II. T/ie Freedom of lite Will. — Fatalism is a denial of the existence of free-will in any sense in which the term may be used. What is is, because it could not not be ; and what is not is not, because it could not be. The act- ual is equal to the possible, and the non-existent is equal to the impossible. Eternal fate governs all exist- ences and events. Of course atheists are universally fatalists. JIaterialism, when it asserts that nothing ex- ists but matter, is inseparably associated with fatalism, and in any of the forms which it assumes it is logically fatalistic. Dualism and pantheism always lead in the same direction, though dualists and pantheists are not all professed fatalists. One form of professed theism is confessedly fatalistic, namely, that species of theism which affirms that God acts from the necessities of his nature, so that he does all he can do, and what he does he cr^innot avoid doing, the actual being, bj' the neces- sity of God's nature, the measure of the possible. All that it is deemed needful to say of fatalism in this con- nection is that it contradicts the universal convictions of the human mind. All men, fatalists themselves in- cluded, have an ineradicable conviction that man}"- things might be different from what they are. All men irresistibly conceive an essential difference between a man and a machine, and conceive that that difference is found chiefly in the fact that man chooses his ends and the means of their accomplishment, and the ma- chine does not. Fatalism, if true, cannot be proved, for to admit the possibility of its truth long enough for the consideration of an argument is to admit that human thought is a necessary falsehood ; and arguments against fatalism are evidently futile, for the fatalist is by his own profession compelled to ignore all confidence in his own thinkings. Rejecting as he does ultimate princi- ples, denying intuitive truths, there is no foundation for an argument.
The antagonism between fatalism and freedom may be found in their answer to the question. Is mind sub- ject to the law of necessity in every direction, and in the same sense that matter is subject to that law ? The fatalist affirms and the freedomist denies. For all that is apparent, the antagonists must stand face to face for- ever— the one affirming and tlie other denying — with nothing for cither to say that will be of any service to the other.
Among antifatalists there is great diversity of opin- ion, and here controversy begins. All are agreed in affirming the doctrine of human liberty, or technically in asserting the doctrine of free-will ; but they instant- ly begin to differ by giving different and opposite defi- nitions of the terms " libert}'," " freedom," " certainty," " necessity," etc. This controversy may be as explicit- ly stated, and the arguments pro and con. as perspicu- ously presented, with some advantage as to brevity, as in any other method, by making the whole discussion consist in an answer to the solo question. Is there exist- ent such a thing as a " power to the contrary ?" It may
WILL, ARMINIAN VIEW OF 990 WILL, ARMINIAN VIEW OF
be said tliat tliis question docs not cover the whole ground of controversy, since some allow tliat " the power to tlie contrary" is essential to a probation, and that tlie lirst man possessed it; atKrniint; only that the pos- terity of the tirst pair, by reason of their relation to the lirst sin, do not possess it. This is true; but it is also true tliat all, or well-nigh all, arguments adduced to jirove tlie non-existence of a power to the contrary in I lie posterity of Adam prove, if they prove anything, not the nun-existence, but the impossibility, of such a power. The (piestion may be stated in other terms — Is mind a ]iower competent for either of several different results? \Vlicn the niiiul chooses A, could it at the same time and under the same circumstances have chosen B in- stead? Is mind, or is it not, an either-causal power? Is it, or is it not, in respect to any event, a first cause? The parties to this controversy have been called Free- domhts and Xtcessitarians. We adopt these terms not only for convenience, but because they explicitly charac- terize the opinions held by each.
1. Freedomists affirm that the power to the contrary is not only conceivable, but actual ; that it is involved in all intuitive conceptions of infinite power; that at any moment in infinite duration God can create or refrain from creating; that, creating a world, he can place its centre in any one given point in space or in any one of an infinite number of other points; that this power in God is absolutely free from all constraint, either from anything external to himself or from anything pertain- ing to bis own nature. They further affirm that God created man in this feature of his image, so that to de- prive man of it entirely would be to dehumanize him — would be to reduce him to the character and condition of a brute, or perhaps worse, to mere machinery. They still further affirm that the possession of this power is fundamental and essential in the make-up of a moral being. Necessitarians deny the power to the contrary. They affirm — stating it in the mildest terms they choose to adopts — an invariable antecedency in all events, psy- chical as well as physical. All phenomena are uniform, equally so whether pertaining to matter or to mind. External objects determine perception, perception de- termines emotion, emotion determines desire, desire de- termines volition in choice, volition in choice determines volition in the executive nisus, and this determines the external muscular action. The chain is unbreakable; the connection between choice and desire is as uniform, as impossible to be otherwise, as is the connection be- tween external object and perception. Every cause is potent only for one sole effect; every antecedent is fol- lowed, and must be followed, by one sole consequent. As Edwards puts it, the law of necessity governs all events; it is absurd to suppose the possibility of the opposite of what is. Discussions on this subject among theologians have primary and chief respect to the power for good. Pelagians affirm that the power for good is as essential to human nature as any other power. Of course it was not lost by the fall, and all men come into personal con- sciousness as fully possessed of power to choose the good as they are possessed of power to choose the evil. Augustinians and Arminians affirm that power to choose the good was lost by the first sin; that man became enslaved, and that the race have inherited the enslave- ment. Augustinians further afiirm that the lost power is never restored; that if man wills a good, it is by a divine efficiency causing him thus to will — in other words, the power to the contrary does not exist in the human mind, has not since the first sin, and never will. Arminians agree with Pelagians in affirming that the power to the contrary is essential to a moral nature, to a being morally responsible, but differ from them when they deny that the power to good was lost by sin. Ar- minians agree with Augustinians in affirming that the jiosterity of the first pair have inherited an enslaved nature, but they differ from them when they assert that tliis enslavement is perpetual. Arminians atfirm that the race, except the first pair, come into personal con-