And that which is _inconceivable_ in them, is a solid foundation of that _profound humility_, _awful reverence_, _internal piety_ and _tremendous sense_ of the divine Majesty, with which devout persons think of God, and assist at the _offices_ of religion. Which excites in them a higher zeal for doctrines and institutions of divine revelation, than for all things human; that fills them with reverence for all _things_, places, and offices, that are either by divine or human authority, appointed to assist their desired intercourse with God.
And if some people, by a _long_ and _strict_ attention to _reason_, and the _fitness_ and _unfitness_ of things, have at last arrived at a demonstrative certainty, that all these sentiments of piety and devotion, are mere _bigotry_, _superstition_, and _enthusiasm_; I shall only now observe, that _youthful extravagance_, _passion_, and _debauchery_, by their own _natural tendency_, without the assistance of any other guide, seldom fail of making the same discovery. And though it is not reckoned any reflection upon _great wits_, when they hit upon the same thought, yet it may seem some disparagement of that _reason_ and _philosophy_, which teaches _old men_ to think the same of religion, that _passion_ and _extravagance_ teach the young.
To return: As there is no state in human life, that can give us a true idea of any of the fore-mentioned relative characters of God, so this relative state of God towards sinners is still less capable of being comprehended by any thing observable in the relations, betwixt a judge and criminals, a _creditor_ and his debtors, a _physician_ and his patients, a father or prince, and their disobedient children and subjects.
For none of these states separately, nor all of them jointly considered, give us any full idea, either of the _nature_ and _guilt_ of sin or how God is to deal with sinners, on the account of the relation he bears to them.
To ask, whether _sin_ hath solely the _nature_ of an offence, against a prince or a father, and so is pardonable by mere goodness; whether it is like an _error_ in a _road_ or _path_, and so is entirely at an end, when the right path is taken; whether its guilt hath the nature of a debt, and so is capable of being discharged, just as a debt is; whether it affects the soul, as a _wound_ or _disease_ affects the body, and so ought only to move God to act as a good physician? All these questions are as vain, as to ask, whether knowledge in God is really _thinking_, or his nature a real _substance_. For as his knowledge and nature cannot be strictly defined, but are capable of being signified by the terms _thinking_ and _substance_, so the nature of sin is not _strictly represented_ under any of these characters, but is capable of receiving _some representation_ from every one of them.
When sin is said to be an offence against God, it is to teach us, that we have infinitely more reason to dread it on _God’s account_, than to dread any offence against our parents, or governors.
When it is compared to a _debt_, it is to signify, that our sins make us accountable to God, not in the _same manner_, but with the same certainty, as a debtor is answerable to his creditor; and because it has some likeness to a debt, that of ourselves we are not able to pay.
When it is compared to a _wound_, or disease, it is not to teach us, that it may as justly and easily be healed as bodily wounds, but to help us to conceive the greatness of its evil; that, as diseases bring death to the body, so sin brings a worse kind of death upon the soul.
Since therefore the _nature_ and _guilt_ of sin can only so far be known, as to make it highly to be _dreaded_, but not so known as to be _fully_ understood, by any thing we can compare to it:
Since the _relation_ which God bears to _sinners_, can only be so known, as to make it highly reasonable to prostrate ourselves before him, in every instance of humility and penitence; but not so fully known as to teach us, in what manner, God must deal with us: it plainly follows, that if God is not an _arbitrary_ being, but acts according to a _fitness resulting_ from this relation, he must, in this respect, act by a _rule_ known only to himself, and such as we cannot _possibly_ state from the _reason_ and _nature_ of things.
For if the nature of things, and the fitness of actions resulting from their relations, is to be the rule of our reason, then _reason_ must be here at a full stop, and can have no more knowledge to proceed upon, in stating the _nature_, the _guilt_, or proper _atonement_ of sin in men, than of sin in _angels_.