CLK.
Indictio Paschalis. It was an old custom in the Christian Ciuirch of the early ages to announce on Ejiiijliany (q. v.) the days on which Easter would fall, and this announcement was called the Indictio pascha- lis ; but as on the appointment of the days on which Easter should be observed depended the appointment of the movable feasts, this announcement was called the Jndiii(i) /'(s/onnii mobilium. The first practices of this kind we liiid in the Alexandrian Church, but it soon becanii' gt inral tliniughout the Christian Cliurcli, even by ecclesiastical enactments. Thus the fourth Synod at Orleans {Concil. A urelian. iv, c. 1) ordered its observ- ance, and even the fifth Synod at Carthage (A.D. 401, Concil. Curthag. v, can. 7) ordered a written announce- ment, wliich was called Jipistola paschalis et heortustica. See Vnw'j^ham, Antiquit. Ecclesiast. ix, 85 sq. ; Augusti, Ilandbiich der Christl. A rchdol. i, 544; Kiddle, Christiun A ntiqu ities, p. G87. (J. H. W.)
Indifference, Liberty of, a name sometimes giv- en, by metaphysical and theological writers, to the pow- er in the human mind of choosing between opposing motives, or of resisting or yielding to a given motive. The uidiolders of fatalism consider this " liberty of in- difference" as a chimera. If we were indifferent, say they, to the motives which determine our actions, we should either not act at all, or we should act without motive, at hazard, and our actions would be effects with- out cause. But this is intentionally confounding indif- ference and insensibility. We are necessarily sensible to a motive when that motive induces us to act, but the question at issue is whether there is a necessary con- nection between such a motive and such volition ; that is, whether, when such a motive induces us to will any- thing, we can or cannot will the contrary in spite of that motive, or whether we cannot prefer another mo- tive to that by which we determine to act. As soon as it is supposed that we act from a motive, it cannot be supposed that this motive does not determine us to act, for the two suppositions would contradict each other : but it may be asked whether, before any supposition, our win was connected with the motive in such a manner as to render a contrary volition impossible. The advo- cates of moral libertj' maintain that there is no physical or necessary connection between motives and volition, but only a moral connection, which does not prevent our resisting; in other words, that motives are the moral, not the physical causes of our actions. Because we are said to be determined by a motive, it does not follow that that motive acts, and we remain passive ; it is absurd to suppose that an active faculty like volition could be- come passive under the influence of a motive, or that this 'motive, which after all is but an idea, a thought, could act upon us as we act upon a body we put in mo- tion. This metaphysical question is intimately con- nected with another long discussed by theologians, namely, the mode of action of grace on us, and in what sense grace is to be understood as being the cause of IV.-N N
our actions. Those who consider it as their physical riiiise must, to be consistent, suppose the same relation between grace and the action to which it led as between any iihysical cause and its effect. As, according to nat- ural pliilosopliy, the relation in the latter case is a nec- essary one. ^^ (■ cannot perceive how the action produced under the inlhicnce of grace can be free. For this rea- son, other theologians look upon grace only as the moral cause of our actions, and admit between this cause and its effects onlj^ a moral coimection, such as exists be- tween all free action and its motive. It is, indeed, God who acts in us through grace, but his operation is so similar to that of nature that we are often unable to distinguish between them. When we perform a good action under the influence of grace^ — a supernatural mo- tive—we feel as active, as free, as well masters of our actions as when doing it from a natural motive, from temperament or interest. Why should we try to be- lieve that God deceives our consciousness, acting upon us as though he left us free, -while in reality he does not? Consciousness testifies to us that we can resist grace as readily as we resist our natural tastes and in- clinations. Thus the testimony of conscience, that we are entirely free under the influence of grace, is com- plete. Let us not forget the saying of St. Augustine, that grace was given us, not to destroy, but to restore our free agency. The Pelagians erred in defining free agency to be indifference towards good and evil ; they imderstood by this an equal inclination to cither, an equal facility for choosing right or wrong (St. Augus- tine, Op. imp. 1. 3, n. 109, 110, 117; Letter of S. I'rospier, n. 4). They concluded from this that if grace destroyed this indifference, it would thereby destroy free agency. St. Augustine correctly affirms, in opposition, that in consetjuence of Adam's sin man is more inclined to evil than to good, and that he needs grace to restore the equilibrium. Those who accused St. Augustine of dis-' regarding free will in maintaining the necessity of grace,