MATTER
883
MATTER
of matter into primary and secondarj', and have said that our knowledge of the former, as of impenetrability and extension, is clear and absolute ; while our knowl- edge of the latter, as of sound and smelJ, is obscure and relative. This distinction taken by Des Cartes, adopted by Locke and also by Eeid and Stewart, was rejected by Kant, according to whom, indeed, all our knowledge is relative. Others who do not doubt the objective reality of matter, hold that our knowledge of all its qualities is the same in kind. See the distinctions precisely stated and strenuously upheld by Sir William Hamilton (Heid's WorJc^, note D), and ingeniously controverted by jMons. Emilie Saisset, in Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. art. "Ma- tiere." See Materialism.
The metaphysical historj' of this term, like that of most others, begins with Aristotle ; its theological sig- nificance may be said to begin with the first two verses of Genesis. Three questions of theological as well as philosophical interest grow out of this subject.
I. Popular language, in spite of Berkeley's own appeal to popular opinion, must be admitted to be framed on the hypothesis that matter exists in itself, independently of any mind perceiving it ; and theologians have in general been content to accept popular language on the point, so that the language of theologians represents the popu- lar opinion. But as Berkeley's system does not, when understood, contradict any of the ordinary facts of expe- rience, so the language of theologians, like that of other non-Berkeleyans, does not become meaningless in con- sequence of the sj-stem being accepted. For a system invented or advanced from a theological motive, it af- fects theology singidarly little.
It can hardly be denied, that a belief in the reality of matter, however reality may be defined, is necessary to orthodox Christianity. The narrative of the Creation becomes meaningless, or at least deceptive, if the things created be no more than " permanent possibilities of sensation," things that vjould be perceived, or rather groups of phenomena that would make impressions, ij' there were any minds placed ready to observe them, which there are not; and, to tell the truth, even Berke- ley's system confuses or obscures the notion of creation. The existence of a material substance means, according to him, that some mind or minds are affected with cer- tain sensations, from a cause external to themselves. Now in this there is nothing to conflict with Christian doctrine; when we say that God created all material substances, we shall mean, on this hypothesis, that he is the sole and ultimate cause of the laws, external to cre- ated minds, whereby their consciousness is modified in the various ways which we ascribe to the presence of matter.
So far, then, all is clear. If Berkeley has not j'et given any support to the doctrines of religion, he cer- tainly has not assailed them. But when we come to the part of his theory >vhich was to confute atheism, it is more possible to bring him into collision ^vith that Kevelation which he undertakes to defend. Matter, it is said, exists in virtue of being perceived by a mind : e. g. " my inkstand exists," means " my mind has a group of sensations, simultaneous or successive, which I describe as seeing and feeling a glass inkstand, hearing it ring when struck or thrown down, etc., or otherwise as being conscious of the presence of a hard, smooth, round, hollow body, of a heavy, grayish, transparent sub- stance." But if I go out of the room, I believe that my inkstand still exists, though no longer perceived by me. What do I mean by this, on the idealistic hypothesis? We have rejected the answer, " You mean that you be- lieve that, if you went into the room again, you w-ould again experience the same sensations." In the first place, I do mean more than that, though I am unable to prove that anything more than that is true. And fur- ther, as has been said above, unless the inkstand exists when not seen, how is it true that the Creator caused the flint, sand, alkali, copper and zinc ore, etc., of which it is made, to exist ages before they were discovered
and used, and sustains the manufactured product of his works in being now ?
To these objections the sensationalist has no answer; the Berkeleyan has. " When you say that the inkstand exists in your absence, you mean that when it is not perceived by your mind, it is perceived by some mind or other. Your only notion of existence (except the existence of a mind, a conscious subject) is of existence as the object of consciousness of a mind. If you be- lieve, as you doubtless do, that matter exists absolutely, not only in relation to the finite minds that perceive it, you are bound to admit that there is an infinite mind, which always perceives all matter existent, even what is perceived by no other mind."
Injustice is done to Berkeley by a sensationalist phi- losopher, if he regards the negative part of his system, the denial of an objective substratum to material phe- nomena, as separate from this, its positive part. Berke- ley was a real idealist, not a mutilated or inconsistent sensationalist; and any one who denies an objective substratum to matter, but does not recognise its absolute existence as an object of consciousness to a necessarily existing mind, is not taking half Berkeley's sj'stem and leaving the other half, but framing a new one, suggest- ed, it may be, by Berkeley's, but essentially different from it. His religious pliilosophy was not an amiable excrescence on his metaphysical, but an essential cor- relative to it ; and therefore his system has no sceptical tendency. Neither does it seem fair to charge it with a tendency to pantheism (jMansel's Prolegomena Logica, App. B) ; for God is distinguished adequately, on the one hand, from the created objects, i. e. groups of ideas, which he perceives; on the other, from the created minds which he causes to perceive the sjwiie objects. But it seems doubtful whether the system, sublime as is the picture it gives of the Creator's relation to his universe, does not really, by implication, lower our view of his na- ture and his dealings with it.