As regards (a), the clause i<j)' <f irdvres ij/j.apToi' cannot mean that all sinned in Adam ('omnes peccarunt, Adanio peccante,' Bengel), either as the physical source or as the moral representa- tive of the race ; for i^' i} most probably means ' because.'
As regards (6), while St. Paul affirms that guilt is not ascribed unless there is transgression of law, as in the case of Adam, yet he asserts that never- theless the same penalty falls on all. For him, therefore, penalty may be racial, while guUt must be personal. This statement, however, is qualilied by his declaration in chs. 1 and 2 of the responsi- bility of the Gentiles as having an inward law. Did he really think of anj' period or nation as having had in this sense no law ?
(2) Inheritance of a sinful disposition. — Unless the analogy with Christ is incomplete, there must- be, however, some connexion between Adam's transgression and the actual sin of all mankind. How does St. Paul conceive that connexion ? It has usually been taken for granted that he teaches that by Adam's transgression human nature was itself infected, and that from him there descends to all men a sinful disposition. But he might mean no more than that sin as an alien power found entrance into the race, and brought each individual under its dominion. He may regard social rather than physical heredity (to apply a modern distinc- tion) as the channel of the transmission and diffusion of sin. In view, however, of his teaching about the ' flesh,' it is more probable that he did regard human nature as corrupted and perverted ; and, in the absence of any other explanation, we seem warranted in assuming that he did connect this fact with the Fall. We must beware, how- ever, of ascribing to him such definite doctrines as those of ' original sin ' and ' total depravity ' ; for
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later thought has probably read into his words more than was clearly present to his own mind.
It cannot be shown that St. Paul rejjarded all men as involved In Adam's jruilt, either because of llieir physical descent from him or of any federal relation to him, even althouijh all men are subject to the penalty of death. He does not explain how t here is liability to the penalty without culitability for the offence ; but he does re^iara mankind as j.Miilty in the first sense, and not guilty (except by personal transy:ression) in the second sense. Later theolojry blurred this distinction in teaching * oriy:nial sin' in both senses. Nor is there any ground for holdinjr that he ascribed to Adam that moral endowment which this tbeolo;,'y ailsigned to him. He does not, as is sometimes maiutuined, represent Adam himself as subject to the flesh in the same way as are his descendants ; for 1 Co 15*^ contrasts not the unfallen Adam with the pre-existent Christ, but the fallen Adam witlt the Risen Christ ; but he does emphasize the voluntary character of Adam's act : it was disobedience (Ro S'*-*). Could he have assigned to it the moral signiflcance he does, had he thought of Adam as in the hopeless and helpless bondage described in 77-23 ? This passage, however, re(>resents that bondage not as directly inherited, but as resultmg in the individual from a moral development, in which sin uses the flesh tobritigit about. Thus he does not teach total depravity as an inheritance.
(d) The penalty of sin. — St. Paul undoubtedly teaches that death is the penalty of sin (Ro5''^). While he includes physical dissolution, death means more for him (6'-'"'-^) ; it has a moral and religious content ; it is judgment and doom ; it is invested with dread and darkness by man's sense of sin (1 Co 15'*). While we cannot in the light of our modern kno'svledge regard physical dissolution, as St. Paul regarded it, as the jienalty of sin (for it appears to us a natural necessity), yet, viewing death in its totality, as he did, we may still main- tain that it is sin that gives it the character of an evil to be dreaded. The connexion between death and sin, St. Paul affirms, is not that of ettect and cause, but of pen.alty and transgression (Ko 5"), or wages .and work (6-^); for he thinks not of a natural sequence, but of a deserved sentence (2'). He approaches our modes of thought more closely, however, in the analogy of sowing and reaping (Gal 6" ; cf. Ja I").
(e) The deliverance from sin. — This is for St. Paul two-fold : it is an annulling of the guilt and removal of the penalty of sin, as well as a destruc- tion of the power of sin. Sin is an act of dis- obedience (Ro 5"), committed against God (!-') and His Law (3™ 7'), which involves personal responsibility (l™), ill desert (13-), and the Divine condemnation (5''- "). This condemnation is e.x- pressed in the penalty of death, which is not, as we have just seen, a natural consequence, but a Divine apiiointment, an expression of God's wrath against sin (Ho l'», Eph 5«, Col 3«). Tlie work of Christ as an act of obedience (Ro 5") reversed this condemnation (8'), and reconciled men with God (5'", 2 Co o'*- '■"'). We shall miss what is central for St. Paul if we ignore this objective atonement of Christ for the race, and confine our regard, as we tend to-day to do, to the subjective influence of Christ in destroying sin's power in the individual.