pect of final accordance ; if there is not, the antipathies are ineradicable and immedicable.
The conditions under which the question presents itself are thus, the determination of the nature of the contending parties ; the detection of any agreement in their intrinsic character ; and the discernment of the causes of their opposition and diverse procedure. It becomes expedient, therefore, to ascertain the peculiar character and functions of faith and science respect- ively. This cannot be accomplished by any mode of mere logical division and definition, because faith' re- sides in our spiritual susceptibilities, and is incapable of verbal circumscription ; and because science admits of no immutable boundaries, but "grows forever and forever." But the character of each maj' be sufficient- ly described to permit the contradistinction of the two, to exhibit their contrasts, and to disclose any harmony that may exist between them.
Science is precise, definite, systematic knowledge, attained and co-ordinated by the application of human reasoning to admitted facts or observed phenomena. The conclusions of science are reached and are con- nected together bj' the discovery of the general prin- ciples which regulate the occurrence of the phenomena and reveal the conditions of then- occurrence. These principles are established b}' the employment of the two processes of deduction and induction; and science is the determination by the arts of reasoning of such knowledge as is apprehensible by the logical faculties of the human mind. The conclusions attained are more or less firmly believed according to the sufficien- cy or insufficiency of the reasoning ; but, when firmly established, are believed on the strength of the evi- dence, and cannot be doubted except by rememljering the finite power and comprehension, and consequent fallibility of the reasoning mind itself. This limita- tion, though properly — naj', inevitably overlooked in the constitution and acceptance of scientific truth, can- not be safely disregarded in the estimation of the va- lidity and certainty of scientific procedure.
Faith is something more than rational belief — some- thing more firm and assured than scientific or phil- osophic conviction. Conviction is produced bj' the strength of the arguments adduced — by the influence of the demonstration or other evidence on the under- standing. Faith goes far beyond this, both in the as- surance convej-ed, and in the disproportion between the testimony and Avhat is accepted on that testimony'. "Seeing is believing," but he who "walks by faith" "walks not hj sight." We believe in the results of science ; we have faith in the truths of revelation. We believe that the earth is round ; we have faith in the existence of God, and in the immortality of the soul. Conviction questions and scrutinizes ; faitli confides, and does not cavil. The belief which is founded upon reasoning ponders the arguments propounded, the ev- idence presented; faith is itself " the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." This distinction ma}' not be acceptable to persons of loose habits of thought, who employ words without dis- criminating their delicate shades of meaning; but it seems to be required by more than one passage of the New Testament, and is fully sustained bv the most acute, profound, and sagacious of the schoolmen, Thom- as Aquinas (Smnma Theologite, 2, a, qu. ii, art. x ; qu. iv, art. i). It is of the essence of faith to transcend the logical evidence, to accept more than is contained in any logical premises, and to hold the tenet thus re- tained with a more earnest tenacity than any demon- stration or generalization can produce. Not that faith is independent of evidence or testimony ; but the co- gency of such proof is not intrinsic or indisputable in itself, but is derived from its acceptance, and from the submissive adherence of the recipient. It is "the Spir- it of truth" which "will guide you into all truth." This exposition may seem applicable only to religious faith, or to faith in supernatural truth ; but it is with
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faith of this kind that the controversy on the part of science is maintained. It is tlierefore in tiiis domain that tile essence of faith is to be specially considered. Nevertheless, a little reflection and examination will show that all faith possesses the same general charac- teristics. The faitli which we repose in another simi- larly transcends, and usually precedes the evidence
The true doctrine with respect to the foundations of scientific procedure is laid down by Aristotle in the close of the Posterior Anulijtics. "It is evident," says he, "that, as demonstration is not the beginning of demonstration, so neither is science the first princi- ple of science." Nearly' six centuries later, Proclus similarly declares in his Theological Institutes that
the f.ulh wliicli we hold in regard to the regular order i "intuition is the principle and first cause of knowl-
of nature is manifested -witiiout thouglit of the argu- ments by which tliat order is proved ; the faith which we entertain in the necessity and generally beneficent action of government is wholly irresjiective of our opinions in relation to its particular measures. See Faith.
Thus widely contrasted, then, are the characteristics of faith and science. The former is out of all propor- tion to the proof addressed to the reasoning faculties ; the other is strictly limited by the proof. The one is an adhesion of our whole spiritual nature, undoubting, and unvisited by any anxious concern ; the other is simply the acquiescence of the understanding, which may be dispelled by further discoveries. The one may be resisted, the other cannot be denied; the one is of voluntary acceptance, the other of compulsorj' belief. The being of God may be denied ; the validity of a demonstration of Euclid cannot be gainsaid, if the terms and the logical process are apprehended.