to the mere form of universality. The ttesli and blood of goodness have vanished, and we are left with the spectre of a law characterized only by the admission of no exceptions.
But no one can rest satisfied with an abstrac- tion. Kant, therefore, restores content to the idea of duty by throwing into the form of Law Universal the various kinds of action which Society enjoins or forbids. Thus we receive a code of moral laws, each demanding unconditional obedi- ence. But this is not always possible. Conflicts of ' duties ' Avill from time to time appear, not in the sense that Duty issues conflicting commands (for under any given circumstances only one action can be right), but in the sense that one of two twrnuil lines of conduct must overcome and contra- dict the other. Thus arise the jiroblems that have cxcniscil rasuists and made real tragedies. Am I til irtii-i- .iih.a- to kill my fellow-men or to defend my ...iiiiti \ .' Am I to tell a lie, or to become the a(Vi.iii|ili..-, Iiuwever imwilling, in the murder of my trieiul ? * Such problems are inevitable and insoluble, if we conceive duty as a group of co- ordinate and absolute laws of action. Conflicts must ensue in the ajiplication of such laws, once the ideal systiMii .ji Jiiuial relations on which they are based laiK to rcrnsi.ond point for pohit with the actual system in \\liicli they claim realization. But the woild is full uf imperfection and sin, and every man has sinned and is weak. Consequently the only possible choice may often lie between two lines of conduct, both of which are ideally wrong.
Moreover, if the moral ideal is expressed as a code of rules of action, morality tends to become no more than the rigid observance of ceremonies that characterized the Pharisee. Life hardens into conventionality, if the emphasis is laid on doing rather than on being. We do not deny that char- acter must express itself in action ; that charity without works is a contradiction ; that the good will cannot be formed save by doing good. But deeds are particular, and relative to time and place ; and an ethical code which prescribes or forbids particular acts not only loses touch with real life, but diverts the attention from the si)irit to the letter. In the same way the institutions by which a man's station and duties are determined tend also to become rigid and conventional.
Now Jesus Christ did not promulgate a new code of morals ; nor did He do more tiian lay the foundations of a new -society. Had He instituted a definite social, political, or ecclesiastical order, or prescribed a .scheme of duties for His followers, the gospel would have possessed for Ethics only an historical interest, instead of aflbrding, as it does, jjrinciples by which we may criticise every action and reform every institution. The words and works of Jesus are a well of living water, from which all men of whatever time or nation may drink. We do not disparage organizations and codes of duty. They are essential to the realization of any human icleal ; and it is the part of practical Christianity to work out the gospel in a moral, social, and religious order, appropriate to the needs of each generation. In order to use ideas we must crystallize them ; but in the process they become half-truths. The life of Jesus alone abides as the truth, reflected and refracted on the broken surface of the river of time.