Everlasting. See Eternal.
Everlasting Gospel. See Evangeliuji jEter-
KCM.
Eves, or Vigils, the nights or evenings before cer- tain holj'days of the Church. In the primitive times, it was the custom for Christians to pass great part of the nights that preceded certain holyda3'S in religious exercises; these, from their being performed in the night-time, were called vigils or watchings. One of the most remarkable in the early Church was the East- er vigil. According to the testimonj' of Lactantlus and Jerome, the early Christians expected the second coming of Christ on this night, and prepared them- selves, by fiisting, pr;jyer, and other spiritual exercises, for that great event. The illuminations ou these vig- ils were often splendid. The night-watchings, in all probability, owed their origin to the necessity under which the primitive Christians lay of meeting b}' night : when the occasion ceased, the custom still con- tinued. These night-meetings came to be much abused. Vigilantius, in the 1th century, strongly inveighed against them on tlie ground of their being injurious to the morals of 3'oung persons. lie was opposed in this view by Jerome. Complaints, however, contin- ued to increase, till at length the custom was abolished. The fasts, however, were retained, keeping the former name of vigils. The Church of England has assigned vigils to several of her festivals, but has prescribed no other observance of them than the reading of the col- lect peculiar to the festival. The holydays which have vigils ma}' be seen in the English Prayer-book, in the table of the vigils, fasts, and days of abstinence to be observed in the year. There are no vigils rec- ognised in the Protestant Episcopal Church, the table of vigils being left out by the revisers. The Method- ist Episcopal Church observes one vigil in the year, the ]Vi itck-niffhf, Dec. ol, in which service is kept up until midnight. — Bingham, Oriff. Eccl. bk. viii, ch. x, § 1 ; xiii, 111, 4 ; Eden, Churchman'' s Diet. s. v.
E'vi (Ileb. Evi', "^IX, desire or dwelling; Sept. 'Evil, Ei'in), one of the five kings (" dukes") of the Mid- ianites (near Sihon) slain bj^ the Israelites in the war arising out of the idolatry of Baal-peor, induced by the suggestion of Balaam (Num. xxxi, 8), and whose lands were afterwards allotted to Kcuben (Josh, xiii, 21). See MiDiAN.
Evidence. I. Evidence is the rendering in the A.y. of "i3D, se'pher, a book (as usually rendei-ed), or writing (q. v.) generally, hence adocument of title, i. q. deed or bill of sale (Jer. xxxii, 10, 11, 14, 44) ; tXty\OQ, , proof (Yieh. xi, 1 ; "reproof," 2 Tim. iii, 16, i. e. con- victim'),
II. Evidence is defined by Blackstone "to signif)- that wliich demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on tlie one side or the other" {Comm. iii, 23). ■ ^'■Intuitive evidence comprehends all first truths, or principles of common sense, as ' every change implies the operation j of a cause ;' axioms in science, as ' things equal to the i
same thing are equal to one another;' and tha evi« dence of consciousness, whether b}' sense, or meinorj', or thought, as when we touch, or remember, or know, or feel anything. Evidence of this kind arises direct- ly from the presence or contemplation of the object, and gives knowledge without Any effort upon our parts. Deductive evidence is distinguished as demon- strative and jirobable. Demonstrative evidence rests upon axioms, or first truths, from which, bj' ratioci- nation, we attain to other truths. It is scientific, and leads to certainty. It admits not of degrees ; and it is impossible to conceive the contrary of the truth which it establishes. Probable evidence has reference, not to necessar}', but contingent truth. It admits of degrees, and is derived from various sources ; c. g. experience, analogy, and testimony" (Fleming, Vocab- ulart) of Philosophij, s. v.).
The Scotch school of metaphj'sics presents the doc- trine of evidence as follows : " The theor}' of evidence was not unknown to Aristotle and the ancient writers, but it is chiefly to the researches of modern logicians, from Bacon downwards, that we are indebted for a complete exposition of it. The grounds on which we believe a statement to be either true or false are term- ed the evidence. These grounds, it is oljvious, may vary in kind as well as in degree. Some truths are capable of being established with imdoubted certainty ; others, again, admit of a proof more or less strong- It is of great importance, therefore, to know by what kind of evidence any fact or statement can be support, ed, and thus we may readily ascertain to what extent our belief in it may be carried. The two great classes into which all kinds of evidence are usually reduced are intuitive and deductive, the former calling for im- mediate and irresistible belief, independent!}' of any process of argumentation whatever ; the latter requir- ing for its proof various consecutive steps of reason- ing. Some writers are in the habit of dividing evi- dence into three classes : intuitive deductive, and demonstrative, and the evidence of testimony. Under intuitive evidence, which commands instant and irre- sistible belief, are generally included, besides those a priori truths which are necessarily involved in an act of consciousness, the eridence of sense, of memor}"-, and of axioms or general principles. It is well, how- ever, to bear in mind thi t consciousness and intuitive evidence are convertible lerms, and that is in no sense entitled to be considered as resting on intuitive evi- dence which is not invoh'^'d in an act of consciousness. This view of the subject tio doubt limits the number of intuitive, and therefore dogmatically certain truths ; sufficient, however, remains to establish a sure foun- dation for all future reasor'ngs of every kind. And this is all that ought to be desired. Those truths only are entitled to be ranked as 'nti'.itions which we can- not deny without involving Ou'-selves in an obvious contradiction. What is essentially necessary to the operation of our intellectual and moral nature is intu- itive. We cannot think, for example, without being subjected to tiic influence of the evidence of conscious- ness. To these, then, in so far as man is concerned, dogmatical certainty belongs. He cannot doiilit their truth without disclaiming the nature with which he has been endowed. The evidence of intuition, or con- sciousness, is certain in itself, but from its truths no other trutlis can be deduced. Hence the distinction drawn between this and all the other species of evi- dence, which are classed under one head, termed de- ductive. Deductive evidence, or that wliich is chiefly available in the evolution of unknown from known truths, is usually distinguished into two kinds, demon- strative and moral, or probable evidence, giving rise to a corresponding distinction in modes of reasoning. It is of great importance that the difference between demonstrative and probable evidence be kept constant- ly in view, that we may be prevented from confound- ing two species of truth so completely distinct from