although there can be no form without matter, yet as it is the form which makes the thing what it is, the wordyJwwi came to signif}' essence or nature" (Flem- ing, s. v.). The Scholastics distinguished form sub- stantial from form accidental. Substantial form they defined as actus primarius una cum materia cmstituens unum per se ; accidental form as actus serondarius con- stituting a unit jier accidtns. The unit of being com- posed of soul and bod}' was defined to be of the for- mer sort. Form, according to the ancient definition, is therefore necessary to matter ; absolutelv formless matter is inconceivable. Lord Bacon {Nov. Organ, ii, 17, says: "When wc speak ot forms, we understand nothing more than the laws and modes of action which regulate and constitute an}' simple nature, such as heat, light, weight, in all kinds of matter susceiitible of them ; so thatthe/jrm of heat, or the form of light, and the laiv of heat, and the law of light, are the same thing." Also (\ov. Organ, ii, 13), "The/orm of a thing is the very tiling itself, and the thing no otherwise dif- fers fi-oni the form than as the apparent differs from the existent, the outward from the inward, or that which is considered in relation to man from that which is considered in relation to the universe."
"The sense attached at the present day to the words form and matter is somewhat different from, though closely related to, these. TIhe form is what the mind impresses upon its perceptions of objects, which are the matter ; form therefore means mode of vietving ob- jects that are presented to the mind. AVhen the at- tention is directed to any object, we do not see the ob- ject itself, but contemplate it in the light of our own prior conceptions. A rich man, for example, is re- garded by the poor and ignorant under the form of a very fortunate person, able to purchase luxuries which are above tlieir own reach ; by the religious mind un- der the form of a person witli more than ordinary temptations to contend with ; by the political econo- mist under that of an example of the unequal distri- bution of wealth; by the tradesman under that of one w!iose patronage is valuable. Now the object is re- ally the same to all these observers ; the same rich man has been represented under all these different forms. And the reason that the observers are able to find many in one is that they connect him severally with their own prior conceptions. The forin, then, in this view, is mode of knowing, and the matter is the percejition or olject we have to know" (Thomson, Out- line of Laws of Thought , p. 3-1). Sir W. Hamilton calls the theorj' of substantial forms "the theory of quali- ties viewed as entities conjoined with, and not as mere dispositions or modilications of matter" (Hamilton's edition of Reid's WojIs, p. 827).
Dr. M'Cosh remarks, on the distinction between form and matter, that " this phraseology was intro- duced by Aristotle, who represented everything as having in itself both matter (i'A/;) and form (fu"~o(). It had a new signification given to it bj' Kant, who supposes that the mind supplies from its own furni- ture a form to impose on the matter presented from without. The form thus con-esponds to the a priori element, and the matter to the a piostenori. But the view thus given of the relation in which the knowing mind stands to the known object is altogether a mis- tixken one. It supposes that the mind in cognition adds an element from its own resources, whereas it is simply so constituted as to know what is in the object. This doctrine needs onlj' to be carried out consequen- tially to sap tlio foundations of all knowledge ; for if the mind may contribute from its own stores one ele- ment, why not another? whj' not all the elements? In fact, Kant did, by this distinction, open the way to all those later speculations which represent the whole universe of being as an ideal construction. There can, I think, be no impropriety in speaking of the original principles of the mind as forms or rules, but they are forms merely, as are the rules of grammar,
FORM OF CONCORD
G23
FORMS OF PRAYER
which do not add anything to correct speaking and writing, but arc merely the expression of tlie laws which the}' follow. As to the word 'matter,' it has either no meaning in such an application, or a mean- in"- of a misleading character" (^Intuitions of the Mind, N. Y. 18G6, p. 308). Formal, in philosophj', is that which relates to the form, as opposed to material, or that which relates to the matter. So formal logic gives the theorj' of reasoning as grounded in the laws of thought, without reference to the suljjcct-matter to which reasoning may be applied. — Fleming, Vocuhula- ry of Philosophy, s. v. ; Krug, Ilandwovt. der philosoph. Wissenschriftcn, ii, 5(5.
Form of Concord. See Concocd, vol. ii, p. 453.
Formatae. See Liter.e Format.e.
Formosiis I, Pope (891-896), was bishop of Porto, and was sent by Nicholas I in 866 as legate to Bulga- ria (q. v.), and would have been made archbishop there but that the canons (at that time) forbade trans- fers from one see to another. In the time of pope Joha VIII he was condemned on a charge of conspir- acy against Charles the Bald and the po])e (Hefele, Conciliengeschichte, iv, 496), A.D. 876. He was de- prived of his episcopacy, and of all rights except lay communion. Pope Martin V restored him to his see in 883. Formosus was elected pope Sept. 21, 891, and was the first instance in tha West of a bishop trans- ferred from one sea to another. Soon after his elec- tion, legates sent by the emperor Leo and the Eastern bishops arrived in Rome to obtain a confirmation of the ordinations of Photius (q. v), but Formosus would not grant the request, and the East and West were still farther alienated. In 893 he took sides political- ly with t'harles the Simple against Odo. On the death of Guido, 894, Formosus invitsd Arnulf to Rome, and crowned him emperor, 895. Formosus died on Easter day, 896. Pope Stephen VI caused the dead body of Formosus to be taken up and l)rought into a synod at Rome, condemned as guilt}' of intrusion into the holy see, and treated with gross indignit}'. Ste- phen declared all the acts of Formosus null and void. His ''character" was restored by pope John IX, A.D. 898. — Bower, Lives of the Popes, v, 71-73 ; Baronius, Annales, A.D. 891-896.