But there are other difficulties than these general ones by which the theory of personification is encum- bered. This theory supposes the devil to be the^jrwi- ciple of evil. Let it be applied in the interpretation of two or three passages of Scripture. "Then was Jesus led up of the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil" (Matt, iv, 1-11). Was Jesus tempted by a real, personal being? or was it by the principle of evil? If by the latter, in whom or what did this principle re- side? Was it in Jesus? Then it could not be true that in him was no sin. The very principle of sin was in him, which woidd have made him the tempter of himself. This is bad hermeneutics, producing worse theology. Let it also be remembered that this princi- ple of evil, in order to be moral evil, must inhere in some conscious moral being. Sin is evil only as it im- plies the state or action of some personal and accounta- ble agent. Again: "He was a murderer from the be- ginning, and abode not in the truth : he is a liar and the father of it" (John viii, 44). With what propriety' could these specific acts of guilt be charged upon an ab- straction ? An abstraction a murderer! a liar! Seri- ously to affirm such things of the mere abstraction of evil is a solemn fiction; while to assert them of a fallen angel, who beguiled Eve by falsehood, ami brought death upon all the race of man, is an intelligible aud affecting truth.
It would be a waste of time to prove that, in various degrees of clearness, the personal existence of a Spirit of Evil is revealed again and again in Scripture. Every quality, every action, which can indicate personality, is attributed to him in language which cannot be explain- ed away. It is not difficult to see why it should be thus revealed. It is obvious that the fact of his existence is of spiritual importance, and it is also clear, from the nat- ure of the case, that it could not be discovered, although it might be suspected, by human reason. It is in the power of that reason to test any supposed manifestations of supernatural power, and any asserted principles of divine action which fall within its sphere of experience (" the earthly things" of John iii, 12). It may by such examination satisfy itself of the truth and divinity of a Person or a book ; but, having done this, it must then accept and understand, without being able to test, or to explain, the disclosures of this divine authority upon
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subjects beyond this world (the " heavenly things," of which it is said that none can see or disclose them, save the "Son of Man who is in heaven").
It is true that liuman thought can assert an a priori probability or improbability in such statements made, based on tlie perception of a greater or less degree of ac- cordance in principle between the things seen and the things unseen, between the effects, which are visible, and the causes, which are revealed from tlie regions of mystery. But even this power of weighing probability is applicable rather to the fact and tendency tlian to the method of supernatural action. This is true even of natural action beyond the sphere of human observa- tion. In the discussion of the plurality of worlds, for example, it may be asserted without doubt that in all the orbs of the universe the divine power, wisdom, and goodness must be exercised; but the inference that the method of their exercise is found there, as here, in the creation of sentient and rational beings is one at best of but moderate probability. Still more is this the case in the sijiritual world. Whatever supernatural orders of beings may exist, we can conclude that in their case, as in ours, the divine government must be carried on by the union of individual freedom of action with the over- ruling power of (iod, and must tend finally to that good which is his central attribute. But beyond this we can assert nothing to be certain, and can scarcely even saj' of any part of the method of this government whether it is antecedently probable or improbable.
Thus, on our present subject, man can ascertain by observation the existence of evil— that is, of facts and thoughts contrary to the standard which conscience as- serts to be the true one, bringing with them suffering and misery as their inevitable results. If he attempts to trace them to their causes, he finds them to arise, for each individual, partly from the power of certain inter- nal impulses which act upon the will, partly from the influence of external circumstances. These circum- stances themselves arise, either from the laws of nature and society, or by the deliberate action of other men. He can conclude with certainty that both series of causes must exist by the permission of God, and must finally be overruled to his will. But whether there exist any superiiuraan but subordinate cause of the circumstances, and whether there be any similar influence acting in the origination of the impulses which move the wiU, this is a question which he cannot answer with certainty. Analogy, from the observation of the only ultimate cause which he can discover in the visible world — viz. the free action of a personal will — may lead him, and generally has led him, to conjecture the affirmative; but still the inquiry remains unanswered by authority.