2. The ethical philosophy inculcated by Mr. Finney and his associates of later years is essentially that of the elder Edwards, which makes tlie well-being or blessed- ness of the sentient universe the summum bonum, or ul- timate good ; and the voluntary regard for this good —
respect for all interests according to their value which
is called benevolence, the grand element of all virtue. This benevolence is the love which is the fulfilling of the law — not a mere kindly or amiable feeling, or any emotion whatever, but an attitude of will giving to every apprehended interest its proper place ; a good-will exercised towards every being capable of good, begin- ning with God, the value of whose being is infinite, and coming down to the meanest of his creatures, embracing alike the evil and the good, the just and the unjust. This benevolence is consistent with every natural emo- tion, involving complacency when exercised towards God and other virtuous beings, and displacencj' when exercised towards the wicked, but exhibiting the same essential character — regard for the weU-being of its object.
The faculty by which the primary duty of benevo- lence is apprehended is conscience, and its affirmation, in its own sphere, is inevitable and infallible. Every moral being affirms the duty by the very necessity of his nature; and in reference to primary, subjective duty, the utterance of conscience is forever the same, and always right. A being whose conscience failed in iBiis respect would cease to be a moral being. In all execu- tive action — the carrying out of the benevolent attitude of the will in the performance of relative duties— the judgment must decide what on the whole will tend to promote well-being, or the good ; then conscience follows the judgment, and enjoins the performance of this ap- preliended duty as an expression of benevolence. But the judgment is fallible; and there may be and often is misjudgment on the subject of outward or objective duty, and conscience may thus require us to do what is outwardly wrong. Still we must follow the best judg- ment we can obtain, and the error is a mistake, and not a sin. The moral character is right while the con- science is followed in the maintenance of the benevolent attitude. Blameworthiness can be involved only in a failure in this required ultimate attitude of the will. Hence a moral being always knows his duty — that which is immediately binding upon him ; and meeting this duty he is truly conscientious, and at the same time truly righteous. His mistakes are not sins. They re- quire correction, enlightenment, not forgiveness.
Thus the voluntary attitude called benevolence is the constant clement in all virtuous character, and the source of all virtuous action. It is the root of all the particular virtues, and constitutes the virtuous element in them all. Justice, mercy, obedience, veracity, and the like, become virtues by being expressions of benev- olence under varying conditions, and they cease to be virtues when the benevolence fails. All cUitj' finds its binding force and its limitations in the primary duty of benevolence. In this all duties must forever harmonize. The (hity of benevolence is apprehended intuitively and rationally in connection with the idea of well-being, and can never fail to be duty to every moral being. It is seen to be binding from its own inherent nature, irrespective of all tendency, while all executive action prompted by benevolence is seen to be duty only on condition of its tendency to promote well-being. In this respect the Oberlin view is distinguished from ev- erj' scheme of utilitarianism.
As benevolence is the whole of virtue, so the refusal to be benevolent is the whole of sin, whatever the mo- tive which induces this refusal. These motives are
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always the solicitations of impulse, desire, or passion, which turn the will aside from the requirements of be- nevolence. The sin takes its form from the immediate impulse to which the will subjects itself; but the essence of the sin is the refusal to assume that benevolent atti- tude which reason or conscience requires. The sinner then is not pursuing his own good as his supreme end. He sacrilices duty and his own good alike, in his subjec- tion to an unworthy impulse. He is " carnally minded" — cares for the tlesh or the desires. Benevolence re- quires him to regard his own well-being as well as that of his neighbor, but he sacrifices both in his voluntary subjection to desire. Every moral being, in the exercise of his freedom, stands between the motives which the reason presents, which urge to benevolence — regard for the well-being of God, and of the sentient universe be- cause of its value — and the motives which the desires or impulses present, urging to self-gratitication immediate or more remote, to the neglect of the true good of him- self and of the universe at large, including the Creator. The character and action determined by the motives of the reason are right— they meet obligation; determined by the motives of the flesh — the desires and passions — they are wrong, and are in violation of obligation. The righteousness on the one hand and the sinfulness on the other must lie in the voluntary attitude assumed in the acceptance of one or the other class of motives which address the will ; and this character, right or wrong, remains while the voluntary attitude remains, whether the circumstances admit of outward action or not. Vir- tue or righteousness lies in that primary attitude of benevolence, and virtuous action is the action which springs from benevolence. Sin is in the refusal to be benevolent, and sinful action is the expression of the unbencvolent will in the outward life.