of his new office was assiduous and exemplary ; for he pretend Bystera where system never existed. Other not onlj Bet about improving the course of study pur- inquirers, feeling the difficulty and the hazard of the sued in the van .u- seminaries throughout his di
icese, task, have been content, like the translators and many
PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY
283
PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY
of the editors of Plato, to give an abstract or analysis of the several pieces, with an appreciation of their con- tents. This leaves the doctrines in their original seg- regation, and affords little aid in bringing them into one harmonious picture. This process has been, in the main, followed by Grote, whose extensive work appears rather as a collection of preparatory studies, pursued with great diligence and redundant learning, than as a clear and full delineation of Plato and other Compan- ions of Socrates. The danger is equally great of pre- senting the views of Plato without obvious links of connection, and of organizing them into a compact .scheme, which could not have been contemplated by Plato. In avoiding Scylla on the one hand, and Cha- rybdis on the other, we are thrown back upon the orig- inal record, with such assistance as may be derived from illustrative works, and especially from the historians of ancient philosophy. Among these expositors, the one who may still render the best service is Brucker. He is in many respects antiquated ; he has morbid antipathies and scornful condescensions ; he is very mechanical, and even wooden in his arrangements; but he is honest, earnest, discreet, and free from preoccupations. The very methodism of his procedure is serviceable, when we seek a summary but connected view of the doctrines which Plato taught, or was supposed in ancient times to have taught.
The leading object of Plato's life and philosophical activity was to teach the Greeks the correct use of reason, and to induce them to apply it, with a constant observance of the requisite conditions, to the practical concerns of private and public life. The human mind, alike from its constitution and from the defects of its instrument of communication, is ever exposed to the hazard of plausible delusions, and to the peril of accept- ing fallacies for irrefragable truth. These pernicious consequences were the daily diet of the Athenian peo- ple. Hence arose errors in morals, disregard of virtue, indifference to wrong-doing, unreflecting license of in- dividual passion or caprice, disintegration of society, corruption, and anarchy. How were welfare, virtue, and happiness to be attained in this mass of disorder? What were justice, right, truth? How were they to be de- tected, appreciated, and appropriated? On truth ev- erything else reposed; but other Greeks besides the Cretans were habitual liars (Grcecia mendax). What is truth? The interrogation of Pilate was the funda- mental question propounded by Plato to himself and to his age; and, in propounding it, he trod in the steps of Socrates. There is a truth of knowing and a truth of being, and they must agree with each other. How are they to be reached and reconciled? If the instru- ments of knowledge are broken, warped, or otherwise disordered, there can be no true knowledge, and no valid apprehension of the character and relation of the facts with which we have to deal. The purpose of Plato was, in some respects, similar to the purpose of Bacon. ' Bacon proposed to rectify the processes of reasoning in the investigation of nature, for the attainment of scien- tific knowledge, and for the practical benefits thence to ; be derived. Plato sought to do the same thing in a more general manner, for the intellectual and moral im- provement of men, of societies, and of states. Coleridge j has enlarged upon the correspondences of Plato and Bacon, and has exaggerated them. It was a fine and just instinct which suggested the parallelism. With Plato, as with Bacon, the first step was the exposure and expulsion of confident ignorance and presumptuous error ; the refutation of the vast brood of sophisms which swarmed around every principle of speculation and con- duct; the determination of the character, extent, and validity of human knowledge, and the requirements for the legitimate use of reasoning, and for the avoidance i of its abuse. Only after this had been done would it be possible to arrive at trustworthy knowledge or safe opinion in regard to the universe of which we are members, and in regard to the relations in which we |
stand to it and to its parts. The truth of being, as a subject of knowledge, thus demanded and presupposed the truth of knowledge, not in its rounded fulness, but in its formulary of procedure. In the ultimate and unattainable result, the truth of knowledge would ac- cord and be superficially coextensive with the truth of being, as the reflection in a perfect mirror corre- sponds with the object reflected. Not until such a rec-' ognition of the truth of being was gained as the com- petency of the weak, fallible, finite mind of man might permit, could the conduct of men find safe and authori- tative regulation, and the truth of action, or right in all moral contingencies, be discovered. To reason ac- curately in order to know the essential character of the facts on which action should depend, and by which it must be controlled, and to use right reason and correct knowledge of facts for the determination of right ac- tion, may be said to be an abstract statement of the Platonic scheme, which thus embraces the whole duty of man. The intricate casuistry of Plato, and the breathless flights of his daring and playful fancy, v. iih- draw attention from his solemn, earnest, direct, every- day aim. The determination and discipline of the reason, the appreciation of the universe, sensible and intelligible, and the application of these acquisitions to the permanent needs of individual, social, and politi- cal existence, constitute the sum of Plato's teachings; but how wonderfully are they diversified and adorned and enriched by his endless variety and poetic imagina- tion !