420
FOUR
FREEDOM OF THE WILL
The Candle of the Lord, 1S92, pp. 6S, 69 ; S. A. Cook, The Foundations of Religion, in The People's Books ; J. Alcorn, The Sure Foundation, 1893, p. 3; W. E. Cha.Awick., Social Rdation- ships in the Light of Christianity, 1910, p. 154.
W. M. Gkaxt. FOUR.— See Numbers.
FRANKINCENSE (X/Soj/os).— Frankincense, which is mentioned (Itev 18'^) as part of the vast merchan- dise of Imperial Rome, is a gum-resin yielded by- certain species of trees of the genus Boswellia. In ancient times the most famous of these grew in Hadramant, S. Arabia. To obtain the frankin- cense a deep incision is made in the trunk of the tree, and below the incision a narrow strip of bark is peeled off. As the Heb. n:2^ (from which the Gr. is derived) signities, the resin exudes as a milk- like juice (spuma pinguis, Pliny, xii. 14), which in about three months attains the necessary degree of consist encj''. Frankincense was sold in semi- opaque, round, or ovate tears or irregular lumps, which were covered with a white dust as the result of their friction against one another. It was valued for its sweet odour when burned, and it often served for illumination in place of oil lamps. As it was one of the ingredients of incense, great quantities of it were required for the sacrilieial ritual. As a per- fume it was used for the care of the body and for the flavouring of wine. It was also in high i-epute as a medicine. James StKxVHAX.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL.— 1. Introduction.—
Properly speaking, the phrase ' the freedom of the will ' is a misnomer. As Locke pointed out, the question is not whether the will is free, but whether man is free. Either the will is in the same psycho- logical category as the desires, in which case it is obviously limited by a man's mental universe and his powers of concentration, or it is identical with the man's self. It is quite evident that a man is mt determined always by external force, and that neither others nor he himself can always predict what he will do. But this alone does not make him free. On the other hand, set any two men among the same alternatives, and their attitude will be different ; in each case it Avill be conditioned by education, tastes, habits, range of perceptions — in fact, by the whole previous life, by all that goes to make up what we call character. Yet the consciousness of freedom persists ; we feel that between given alternatives we have the power of effective choice. Hence, the antinomy has often been solved by the word ' self-determination ' ; but this only moves the difficulty further back. What of the self which determines ? Is that dis- tinct from the other self t If so, what is its rela- tion to environment and character? And if not, how can anything be the agent of its own deter- mination?
The interest of the question is great, but it is .'speculative or else merelj' juristic ; that is, what- ever the answer may be, men will continue to form their own ends and pursue them, and to ' weight the alternative' in trying to inlhience the conduct of others. It is not determinism, but fatalism, M'hich has any power to influence conduct, and fatalism is something entirely different. The only result of determinism in practical life is in the formation of judgments with regard to personal responsibility and the infliction of punishment. Punishment would become, what it is indeed at present often held to be, non-retributive ; it would be only disciplinary and deterrent. But this too would leave a man's way of conducting his o\vn life untouched.
The theoretical problem is hardly noticed in the NT. The interest of the NT writers is predomin- antly y)ractical. All that does not directly or indirectly affect a man's relation to his universe is
ignored. At tlie same time, the intellectual world of the NT is identical with that of the OT, but invaded and fertilized by the conceptions of the Incarnation and Redemption of Christ. For the thought of the OT, the problem of freedom did not exist. Not only were there no practical considera- tions to call attention to it ; it was excluded by the heartiness with which the Hebrew mind ac- cei)ted the two convictions of the responsibility of man and the omnipotence of God. Even for Ezekiel, mIio came nearest to realizing the anti- nomy, the problem was one of individuafand social responsibility rather than of freedom and necessity (see 14,18, 33). On the other hand, God can always intervene, though man may still be answerable (1 K 22"'-, Am 3«, 2 S 24i, compared with 1 Ch 21i).
2. The attitude in Acts. — Tlie same ingenuous yet serviceable attitude (to pass over instances in the Gospels) is found in the Acts of the Apostles. While actions are regularly spoken of (as in all normal literature) as originated by their agents, yet new powers, unattainable otherwise, are be- stowed by the Spirit {e.g. 2*), whose coming, how- ever, may be hastened or caused by prayer (8^'^). Men may be frustrated in some purpose by the Spirit of Jesus (16'^), constrained by the Word (18^), or bound in the spirit (20--). So, too, they may act in ignorance (3^^) ; or sin may even be the re- sult of Satan's ' filling their heart ' (5*, but contrast v."). But this interference with normal powers of choice is neither felt to limit man's freedom, nor does it affect the writer's faith therein. The con- ception of some Divine power as temporarily dis- placing a man's control over his speech or thought was by no means strange to the Hebrews, or to the Greeks and Romans, wlio had not learnt to think in terms of the sub-conscious ; and Mhen we, for- getting or improving on our philosophy, say ' he was not himself,' they would have said ' God, or some evil spirit, entered into him' (1 S 16'''; cf. Verg. ^n. vi. 77 tt'. ). But while cases of more or less permanent possession by demons were familiar, the entrance of the Spirit of God was felt chiefly on special occasions (Ac lO'^'''- ; cf. 4** 6^).