WILL, ARMINIAN VIEW OF 989 WILL, ARMINIAN VIEW OF
the course of their husbanclr_v, and the process of their manufactures; and he introduces you to their private life with a graphic vivacity which makes you at once a judge of tlie virtues and vices of the Egyptian char- acter, and a partaker, as it were, of the intimacies of their domestic society."
Will, Akminian View of the.— I. Definitions. — 1. Jlind is one and indivisible. For convenience in lan- guage, the phenomena of mind are generalized, and names given to the powers by which phenomena be- come possible and to which phenomena are referred. Those powers of mind which are immediately concerned in tlie acquisition, retention, and classification of knowl- edge are classed together and generalized so that the generic name of the intellect is made to include them all, or, more briefly, the mind's power to know is called the intellect. In like manner, the susceptibility oi feeling is called the sensibility, and the power to put forth action is called the will. Not that there are three distinct en- tities, for evidently it is the same one and indivisible mind that perceives, judges, remembers, imagines, is pleased or displeased, loves or hates, chooses, resolves, determines, acts. Perhaps it would be quite as scientif- ic as is the usual method of statement to say that mind, considered as an entity, is one, simple, indivisible, and ultimate ; that the same one mind, considered as a pow- er to know, is called the intellect ; considered as a pow- er of feeling, is called the sensibility ; and considered as a power of action, is called the will.
2. Edwards defines will as " the power to choose." This is unscientific and inadequate, because there are evidently other phenomena of mind as distinctly active, and as clearly distinguished from knowledge and from feeling, as is choice.
Tappan's definition of will is "the mind's causality." This is not objectionable, unless it be said that it is too general and does not enable the thinker to form a defi- nite conception.
Whcdon says the will is " that power of the mind by which it becomes the conscious author of an intentional act." This is more specific, and is correct so far as it g<>es ; but it may be asked. Is not will sometimes active when there is no intention or purpose cognized in con- sciousness? Does not the mind put forth acts of will unconsciously V
Haven says, " I understand by the will that power which the mind has of determining or deciding what it will do and of putting forth volitions accordingly."
Uphani says " the will may properly enough be de- fined the mental power or susceptibility by which we put forth volitions." These are both defective, because they require a knowledge of what is meant by the term volitions.
Manifestly mind is so perfectly one, and its phenome- na are so thoroughly interpenetrated, each and all be- ing mutually conditioned one upon the other, that accu- rate and exhaustive definition is extremely difficult, if not impossible. In the present state of mental science, perhaps we say the best thing possible, and all that is requisite for practical purposes, when we say that to know, to feel, and to act is an exhaustive category of mental phenomena, and the mind's power to act is what is expressed by the term " the will."
3. In general use, all acts of will are called volitions. Some writers, however, distinguish them as " choices" and "volitions;" but no reason is apparent for varying from the general usage, as the distinction sought may be easily made when necessary by simply noting one class as volitions in choice, and the other as volitions in the executive nisits. To make a choice, to form a pur- pose, to seek an end, to indulge an intention, to resolve to do, with other terms of similar import, express acts of mind which are different from the mental nisiis that moves the mind or body, or both, to do the thing in- tended. As between idleness and eraploj'ment, as be- tween one form of occupation and another, and as be- tween several books lying before me, I determine to
take up a particular book and give attention to the reading of the same, and the study of the topic on which it treats. These selections and the determination formed are acts of will — are choices, volitions in choice ; but no one of them alone, nor all of them together, have as yet stirred a muscle. Another act of will is requisite to move the body and do the work intended : this may be called volition in the executive nisus.
The executive power of will is exerted both upon the mind and upon the body — upon the mind as in all acts whereby attention is confined to any particular topics; upon the body as in all cases of intended muscular movement.
The above, in a matter so well understood, may suf- fice as a sort of index pointing towards, rather than ac- curately defining, what is intended by the terms "will," "choice," " volition," and their synonyms; and we now proceed to the discussion of the question which, more than all others connected herewith, is of vital impor- tance, namely —