Omnipresence, another attribute of God alone, his ubiquity, or his presence in every place at the same time. This attribute may be argued from his infinity (Psa. oxxxix) ; his power, which is everywhere (Heb. i,3); his providence (Acts xvii, 27, 28), which supplies all. As he is a spirit, he is so omnipresent as not to be mixed with the creature, or divided, part in one place and part in another; nor is he multiplied or extended, but is essentially present everywhere. God is everywhere, but he is not everything. All things have their being in him, but he is distinct from all things ; he fills the universe, but is not mingled with it. He is the intel- ligence which guides, and the power which moves; but his personality is preserved, and he is independent of the works of his hands, however vast and noble. See Krauth, The Conservative Reformation, p. 797 ; Pearson, On the Creeds ; Wardlaw, Syst. Theol. i, 554 ; Haag, Hist, des Dogmes Chretiens, ii, 140 sq., 311 ; Malcom, Theol. Index, s. v. See Pantheism.
Omniscience, the third essential or natural attri- bute of God, is that perfection by which he knows all things. This is: 1. Injinite (Psa. cxlvii, 5); 2. Etei-nal (Isa. xlvi, 10; Acts ii, 23; xv, 18; Ephes. i, 4) ; 3. Uni- versal, extending to all persons, times, places, and things (Psa. 1, 10-13 ; Heb. iv, 13) ; 4. Perfect, relating to what is past, present, and to come. He knows all indepen- dently, distinctly, infallibly, and perpetually (Jer. x, 6, 7; Rom. xi, 33). 5. This knowledge is ;3ecu/«.«?' to him- self, and not communicable to any creature (Job xxxvi, 4; Mark xiii, 32). 6. This attribute is incomprehensi- ble to us, how God knows all things, yet it is evident that 'he does; for to suppose otherwise is to suppose him an imperfect Being, and at variance with tlie rev- elation he has given of himself (Job xxi, 22; xxviii, 24; I'sa. cxxxix, G; 1 John iii, 20).
This attribute of God is constantly connected in Scripture with his omnipresence, and forms a part of almost every description of that attribute; for as God is a spirit, and therefore intelligent, if he is everywhere, if nothing can exclude him, not even the most solid bodies, nor the minds of intelligent beings, then, indeed, as Paul avers, are "all things naked and open to the eyes of him with whom we have to do." Where he acts, he is; and where he is, he perceives. He under- stands and considers things absolutely, and as they are in their own natures, forms, properties, differences, to- gether Avith all the circumstances belonging to them. " Known unto him are all his \vorks from the beginning of the world," rather from all eternity, known before they were made, and known now they are made, in their actual existence. It is also properly associated with his omnipotence; so that God is universal in his per- fections.
Two theological, or rather metaphysical, questions have been raised on this subject. 1. Whether this knowledge is all equally present to the divine conscious- ness, or only brought up as occasion requires. That the latter position cannot be true may be argued from the consideration that it would imply an imperfection or limitation in (Jod's knowledge itself, inasmuch as it would thus become partial and fragmentary. The "oc- j casion" implied in the supposition must be either in the I divine mind, or else outside of it. If ab intra, it must ■ be either voluntary or involuntary. The former in- volves the absurdity of supposing a volition respecting a subject not consciously present at the time to the mind of the wilier, and the latter leaves the matter subject to some secret law of variable and therefore contingent
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action. If, on the other hand, the supposed occasion be (lb er/ra, then still more palpably must the knowledge be fluctuating, and even uncertain altogether. In short, we cannot predicate of the divine mind any such Idirs of mental association as those which call up stores of in- formation in human thoughts: these belong only to finite and imperfect beings. Knowledge is not latent in God's consciousness; his nature precludes such a supposition. Even with ourselves positive knowledge or absolute certainty springs only from consciousness; all else is merely belief, probability, reasoning, etc. Memory itself is but the reflex action of consciousness. AVith God, as there is no need of information or infer- ence, so knowledge must be simple intuition, or what is in human language consciousness of all truth, possible as well as actual, throughout that infinity of time and space which his presence permeates.
2. The other and more important question mooted re- lates to God's Joi-eknowledf/e of the future. This, Cal- vinistic theologians generally affirm, depends upon his in-edetermination of all things. Of course, a Being of infinite power must know that his will cannot be frus- trated, and maj' therefore predict with certainty what- ever he ordains. But this is not really knowledge at all; it is simply reasoning, a rapid conclusion from cer- tain data. If the foregoing views are correct, God does not \iTo\)er\y foreknow or remember anything. He sim- ply KNOWS everything — past, present, and future — by virtue of that absolute and infinite intuition which takes in the entire range of fact and possibility in one ever- lasting survey. In the lofty language of Holy Writ, he " inhabiteth eternity." Of course, however, he knows events in their true relation and sequence as to time, and he also knows that they might liave been, might now or hereafter be, otherwise, i. e. he contemplates at the same time with the certain the contingent also, and even the imaginary. For mere mortals, within their finite sphere of the past and present, may do this. The essential difference — aside from the enlarged field of view— is, that God looks upon the future just as we do upon the past, but by a peculiar faculty inherent in Deity alone. Any other view reduces God to but a man of larger projiortions. See the literature referred to in Malcom, Theol. Index, s. v. ; and comp. Pke-