Next to Reid in significance is Dugald Stewart for his undeviating and almost literal adherence to the doc- trines of his teacher. He was more learned than Reid, more elegant, and more imaginative; but he did little else than illustrate and enforce the doctrines of Reid by examples and confirmations from his copious reading in a style which was ornate and carefidly wrought. His influence was not confined to (ireat Britain. His lect- ures were attended by pupils from France, who subse- quently were active in the reform of philosophy in their own country. His treatises were more numerous than those of Reid. In 1792 he published vol. i of The Elements of the Philosophy of the lluuian Mind; in 1814 vol. ii; in 1827 vol iii; in 1793 The Outline of Moral Philosophy; in ISWh'xs Philosophical Essays, yih'xch are more severely and purely metaphysical than any of his other writings; in 1815 and 1821 parts i an<l ii of his Gen- eral View of the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Science since the Revival of Letters, in which his critical taste and erudition are abundantly displayed; in 1828 The Philosophy of the A ctive and Moral Powers.
Dr. Thomas Brown should be named next to Dugald Stewart, not only because he was his immediate suc- cessor, nor because his combination of subtle analysis with rhetorical exuberance made him immensely pop- ular for a time, but because he introduced new elements into the field of discussion, and gave an important im- ptdse to a direction of thought which is now striving to displace the fundamental principles taught by Reid. We refer to the prominence given to the so-called as- sociation of ideas, to which Brown, following Stewart somewhat, assigned a very great significance in the ex- planation of psj'chological phenomena and philosophical beliefs. James Mill, John Stuart Mill, and Alexander
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Bain were all influenced by the philosophizing of Brown. The moilcrn doctrine of inseparable associations was re- ceived through Brown from Hume till it arrayed itself in direct opposition to the so-called introspective theory of Hamilton in the criticism of his philosophy by John Stuart Mill. But although Brown in this and some other particulars deviated from the traditions of lieid and Stewart, he still held fast to the doctrine of irre- sistible beliefs as the foundation of philosophic truth. Though he accepted Hume's conception of the causal relation, he did not, with Hume, resolve our belief in its constancy into custom or experience. His analysis of the sense perceptions opened the way for the physiolog- ical psychology which has since been so earnestly pros- ecuted. For these and other reasons Brown is a consid- erable figure among the Scottish philosophers.
Still more considerable is Sir William Hamilton, whose astonishing erudition, subtle logic, and massive strength revived the interest in the old questions which had begun to wane, and gave a new direction to the old inquiries and discussions. His first published con- tributions were several articles in the Edinhurgh lie- view ; viz. the first on Cousin (ind the Philosophy ofihe Conditioned (18'27), others on the Philosophy of Per- ception (1830), and Recent Publications in Logical Sci- eiwe (I800). In 1836 he was elected professor of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. In 185G he published the first instalment of the works of Thomas Keid, with notes and illustrations, which re- mained unfinished till after his death. This work, in short foot-notes and long, learned appendices, contains some of his most valuable contributions to philosophy. His Lectures on JMetaphysics and Logic were published after his death under the direction of Rev. H. L. Man- sel and Prof. John Veitch (1859, 1800, 4 vols.). Prof. Veitch also published his Jllemoirs (18(59). Hamilton's philosophical teachings may be classed as follows. He was true to Keid's doctrine that common-sense is the foundation and the criterion of all true and trustworthy philosophy. He expended immense research in the effort to show that this view was sanctioned by the most eminent of ancient and modern philosophers. At the same time, he endeavored to foriruilate more ac- curate conceptions and more satisfactory definitions of common-sense and its relations to the criteria of truth. His doctrine of the intuitions, or first principles, is a great advance upon that of Reid in philosophical exact- ness. Hamilton followed Reid in rejecting the doctrine of representative perception, tracing out with laborious erudition tlie several theories held by the advocates of this doctrine, and refuting them at every point. His classification of these theories is a masterpiece of inge- nuity, acuteness, and learning. His own theory is an attempt to reconcile the latest results of physiological research with tlie doctrine of natural realism as taught by Reid. While he held, with Reid, to the necessity of a priori or intuitive truths, he sought to reconcile or modify this position by his doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. His philosophy of the conditioned was the result of an effort to adjust the Scottish with the Kantian theory of the a. priori element in knowledge. In doing this, he coincided more nearly with Jacolii than with any other (ierman philosopher, although he differ- ed from Jacobi in his fondness for scholastic distinctions and learned erudition. In formal logic he was eminent- ly at home, lioth in its suljtle refinements and its sjjecial literature. He elaborated a new and original scheme of logical symbolization on the basis of the doctrine of the (pianlilication of the jiredicate. to which he atta<^h- ed great importance. Whatever may lie the fate of his jieculiar teachings, his influence will long be felt and acknowledged in reawakening an interest in philoso]))!- ical speculation and a respect for profomid metaphysi- cal studies in Great Britain and every JCnglish-speak- ing country. See Hamilton, Sii: W^iij.iam.