But the latter part of the 9th, the whole of the 10th, and most of the 11th century were eminently unfavorable to diligent study and tranquil speculation. It was the period of Arab ravage and encroachment in the Eastern Empire; the period of the ruthless descents of Danes and Northmen in the Western; the period when the reign- ing dynasties of France and England were changed ; when Italy was distracted by invasions and by wars between contending emperors; and when the fierce strife between the secular and spiritual authority be- came peculiarly acrimonious. As the result of these wide-spread disturbances, discord and anarchy, lawless- ness and rapine, general wretchedness and insecurity prevailed. Two centuries thus elapsed before the great question of Universals distinctly emerged out of the earlier discordances of opinion. Towards their conclu-
REALISM
942
REALISM
sion, a purely theological question bad arisen, which recalled eager inquiry into the nature of Universal*. This was the denial of transubstantiation by Berenga- rius on grounds which implied Nominalism.
the same i inn-, the doctrine of Nominalism was explicitly assi rted by Roscellinus, a canon "I I lorn- usually regarded as the founder of the sect, bul may have been preceded by liis master, Johannes Surdus (John the Deaf), of whom very little is known. Roscellinus held thai "genera and species are i. 3, bul only words denoting abstractions;" that, consequently, " there an- no Bucb things as uni- versal, bul only individuals." Realism is tlm- directly contradicted. These speculations pointed towards dan- gerous heresies in theology. Roscellinus, denying all but individual existences, assailed the unity of persons in the Trinity, and thus maintained Tritheism. The Church was at once aroused. Numerous confutations were propounded, the most celebrated of which was the tractate of Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, I>< Fide Trinitatis. Anselm holds the Realist doctrine of Uni- versals, and i- occasionally betrayed into extravagance. His polemics is. however, theological rather than dia- li ctical "i- in. taphysical. lie attacks perilous errors in religious belief, an. I assails speculative opinions only in- cidentally. Remusat, while considering him a decided Realist, deems that his prominence in the controversy between Realism and Nominalism has been exagger- ate. 1 i Remusat, St. . I nselmt , pt. ii, ch. iii, p. 494). Ef- forts were made to reconcile the conflict between the ii doctrines, but they only rendered the issue an. I the antagonism more pronounced. William de Champeaux (De Campbellis) held that "the Universal or genus is something real; the individuals composing the genus have no diversity of essence, bul only of acci- lements." This is the tir-t precise asseveration of Realism in mediaeval philosophy. With William de Champeaux "the essence of things is ascribed to the genera, the individual is reduced to a simple accident. With Roscellinus, the individuals alone exist, and they constitute the essence of things. With Champeaux. the essence of things i- in the genera to which they be- long, lor SO far a- tiny arc individuals they are only
accident-" (Caraman, Hist, des Rev, <l' l,t Phil. vol. ii. ch.ii,p. 18).
Thenceforward the greal controversy proceeds with increasing ardor, and furnishes the battle-field for the
rival Schools and rival Schoolmen of lie- Middle Ages.
The further consideration of these dissensions belongs, however, more appropriately to the discussion of the oi ni of scholasticism. See Scholasticism. II. Vatun of Realism. — The general character of Realism has been exhibited sufficiently to render its or- igin and evolution intelligible. A fuller explanation is needed to enable us to understand the importance which it assumed in mediaeval speculation. Cicero has said that •there is nothing so absurd as not to have been maintained by some of the philosophers." It is easier to ridicule than to appreciate the reveries of philosophy. Tin. aberrations of metaphysics and tie- paradoxes of ire ..uly the zealous and inadequate expres- sion of far-reaching truths imperfectly apprehended. We certainly should not complain of either the excesses or the blindness of the schoolmen, in an age which is inclined t.. accept protoplasm as a sufficient explanation of all life, and evolution a- a complete exposition of
creation, or a substitute for it. Vet. even in these cases.
much is charged upon the hieropbants which they do
irl of their doctrines. Realism was the
mediaeval and dialectical reproduction of the Platonic
ideas. It a I thai general terms. BUCh as Mnn.
Horse, I c, were not merely logical de-
vices, cieai no- of abstraction, ingenuities of language, hut were realities, separable (xiopiara) from the being of individual men, horses, trees, flowers, etc. In Plato and the Platonic Bchool these ideas were supposed to have a real, primordial, changeless, and eternal exist- 1
enee in the Divine Mind, as the archetypes of all things that are made. It demands no extraordinary range of intellect to point out the presumption of attempting to determine the contents of the Divine .Mind and the mod.- of it- procedure in ordering the creation. It needs no great intellectual effort to dilate upon the practical incongruities of representing Socrates a- a transitory accident ; having no real existence except so ! far as he partakes of the one. universal, ideal Man, who is immortal, incorporeal, immaterial, and unchangeable; communicated and communicable to all men. past, pres- ent, and future : completely contained in each, yet abun- dant for all. and independent of each and of all. These objections blink or evade the subtleties of the problem. These sneers do not reach the difficulty with which the greatest philosophers have struggled, and struggled in vain. No doubt our knowledge "i </< m rals and specials is attained (so far as the human mind is capal certaining the process of attaining knowledge) by ab- straction from individual things observed, and by re- combination of their accordant characteristics. No doubt the abstract terms, so arrived at. are the instru- ments of linguistic and logical classification, which we