A great step towards the definite restriction of the
meaning of philosophy was made by the Platonic writ- ings, though the name continued, and has always con- tinued, to be employed with great latitude. Aristotle, who gave a sharp, scientific character to nearly every- thing which he touched, first confined the term to spe- cial significations, and gave to it a limited and, in some cases, a purely technical meaning. He calls philosophy "the knowledge of truth ;" and he endeavored to dis- cover a "first philosophy," or body of principles com- mon to all departments of speculative inquiry, and deal- ing solely with the primary elements and affections of being (Met. i, 1, p. 993; Pfys. i, 9, p. 5; Simplicii Schol. p. 345). This first philosophy, or "knowledge of the philosopher," corresponds to metaphysics in its stricter sense — a division of speculative science receiv- ing its name from the remains of Aristotle, and. in great measure, constituted by his labors. It is the science of being as being (to iv >) ov, Met. vi, 1, p. 1026; xi, 3, p. 10G0 ; iv, p. 1061). Thus, with the Peripatetics, phi- losophy included all science, but especially theoretical science, and was peculiarly attached to metaphysical science. With this accords the definition of Cicero, which is evidently derived from Peripatetic sources (De Off. ii, 2, 5).
This historical deduction is not unnecessary. Many words grow in meaning with the growth of civilization. Many gradually lose witli the advancement of knowl- edge their original vague amplitude, and acquire a defi- nite and precise significance. The real import of either class of words can be ascertained only by tracing their development through their successive changes. The history of the term philosophy enables us to understand the still subsisting vacillation in its employment, and to detect the common principle which runs through all its various and apparently incongruous applications. It brings us, at the same time, to the recognition of the mode and measure of its most rigorous employment.
Philosophy is the earnest investigation of the princi- ples of knowledge, and most appropriately of the first principles, or principles of abstract being. It is not science, but search (Kant, Program. 1765-66; Sir Will- iam Hamilton, Metaph. lect. i, iii ; Discussions, p. 787). It is distinctively zetetic, or inquisitive, rather than dog- matic. Its chief value consists in the zeal, perspicacity, simplicity, and unselfishness of the persevering desire for the highest truth, not in its attainment ; for the highest truth is, in its nature, unattainable by the finite intelli- gence of man. It has not, or ought not to have, the pretension or confident assurance of knowledge, though this claim has frequently been made (?'/ (pi\oo-o<pia yvu)- mc tan iravTwv twv ovraiv. David. Interpr. .*■. Categ. Schol. A ristot. p. 29, ed. Acad. Pcrol.). It is only a sys- tematic craving and continuous effort to reach the high- est knowledge.
'For man loves kne More welcome tor Than nil the blanc Than all of taste 1
■<1lm
and the benmR of truth nderstanding's eye
ngue" (Akeneide).
Philosophy was called by the schoolmen "the science of sciences ;" and wherever the recondite principles of knowledge are sought, there is philosophy, in a faint and rudimentary, or in a clear and instructive form. Hence it admits of being predicated of investigations far remote from those higher exercises of abstract con- templation to which it is most properly applied.
What is man ? What are his faculties and powers ? Whence is he? Whither is he going? How shall he guide himself? What is this vast and varied universe around him ? How did it arise ? How is it ordered and sustained? What is man's relation to it, and to the great Power behind the veil, manifested by its won- drous movements and changes? What is the nature of this power? What are man's duties to it, to him- self, and to his fellow-men ? What knowledge of these things can he acquire? What are his destinies, and his aids for their achievement? These questions, and ques- tions like these, constitute the province of philosophy
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PHILOSOPHY
proper. They present themselves dimly 01 distinctly to every reflecting mind; and they will ool l» Our intellectual constitution compels us i<> think of them : and to think of them, however weakly and spas- modically, i- the beginning of philosophy. They all adroit of partial solution— of an answer at least, which stimulates further investigation. None of them can re- ceive a full and complete reply from the human reason — they stretch beyond its compass. All of them, in every age, have met with some response, either in the poetic and bewildering fancies of the prevalent mythology, or in the wild guesses of popular credulity; either in the aphorisms of the prudent, <>r in the conclusions of those who have sedulously devoted themselves to the unrav- elling of these enigmas. This latter class have been the philosophers of each generation, from the com- mencement of rational inquiry to the current day. as
such schools, the development or perversion of the sev- eral successive or contemporani ous schemes of specula- tion in the bosom of the schools themselves, either in consequence of their own internal activity, or of the necessities suggested or enforced by external attack. In this manner, and from these motives of change, philosophy exhibits unceasing activity and frequent noveltj of form, notwithstanding the substantial iden- tity of the questions debated, and t hi- sameness ot the ground surveyed. In these vicissitudes of opinion then- is, however, an element which ought never to be overlooked, and which gives an immediate and urgent interest to all the variations. The philosophy of an age or seel is largely influenced by recent experi- ences, and by the present demands of the society or circle to which it is addressed ; and. in turn, it exercises a most potent influence in determining the views of the rising