In this way alone can the emphatic statements of the Scriptures, as classified above, be explained in harmony with other passages which distinctly deny his complic- ity with evil, i. e. in the sense of moral wrong. We first bring fully into view the seeming impeachment of his attributes contained in the classes of passages above referred to, which may be epitomized, in princi- ple, as follows: Exod. iv, 21; vii, 13; x, 1, 20; xiv, 7; Deut, ii, 30 ; xiii, 1-3 ; Josh, xi, 20 ; 1 Sam. xvi, 14 ; xviii, 10; xix, 9; 1 Kings xii, 15; xxii, 20-22; 2 Chron. xviii, 22 ; xxv, 20 ; Psa. lxxviii, 49 ; cv, 25 ; Isa. vi, 9, 10; xix, 14; xliv, 18; lxvi, 4; Jer. vi, 21; Ezek. iii, 20; xiv, 9 ; Amos iii, 6; Zech. viii, 10; 2 Thess. ii, 11, 12; 1 Pet. ii, 8; Kev. xvii, 17. In striking contrast with these stands the revelation of his character and works in the following: Lev. xi, 45; Deut. xxxii, 4; 1 Sam. vi, 20 ; Job viii, 3 ; xxxiv, 10, 12, 23 ; xxxvi, 3 ; Psa. v, 4; xi. 7; xxxiii, 5; lxxxix, 14; xcii, 15; xcvii, 2; cxix, 137; Isa. v, 16; Ezek. xviii, 29; Hab. i, 13; Zeph. iii, 5 ; Rom. ii, 2, 5, G ; James i, 13 ; 1 Pet. i, 15, 16 ; Rev. xvi, 7.
Truth cannot be inharmonious, much less contradic- tory ; therefore, there must be some possible reconcil- iation of these apparently conflicting statements. We find that reconciliation in the divided sovereignty which allows man to be supreme within the sphere of his vo- lition, and attributes all outside of the mere mental fact of free-will determinations to the will and operation or co-operation of God. Upon any other hypothesis it is not possible to draw the dividing line between divine and human responsibility; and therefore, if this be de- nied, the hope of constructing any consistent doctrine of divine providence must be abandoned.
III. Some Objections Considered. — Objection 1. If prov- idence be the care exercised over his creatures by a God of infinite goodness and purity, he cannot be implicated in the wicked actions of men. Answer. As a matter of fact, he is concerned in them, else they could not exist ;
for, were he to refuse the concurrence of his upholding power, men would drop into non-existence. Again, the objection is destroyed by considering that actions have no moral character whatever, as between the creature and the Creator, such character being vested entirely in the volitions of the will from which the actions re- sult. Therefore, God can use the wicked actions of men as he does any other indifferent thing, provided that his own inu-pose in using them be right, which no one disputes.
Objection 2. God's majesty is degraded by the as- sumption contained in the doctrine of providence, viz. that he is interested in all the minutia; of nature. An- swer. If he has created faculties or forces, nothing that they can evolve can be unworthy of his care.; besides, things which seem to men most insignificant are often causatively linked with stupendous results. Again, the revelations of the microscope prove that the infinitesi- mal are embraced within the sweep of the same laws that pervade the infinite, and hence are under the same benign care. Further, the impression of the grandeur of the Infinite Intelligence, comprehensive as it may be, from the contemplation of the rolling spheres and interlocking systems of the universe, is, after all, less profound than that which results from tracing his hand- iwork in the conformation of the beautifully wrought shells of the animalcula, and their exquisite life-appli- ances and adjustments, which only the most powerful glasses can reveal to human sight.
Objection 3. The prosperity of the wicked and the af- flictions of the righteous are inconsistent with the sup- position of a just and holy providence. Answe?: The equal dispensation which the objection assumes to be necessary under the government of God is an impossi- bility; for the affections and interests of men are so interlocked that exact justice could rarely, if ever, be meted to the transgressor without involving conse- quences to others which would be undeserved. Again, the prosperity of the wicked, if they continue in their evil courses, is always a curse to them in the end ; and God's processes should not be condemned until their final issue is known. On the other hand, the adversi- ties of the righteous have attending or following com- pensations which satisfy them that all is right ; and if those who are chiefly interested are content, the objec- tion of the mere observer should be esteemed of little weight.
Objection 4. It is alleged that the laws of nature suf- ficiently account for the order of nature; therefore, a providence is not necessary. Answer. The laws of nature are only the regular order which is found to subsist, termed laws because of the uniformity of the changes which occur, and signify certain results of pow- er, but not power itself — effects, but not their causes. These uniformities are, therefore, only modes in which the self-existent controls the contingent, the manner in which God manipulates his material creation.
IV. History of the Doctrine.— The idea of a superin- tending or controlling Providence has appeared under various forms, sometimes scarcely recognisable, depend- ing largely upon the culture of the age and the state of philosophical speculation at the time.