SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY 421 SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY
of the relation of reason to faith. Reason cannot prove the articles of faith, for the latter spring from revelation, which is above reason. But rational and theological truths cannot possibly be in conflict, for they both come from God — the one indirectly and the other directly. Yet they do not overlap each other; tliey stand in dif- ferent spheres. The rational truths do not reach up to the theological {deficiunt ub eis)\ they are only a praambula to them. Natural reason serves, therefore, as a preparation for faith; iiut Thomas Acpiinas else- where in his system robs reason of even this conceded service, for he really attributes the so-called truths of natural reason to former half-remembered revelations, and regards them as implicitly containing the whole series of Christian dogmas. Another service (so teach- es Aquinas) which reason renders to faith is to eluci- date the doctrines of faith by means of natural analo- gies. The possibility of this rests on the fact that all natural objects retain a certain faint resemblance to their Author. Still another use of reason lies in con- vincing our adversaries. The singulurls modus convin- vendi adrersarios is reall}' ex audoritate Scripturce divi- nilus confirmata viiraculk. If the adversary concedes a part of the Christian system, his remaining errors may be removed by developing the implications of the par- tial truths which he does accept. If he rejects the whole, there remains no other resource than an indirect procedure, viz. by evolving the absurdities which are implied in his errors.
The form which Aquinas thus impressed upon theol- ogy was of the greatest influence upon all subsequent theological thought. It retained its sway in German orthodoxy down to the time of Schleiermacher. In the rest of Christendom, Catholic and Protestant, it largely prevails even to the present. Its essential feature is the sharp distinction made between that religious knowl- edge which is attainable by reason and that which we owe to revelation, as also the designating of revealed truth as supra sed iion contra ratiunem. It is within the range of this narrow fiehl that Aquinas usually con- fines his thoughts. At times, however, he breaks forth in what might have proved very fertile speculations but for the hampering effects of his self-imposed yoke. Occasionally, however, he makes a real sophist's use of this yoke, calling in abruptly the help of mere ecclesi- astical authority to veil the absurd consefpiences to which some of the official definitions of doctrine seemed to lead. In philosophical respects Thomas A()uinas was equally attracted by the opposed systems of Aristotle and Plato. He seems to have oscillated not a little be- tween the central differences of these systems — the real- istic ideas of Plato and the univeisalia in re of Aristotle. Under this influence he sometimes assigns too high a role to natural reason (e. g. to demonstrate the existence of God), and at others he almost robs it of any power whatever (e. g. when he attributes the truths of natural religion to forgotten revelations). In his ontology Aqui- nas leans somewhat to the emanation of his master, Al- bertns Magnus. He does not clearly distinguish be- tween will and nature in God ; and his system, as a whole, is deterministic in its implications. In form it is an ideal of artistic construction. It is, however, not merely its form, but also and chiefly the rich fulness of its matter, which secured to it its long ascendency over the theological activity of the Church.
Contemporary with Aquinas was the gifted and elo- quent Bonaventura (died 1274). He is peculiar for the completeness with which he combined the scholastical element with the mystical. His masters were Aris- totle and the St. Victors. Less speculatively original than A(juinas, he is distinguislied bj^ a moderation which preserves him from dogmatic extremes, and by a warm religions element which lends to his pages an enduring attraction. This latter element saves him from the trivial subtleties into which his contemporaries so gen- erally fell, and induces him to give great prominence to the simple practical elements of scriptural [)iety. Well
did he merit the encomium of Gerson : " Kecedit a curi- ositate quantum potest, non immiscens positiones extra- neas, vel doctrinas terminis philosophicis obunibratas more multorum, sed dum studet illuminatioui intellec- tus, totum refert ad pietatem et ad religiositatem atfec- tus." Hence to Bonaventura theology, though specu- lative as to its object, is yet predominantly a merely practical science. As to his mj'sticism, it does not ma- terially affect the form of his theology ; rather is it sim- ply an attending complement serving to supplement the inadequacy of tlie formally logical element. As a whole, his influence, though permanent, was not so inniiediate- ly effective as that of Kaymund Lull(died ViXb). Lull's Ars Generaiis was a laudable endeavor to sitn|ilify and to render more practically effective the whole arsenal of scholastic resources. The enthusiasm with which he undertook to frame a system which would absolutely annihilate the scepticism of the Averrhoists, and demon- strate Christianity with the evidence of a simple syllo- gistic inference, is only to be compared with the kindred ambition of Wolf in the 18th century. But tlie results did not justify his hopes. And though he had a long series of enthusiastic disciples, his logical rationalism failed to produce any long-lasting benefits.