1835, 1842, 8vo); Herzfcld, Chronoloi/ia, etc. (Berol.
1836, 8vo); *BeTtheiiu, ErHdrniif/ [includ. Ruth] (Lpz. 1845, 8vo) ; Bush, Notes (N. York, 1852, 12mo) ; Noble, Sermons (London, 1856, 8vo) ; Cummings, /?eaf/2w,«/.? [in- clud. Josh.] (Lond. 1857, 12mo) ; Rordam, Vers. Si/riaco- hexapl., etc. (Havnise, 1859, 4to) ; Fritzsche, Secunchm Sept., etc. (Turici, 1867, 8vo) ; *Baehmann, Erkldrung (Berlin, 1867-70, vol. i, 8vo). See Old Tkstajient.
Judghanites. See Judah Judgiian. Judging, Rash, the act of carelessly, precipitately, wantonly, or maliciously censuring others. This is an
evil which abounds too much among almost all classes of men. "Not content with being in the right our- selves, we must find all others in the wrong. We claim an exclusive possession of goodness and wisdom ; and from approving warmly of those who join us, we proceed to condemn, with much acrimony, not only the princi- ples, but the characters of those from whom -we differ. We rashly extend to every individual the severe opinion which we have unwarrantably conceived of a whole body. This man is of a party whose principles we reckon slavish, and therefore his whole sentiments arc corrupted. That man belongs to a religious sect wliich we are accustomed to deem bigoted, and therefore he is incapable of any generous and liberal thouglit. An- other is connected with a sect which we have been taught to account relaxed, and therefore can have no sanctity. We shoidd do well to consider, 1. That this practice of rash judging is absolutely forbidden in the sacred Scriptures (jNIatt. vii, 1). 2. AVe thereby author- ize others to requite us in the same kind. 3. It often evidences our jiride, envy, and bigotry. 4. It argues a want of charity, the distinguishing feature of the Chris- tian religion. 5. They who are most forward in censu- ring others are often most defective themselves." See Barrow's Works, vol, i, ser. 20 ; Blair's Sermons, ser. 10, vol. ii ; Saurin's Sermons, ser. 4, vol. v. — Buck.
Judgment, considered as a technical and scientific term of logic, is an act of the mind by which something is affirmed. In this restricted sense it is one of the sim- plest acts or operations of which we are conscious in the exercise of our rational powers. The intellectual fac- ulty called judgment is the power of determining any- thing to be true or false. In every instance of memory or perception there is involved some judgment, some feeling of relationship, of space, or time, or similarity, or contrast. Consciousness necessarily involves a judg- ment ; and, as every act of mind is an act of conscious- ness, every act of mind consequently involves a judg- ment. It is a process not only subsequent to the acqui-
j sition of knowledge, but " involved as a condition of the acquisitive process itself." There is not only included what is popularly understood as comparison (when the properties of bodies are compared), but that elemen- tary faculty, that fundamental law or innate idea, which, in the first instance, makes us cognizant of the property. Hence Sir William Hamilton's division into derivative and primitive cognitions, the derivative being of our own fabrication, formed from certain rules, and being the tardy result of perception and memon,', of attention,
1 reflection, abstraction. These are derived from expe-
JUDGMENT
1080
JUDGMENT
rience, and, as such, are contingent; and as all expe- rience is contingent, aU the knowledge derived from experience is contingent also. But, as there are condi- tions of the mind which are not contingent, which are necessarj', which we cannot but thinli, which thought supposes as its fundamental condition, these are denom- inated primitive cognitions; these primitive and gen- eral notions being the root of all principles, the founda- tion of the whole edifice of science. For the discovery of this great truth we are indebted to Leibnitz, who, in controverting Locke's view of innate ideas, asserted the existence of a principle of human knowledge indepen- dent of and superior to that which is afforded by rhe senses. Kant,' adopting Leibnitz's view, furnishes a test by which these two elements are distinguished from each "other : the former, being contingent, are fluctu- ating and uncertain ; they may be in the mind, or they may not. Every fresh scene in which we are placed completely alters the sensations, and the particular sen- sational judgments of which we are conscious. On the contrary, our primitive judgments are steady, abiding, unalterable. These primitive j udgments, he asserts, are of two kinds, analytic and synthetic. An analytic j udg- ment is simply a declaration of something necessarily belonging to a given notion, as that every triangle has three sides. A synthetic judgment may be a declara- tion of something which does not actually belong to a notion, but which our minds are led, by some kind of evidence or other, to attribute to it, as " Every event has an efficient cause." Here we do more than analyze the expression : we attribute altogether a fresh notion to it, and form a judgment by which our knowledge is ex- tended. Both these judgments are found in the pure sciences, and form the very principles upon which they are pursued. It may be well to remark, however, that Comte, Herbert Spencer, Mill, etc., following Locke, deny the existence of these primitive judgments alto- gether, even tlie axioms which stand at the head of mathematical reasoning. So far from being mental and subjective, they are truly inductive, derived from ob- servation ; only that observation is so constant, and that iniluction is so easy and immediate, tliat we fall easily into an impression that these laws are intuitive, where- DA they are, in fact, experimental. For instance, the axioms and postidates which are the basis of Euclid's (icometry are not metaphysical— written on the intel- lect, and drawn out of the brain — they are only state- ments of laws observed and experienced. See Watts, Loyic, ch. iv, p. 231; Locke, On the Umler standing, i, 222, 250; ii, 271, 278; Duncan, Logic, p. 145; Keid, On the InliUcclntd Powers, p. 497, etc. (E. de P.)