See Ueberweg, Hist, of Philnsophj, i, 76 sq., 205 sq. ; Porter, The Human Intellect; McCosh, Intuitions of the Mind; also Christianity and Positivism ; Blackie, Four Phases of Morals, p. 296 sq.
II. In its second form nihilism is a certain theory of the incarnation. In this sense it is also called nihilian- ism. The name was applied to the views of Peter Lombard, contained in his Sententiarum libri quatuor (lib. iii, distinc. 5-7). See Lomhardus. The conception of Lombard is an outgrowth of the fundamental ideas of the Antiochian school, and of the theories of John of Damascus and Abelard. It stands in contrast with the theory of adoption. See Adoptianists. Abelard es- pecially made prominent the idea which underlies the Christology of Lombard, viz. that God is absolutely im- mutable, unchangeable. The proposition which occa- sioned the cliarge of nihilism was: "Christus, secundum quod est homo, non est aliquid." Christ, the Son of God, did not become anything bj-^ the assumption of human nature, because no change can take place in the divine nature ; •' Deus non factus est aliquid." His language was not always clear and definite, and was by some falsely interpreted as affirming that Christ had become nothing. In his view, the divine nature did indeed as- sume the human— that is, it took the human form to itself, but did not bring it into union with itself, so that it became in any intimate and peculiar sense its own. He implies that in the incarnation no human being of body and soul was formed. There was not a production of one nature or of one jierson out of the different elements of body, soul, and divinity, but the Logos simply clothed itself with body and soul as with a garment (indumen-
tum), in order to appear more fittingh^ to the eyes of mortals. Accordingly Christ took the human body and soul into union with himself, not in such a way that they, either separately or themselves in union, became one person with the Logos, or themselves became the Logos, but they were only brought into a relation or connection with the Logos anal(\gous to that of a gar- ment or dress to the person putting it on. The person of the Logos by the assumption of human nature was in no way changed, but remained one and the same. According to this view God became man only by way of occupying a human Ijody, or only in the form he as- sumed, "secundum habitum," as his formula was, which implies that what was assumed was merely adventi- tious, so that without it the person of the Logos would be the same as with it. In the Son's becoming man, his form or fashion (habitus) was found as that of a man, which he really was not in himself and to himself, but only to those human beings to whom he appeared in humanit}'. " Verum hominem suscipiendo," as he says {Dist. vii), " hal)itus inventus est ut homo — id est, ha- bendo hominem inventus est ut homo, non sibi sed eis quibus in homine apparuit." He expressly admits that the Son was not conscious of himself as a man, but was a man only to men. This makes the incarnation only a sort of prolonged theophany, and essentially disinte- grates and breaks the bond of union of divinity and hu- manity. The conception of Peter Lombard is a con- tinuation of the idea of the Antiochian school that the divine and the human are alike or comparable in noth- ing, and hence not in anj' intimate sense capable of union, but must remain exclusive the one of the other. The problem of the union is in reality avoided, and the mode given of the Word becoming flesh is a mere illu- sion. The proposition that God through the incarna- tion became nothing, is in fact nearly equivalent to the assertion that the incarnation attained nothing, estab- lished nothing — that is, was in reality only a theoph- any. This nihilism, it should be noted, is not an ab- solute denial of existence, as that Christ, or the Logos, was nothirtg, or became nothing, but is only a denial of existence in a certain individual form. These views of Lombard aroused much opposition. The phrase, " Deus non factus est aliquid," was rejected by the Council of Tours in 1163. His pupil, John of Corn- wall, opposed his view in his Eidoyimn (ad. Alex. Ill, published 1175). See John of Cornwali,. The Lateran Council of 1179 condemned it, and later Walter of St. Victor especiall}' made it appear that the language of Lombard contained the heresy of nihilism, or that "Deus est nihil secundum quod homo." This so-called nihil- ism, that the incarnation was no new existence of God, was not God becoming man, but was only a new mani- festation to men, with nothing new in God, appears also in the writings of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus.
See Hagenbach, Hist, of Doct. vol. i, § 171; vol. ii, § 179; Gieseler, Dogmeivjeschichte ; Dorner, Geschichted, Lehre von d. Person Christi; Augusti, Dorpnew/esch. p. 300 sq. ; Haag, Hist, des Do<jmes Chret. i, 279 sq. ; 15aur, Dorjmenriesch. vol. ii.
III. The term nihilism is also used to denote the views of a party that has assumed considerable impor- tance in Russia within the last half century, and ^vho call themselves Nihilists. Their nihilism includes a pe- ciUiar philosophical theory in connection with socialist- ic tendencies. It consists of three original elements : the " cosmopolitical" conception, the " political and so- cial" principles, and the " moral" ideas in individual and collective spheres. Their theory of nature and tlu' uni- verse is based upon the two principles of the eternity of matter and the unity of the natural forces. Along with these two, they adhere to a third fundamental principle, that an objective method of investigation is the only way to the attainment of knowledge and truth. Materialism forms the chief philosophical element of this movement. Th£ leaders have borrowed their jihil- osophical doctrines from German materialists, such as