We find the same large use of the word C77c6vnia in Plato. Generally with him it means ' appetite ' in the narrow sense — the motive element in the lowest part of man — yet he uses it also of the other higher departments of the personality. Even the rational soul has its high and lofty desires {Hep., bks. iv. and ix.).
{b) When the word is used without an object it
generally refers to evil longings (cf. Ro V 13^ [from Ex 20=^], Ja 4-, 1 Co 10"), not, however, in the re- stricted usage of sexual lust. The moral colouring is as a rule supplied by the context, either by the mention of the object desired, as in Mk 4^^ 1 Co lO*^, which is the ordinary classical usage, or by the mention of the source of the desire (commonly in the NT) or by a descriptive epithet (Col 3=). This transference of moral colouring from the object desired to the subject desiring is significant. It is in harmony with the NT moral standpoint. Here the stress is laid on the inwardness of morality, and the object of moral judgment is the character (Kapola), rather than bare outward actions, or the consequences of actions. In the NT the desire is morally judged according to its origin, i.e. the originative personality as a whole is dealt with rather than the desire per se. The NT is thtis more concerned with change of character than with the reformation by parts of the individual.
'Scripture and reason alike require that we should turn entirely to God, that we should obey the whole law. And hard as this may seem at first, there isa witness within us which pleads that it is possible. . . . "Easier to change many things than one," is the common saying. Easier, we may add, in religion and morality to change the whole than the part. . . . Many a person will tease himself by counting minutes and providing small rules for his life who would have found the task an easier and a nobler one had he viewed it in its whole extent and gone to God in a "large and liberal" spirit to offer up his lire to Him' (B. Jowett, Interpretation of Scripture and other Essays, London, n.d., p. 321).
The NT, however, does not hesitate to pass judg- ment on desires j5e?' se and on their consequences. We find sucli expressions as ' the conuption that is in the world through lust ' spoken of (2 P 1*) — where corruption is the consequence of evil desire. We find the phrase 'polluting desires' (2 P 2^"). We find pleasures (ridovai) regarded as a turbulence of the soul (Ja 4^), as if desires destroved the balance of the soul (cf. 1 Ti 6^ 1 P 2", Ro 7^). The NT has no meticulous fear in passing judg- ment on evil desires and on their consequences. It does not take up the immaculate, fastidious attitude of 'virtue for virtue's sake,' but its point of view is the whole personality, and on this is moral judgment for good or evil passed.
(c) Thrice in the NT Ave find the word iwiOvfjJLa translated by 'concupiscence.' This term is a dogmatic one, which has played a large part in theological controversy. It means the natural in- clinations of man before these have passed into overt acts. It is diUerent from consilium, which is the 'deliberata assentio voluntatis' (so Calvin, Institutes, bk. ii. ch. viii. 49). Two questions of importance arise in connexion with this concupis- cence : (i.) What is its origin and nature ? and (ii.) What is its relation to responsibility and redemp- tion ? The Pelagian theologian tends to identify it with man's nature as appetitive and in itself morally neutral. What makes the moral difference is the exercise of the will, and the will is free. It may be that there is weakness in man due to the removal of ' original righteousness ' which Adam had before he sinned, but this removal does not impair human nature and it does not make virtue impossible. To this class of theologians free-will is the important matter. Sin is only conscious sinful actions. This is, generally speaking, the position of Abelard, Arminius, and the Tridentine Council. To Augus- tine and the Reformers, however, this concupiscence was prior to the individual's evil volition and in a sense caused it. Free-will was not sufficient to cope with it. The redemption of man was a radical affair, cleansing tlie whole personality, the will in- cluded. Concupiscence is not simply a defectus (morally indifierent) but an affectus of the soul resulting in a positive ?iwi(^ towards sin in man's nature. The soul as a whole is deflected from its true centre — God. As regards responsibility for
concupiscence, this school distinctly teaches it while the other side denies it. The Reformers did not regard ' desire ' viewed as a part of man's ideal nature as ' evil ' ; but, as a matter of fact, in actual experience the desires are found to be evil.
' All the desires of men we teach to be evil, . . . not in so far as they are natural, but because they are inordinate, and they are inordinate because they flow from a corrupt nature' (Calvin, luMtutes, bk. iii. ch. iii. 12).