SOCRATES
853
SOCRATES
liminary task. His whole life was engrossed with it. He only laid the foundations and discovered the ele- ments of dialectical science.
Socrates thought^ — at first, perhaps, onlj- instinctively felt or ascertained by experience — that any hope of moral reform must be preceded or accompanied by in- tellectual reform. He examined himself, he examined others, and discerned that received doctrine was noth- ing better than ingenious fantasy or unauthenticated opinion. The first effV)rt, then, was to remove delusion, prejudice, presumption, and what Grote calls "the con- ceit of knowledge." The humble confession of igno- rance was the indispensable preparation for a candid and hopeful search for truth. Grote has acutely and ingeniously compared the procedure of Socrates with that of Bacon. It may be as justly compared to that of Descartes. Hence the Delphic Nosce teipsum became the point of departure (Aristot. Fi-a(/m. i), and both in his own case and in the case of all with whom he con- versed his effort was to unveil ignorance under the pre- sumption of knowledge. This was his special function with all who approached him — friends and opponents, young and old, notable and simple; for school and schol- ars he had none. This was his unpaid office, for which lie would take no pay. Why should he take paj' when he disclaimed teaching or having anything to teach? Why should he seek gain when the teaching for gain and the pursuit of gain had engendered the mental and moral diseases which he attempted to cure? In ac- cordance with his function, he required those whom he catechised to examine the precise import of their terms and propositions. By a succession of adroit cavils he compelled them to apprehend the absence of precision and consistency in the vague phraseology which they employed and the hazy meaning which they attached to their statements. It was purely an inquisitive or investi- gative process — an examination of mind and conscience, confined to negative results, the recognition and admis- sion of ignorance, or of fsilse knowledge, which was worse than ignorance. These negative results involved living germs of positive and active growth. Much, too, was learned by the way. The investigation of duplicities of expression and of the derivative fallacies and discords compelled attention to the meaning and to the strict use of language. It compelled the habit of strict definition and regard to the comprehension of terms and the limitation of conceptions. It compelled also habitual observation and observance of the just processes of reasoning, and thus introduced dialectics. The purpose and results of the method of Socrates may be fitl)' compared with the tenor of John Locke's Essai/ OH the Human Understdndiiif/, which is occupied with the legitimate import of words and the cautions need- ful in their employment. Aristotle says (^Melaph. xiii, 4) that Socrates deserves the credit of two inventions — the definition of general terms and the introduction of inductive (or anagogical) reasoning. It was neces- sary to induce men to look into their own minds, to dissect their own thoughts, to test their own language, that they might detect their own meaning, or want of meaning, and thus arrive at actual knowledge, or at the conditions precedent to anj' valid knowledge. This les- son once taught was taught forever. The character of the day, the character of the habits, doctrines, specula- tions of the day, no less than his own tem|)erament and gradual self- development, inevitably led Socrates to adopt this procedure. It was not deliberately chosen : it was forced upon him. Some influence may be as- cribed to the outdoor life of the Athenians, and to their addiction to free converse, inquiry, and disputa- tion. The process, it will be seen, was not adapted to instruction, but to compulsory introspection. In the exercise of his peculiar vocation, Socrates furnished continual illustrations of ingenious cross-examination to those who sought dexterity in eristic arts. He irri- tated many, and among them persons of note, whose ig- norance and sophistries were skilfully exposed by him;
but in others — sages, anxious for knowledge, for im- provement, for intellectual and moral growth — he kin- dled a zeal, an enthusiasm, and an affectionate admira- tion which no other education has ever equalled (Plato, i^pnp. p. 219). It must be manifest how effectual this continual introspection, this constant testing of terms and torturing of significances, this inspection of the in- terdependence of thoughts, must have been in clearing the ground for healthy inquiry and in stimulating wholesome investigation, Socrates thus inaugurated genuine philosophy, or the earnest search for truth sim- ply as truth ; and communicated the impulse whence all real Hellenic philosophy proceeded.
The primary and abiding purpose of Socrates to pro- mote moral regeneration through intellectual reform in- clined his thoughts almost exclusively to ethical specu- lation. He was dissatisfied with the development of the physical theories of Anaxagofas, which he studied in early life ; but he was dissatisfied on grounds whose in- validity Bayle has pointed out (Hist. Crit. Diet. " Anax- agoras,"' note K). He rejected physical inquiries entire- ly, deeming them beyond human apprehension and hu- man application : "Quod supra nos nihil ad nos." Grote thinks that he excluded phj'sics only provisionally, and that he contemplated such studies as an ultimate por- tion of his scheme. But he had no system, and could have no system; and Grote is directly contradicted by Aristotle (J/e?(/^)/i. i, 6 ; xiii, 4). Ethics, in the widest sense of the term, was the special and peculiar domain of Socrates, He deserves Grote's designation as "the first of ethical philosophers." This commendation had been anticipated by Augustine (i)e Civ. Dei, viii, 3) : "Socrates primus universam philosophiam ad corrigen- dos componendosque mores flexisse memoratur." Hence he is said to have been the first to draw down philosophy from heaven to dwell \vith men (Cicero, Tusr. Disp. v, 4). But there was no systematic doctrine ; there were principles and tendencies which might be developed into a system, or into several systems, but they were not adapted by him for the places which they might occupy in such systems. They were undeveloped and discon- nected; not inharmonious, but unharmonized; requiring explanation and discussion to be understood in their true bearing. Thus he holds that all virtue is knowledge, and may be acquired by instruction — a doctrine accept- ed and partially developed by Plato, and corrected by Aristotle. His test of good is practical utility — a narrow and dangerous principle, which he was far from acting on himself. In government he advocated the rule of the best and most instructed — an optimist delusion — without showing, or being able to show, how the best and most competent were to be discovered, or to secure obedience. He censured democratic elections and ap- pointments by lot; and, with good reason, condemned the contemporaneous practices in his own State, How- ever wise in purpose, Socrates was a dreamer in practi- cal affairs, despite Xenophon's admiration of his sagacity in counsel. In that higher department of ethics which consists of theology he manifested an inclination to- wards monotheism, though maintaining the formal ob- servance of the religious ceremonial and worship of his country. Like the best of the ancients, he had not at- tained to the conviction of the immortality of the soul. It was a wish, a hope, a probability, not an assured be- lief. It must be remembered, however, that everything we seem to know of Socrates, of his tenets, and of his in- structions is seen through stained glasses, and glasses of a wonderfully magnifying and distorting power. We cannot safely trust either Xenophon or Plato, and there is none other whom we can trust except Aristotle ; and his indications are loose and rare. The number of coin- cidences between the alleged Socratic utterances and the precepts of Scripture, under both the first and the second covenant, are singularly noteworthy. These pre- cepts may or may not be the real expressions of Socra- tes; they may be eagerly accepted as such, but some doubt must always remain. After all uncertainties are