WlI.L.
The philosophical discussions of which this contro- versy is the development are as old as philosophy itself, and form the groundwork of all the systems, physical as well as moral, whether of the Oriental or of the Greek philosoph}'; of Dualism, Parsism, and of the Christian Gnosticism and Maniclueism in the East; and in the West, of the Ionian, the Elealic, the Atomistic; no less than of the later and more familiar Stoic, Peripatetic, and Platonic schools. In the philosophical writings of the fathers, of Origen, Clement of Alexandria, and above all of Augustine, the problem of the seeming mixture of good and evil in the world is the great sub- ject of inquiry, and through all the subtleties of the mediaeval schools it continued to hold an important and prominent place. During the Middle Ages it was ably discussed by the schoolmen St. Anselm and St. Thomas. In times comparatively modern Optimism was em- braced by Descartes and Malebranclie. Spinoza may also be accounted an Optimist. But the full develop- ment of the optimistic theory as a philosophical sj-stem was reserved for the celebrated Leibnitz (q. v.). It forms the subject of his most elaborate work, the Theodicea, the main thesis of which may be briefly stated thus : Among all the systems which presented themselves to the infinite intelligence of God as possible, God selected and created, in the existing universe, the best and most perfect, physically a^well as morally. The Theodicea, published in 1700, was principally designed to meet the sceptical theories of Bayle, by showing not only that the existence of evil, moral and physical, is not in- compatible with the general perfection of the created universe, but that God, as all-wise, all-powerful, and all- perfect, has chosen out of all possible creations the best and most perfect; that had another more perfect crea- tion been present to the divine intelligence, God's wis- dom would have required of him to select it; and that if another, even equally perfect, had been possible, there would not have been any sufficient determining motive for the creation of the present world.
The details of the controversial part of the system would be out of place in this work. It will be enough to state that the existence of evil, both moral and physi- cal, is explained as a necessarj' consequence of the finite- ness of created beings; and it is contended that in the
balance of good and evil in the existing constitution of things, the preponderance of the former is greater than in any other conceivable creation. The optimism of Leibnitz has been misunderstood and misrepresented by Voltaire and others. But the doctrine which Leibnitz advocated is not that the present state of things is the best possible in reference to individuals nor to classes of beings, nor even to this world as a whole, but in refer- ence to all worlds, or to the universe as a whole — and not even to the universe in its present state, but in ref- erence to that indefinite progress of which it may con- tain the germs. The great argument of the optimists is the following: If the present universe be not the best that is possible, it must be either because God did not know of the (supposed) better universe, or because God was not able to create that better one, or was not willing to create it. Now every one of these hypotheses is ir- reconcilable with the attributes of God: the first, with his omniscience ; the second, with his omnipotence ; and the third, with his goodness. See Leibnitz, Theodi- cea ; Baumeister, Historia de Mundo Ojitimo (Corletei, 1741) ; Wolfart, Controversice de Mundo Optimo (Jena, 1743); Creuzer, Leibnitii Doctrina de Mundo Optimo sub Examine denuo Revocata (Leipsic, 1795) ; Contemp. Rev. May, 1872, art. v. See also Pessimism ; Theodi- cy.
Optimists. According to Mr. Stewart {Nat. and Mor, Powers, bk. iii, ch. iii, § 1), under the title of op- timists are comprehended those who admit and those who deny the freedom of human actions, and the ac- countableness of man as a moral agent. See, however, the articles Optimism ; Pessijiism.
Optimus, Heinrich. See Opitz, Heinrich.
Option (Lat. ojytare, to elect, choose) is in ecclesias- tical language the choice or preference which the arch- bishop of a province enjoys as a customary prerogative, when one of his suffragan bishops is consecrated by him, in the appointment of a clerk or chaplain. In lieu of this it is now usual, however, for the bishop to make over by deed to the archbishop, his executors, adminis- trators, and assigns, the next presentation of such dig- nity or benefice in the bishop's disposal within that see ; so that the archbishop himself may choose, and this is hence called the archbishop's option. If the bishop die or be translated before the archbishop exercises his right, the option is lost, because the new bishop is not bound by the grant of the predecessor; and the archbishop cannot present to any benefice which is vacant at the time of the bishop's death, because the patronage of all such vacant benefices belongs by prerogative to the crown. An option is considered the private patronage of the archbishop; and if the archbishop die. it belongs to his personal representatives, who may present whomsoever they please, unless the archbishop has by his will direct- ed them to present a particular individual, in which case they can be compelled to obey the will. See ^Valcott, Sac. A rchaol. s. v. ; Eadie, Eccles. Cyclop, s. v.