With the denial of theism, pessimism is possible, but not necessary. .Spinoza seems to be an optimist when he asserts liiat finite evil and good are only relative conceptions; that what seems to be evil is the neces- sary manifestation or outworking of the universal sub- stance. Logically considered, his argument is not val- id, for, in order to make it such, it must be assumed or proved that the existence of the universal substance or Ciod is itself a good. The philosophy of Hegel found in the necessary evolution of the absolute a place for every form of evil as a necessary stage in the process by which the idea at last comes to self-consciousness in man, and thus marks the steps of its advancement or ev- olution in the history of each individual, and in the prog- ress of the race. But in order to justify the occurrence of these transient evils, this development of the lower into the higher must be assumed to be good. Pessi- mism is by no means excluded b3' this theorj' of Hegel, except by the assumption that an outcome of prepon- derating evil in the universe would be unreasonable, and unreason is evil only, and cannot be actual. But this solution only illustrates a fundamental weakness or limitation of the system itself in its conceptions of good and evil.
Schopenhauer makes the two elements or factors of the universe to be will — i. e. force and thought ; i. e. VorsteUiinff ; conceiving, however, of neither nor of both as implying a personal God. He does, indeed, make the force which is blind when it begins to work to come at the end of its operations to a consciousness of itself and of its work ; but the discovery which it makes of both is anything rather than satisfactory. As soon as the blind will comes to the clear knowledge of the un- satisfactory character of its work, it recoils with horror, and strives for self-annihilation. Schopenhauer gives his reasons for holding that all life is only suffering : 1. The constitution of the human individual; 2. The nature of enjoyment; 3. The consequents of possession and gratification ; 4. The relation of man to the external world ; 5. The aimless operation of history. From these data he concludes that the universe is the worst possi- ble, arguing that if it were a shade worse it could not possibly exist. The only transitory happiness which man can find or should value are the passionless pleas- ures of science and art. These have as little as possible of the elements of feeling and impulse, and therefore are liable to the least possible alloy.
Hartmann contends that the universe as a whole is uncontrolled by design. Each part is adapted to every other, but no design controls the whole. This he ar- gues from the unsatisfactory results of the universe, with which he contends no reasonable being could pos- sibly be content, and therefore the universe as a whole is neither reasonable nor good. In proof, he cites (1) The law of nervous exhaustion ; (2) The pleasure found in relief from pain does not usually outweigh the pain ; (3) The most of our pleasures are unobtrusive; the contrary is true of pains; (4) All gratifications are usu- ally brief, while sufferings are enduring. The remed}' which Hartmann proposes is to elevate and strengthen the will to a passionless indifference to existence and its evils, and a passionless enjoyment of its blessings. See Stoicism.
The affinity of these philosophical theories with the hypotheses of blind evolutionism and tlie survival of the fittest, as taught by many modern expounders of natural history, is too obvious to need exjjosition. The moment we abandon the position that design controls the luiiverse, and that the tendency of its forces and movements authorizes us to believe in the goodness of a personal (iod, it is impossible to set aside the reason- ings wliich lead to the hopeless and repidsive conclu- sions of pessimism. In literature pessimism is nearly allied to nihilism, or that faithless and hopeless view of life's duties and life's activities which is the result of the overstimulated and the overindulged curiosity and tastes that characterize most of our modern life. Indeed, it
is in this practical form only that pessimism is likely to be current or dangerous. There are comparatively few men who will be attracted by this doctrine as an abstract theory of tlie universe. Its assumptions are too remote and doubtful, and the deductions are too at- tenuated. But there are multitudes in this our own cultivated age Avho have found life so empty, and the gratification of passion so unsatisfying, and even the pursuit of art and literature so unrewarding, as to be ready to accept the conclusion that the universe is bad- ly ordered, and human existence is only vanity and vexation of spirit. Theoretic pessimism is, on the one hand, compatible with the grossest debauchery, the most shameless self-seeking, and the most cruel oppression ; and on the other with stoic indifference for one's per- sonal sufferings, and passionless unsympathy for the sorrows of others. No influence can be more unfriend- ly to individual or national character than the absence of faitli in God and man which such r. theory implies or engenders. No heroism nor self-sacrifice nor self-cult- ure in its highest forms can flourish in a community of educated men who have persuaded themselves that their life is a burden, that the universe is false to its prom- ises, and that their very nature is necessarily in conflict with the impulses and hopes which impel it to action. Neither art nor literature nor philosophy can escape the blight which pessimism, as a philosophy of the uni- verse or a theory of life, must of necessity bring upon all that is noble and aspiring in man and his achieve- ments. See Huber, Der I'essimismus (Munich, 1876) ; Volkelt, Jjas Unbeirusste und der Pessimisvnts : Studien ZU7- niodernen Geistesbeicegung (Berlin, 1873) ; Taubert, Der Pessimismus und seine Gegner ; Von Hartmann, 1st der pessimist ische Monisrmis ti'osilos ? Gesammelte phil. Abhandlungen (Berlin, 1872); Pfleiderer, Der Pessimis- mus (Berlin, 1875) ; Christlieb, Infidelity, v, 40 ; Ueber- weg. Hist, of Philosophg (see Index); Clmstian Quar. April, 1874, p. 284-88; North Amer. Per. July, 1873, art. ii. (N. P.)