Thus, when this writer says, _If the relations between things, and the fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must he not be an arbitrary being?_ As he here means some _eternal, immutable relations, independent_ of God; so, to suppose, that God cannot be a _wise_ and _good_ being, unless such eternal, independent relations, be the _sole rule_ of his actions, is as erroneous, as to affirm, that God cannot be _omniscient_, unless _mathematical demonstrations_ be his _sole manner_ of knowing all things. And it is just as reasonable to fix God’s knowledge _solely_ in mathematical demonstrations, that we may thence be assured of his _infallible knowledge_, as to make I know not what independent relations of things, the _sole rule_ of his actions, that we may thence be assured, he is not _arbitrary_, but a wise and good being.
And we have as strong reasons to believe God to be, in the highest degree, _wise_ and _good_, without knowing on what, his wisdom and goodness is _founded_; as we have to believe him to be _omniscient_, and _eternal_, without knowing on _what_ his _omniscience_ is founded; or to _what_, his eternity is owing. And we have the same reason to hold it a vain enquiry, to ask what obliges God to be _wise_ and _good_, as to ask what obliges him to be _omniscient_, or _eternal_.
And as it would be absurd to ascribe the _existence_ of God to _any cause_, or found it upon any _independent relations_ of things, so it is the same absurdity, to ascribe the infinite wisdom and goodness of God to _any cause_, or found them upon any independent relations of things.
Nor do we any more _lose_ the notion, or _lessen_ the certainty of the divine wisdom and goodness, because we cannot say on _what_ they are founded, than we _lose_ the notion of God, or render his existence _uncertain_, because it cannot be founded on any thing.
And as in our account of the existence of things, we are obliged to have recourse to a being, whose existence must not be ascribed to _any cause_ because every thing cannot have a cause, no more than every thing can be created, so in our account of _wisdom_ and _goodness_, there is the same necessity of having recourse to an infinite wisdom and goodness, that never _began_ to be, and that is as different as to its _manner_ of existence, from all other wisdom and goodness, that have a beginning, as the _existence_ of God is _different_ from the existence of the creatures.
* But if it be necessary to hold, that there is an infinite wisdom and goodness that _never began_ to be, then it is as necessary to affirm, that such wisdom and goodness can no more be _founded_ upon the _relations_ of things, than the _unbeginning existence_ of God can be _founded_ upon the existence of things. And to seek for any _reasons_ of a wisdom and goodness that was always in the _same infinite_ state, is like seeking the cause of that which can have no cause, or asking _what_ it is that _contains_ infinity.
* When therefore this writer saith, _Infinite wisdom can have no commands, but what are founded on the unalterable reason of things_;¹ he might as justly have said, an _infinite Creator_ can have no power of creating, but what is founded on the _unalterable nature_ of creatures.
¹ Page 247.
* For the _reason_ of things, is just as unalterable, as the _nature_ of creatures. And if the reasons and relations of things are nothing else but their _manner_ of existence, or the _state_ of their nature, certainly the relations of things must have the same _beginning_, and the same _alterable_ or unalterable nature, as the things from whence they flow. Unless it can be said, that a thing may exist in _such a manner_, though it does not exist at all.
When therefore he says again, _That the will of God is always determined by the nature and reason of things_;¹ It is the same as if he had said, the _omnipotence_ of God is always determined by the _nature_ of _causes_ and _effects_. For as all causes and effects are what they are, and _owe_ their _nature_ to the omnipotence of God, so the relations of things are what they are, and owe their nature to the wisdom and will of God.
¹ Page 65.
Nor does this dependance of the relations of things on the will of God, destroy the nature of relations, or make them doubtful, any more than the existence of things depending on the _power_ of God, destroys the certainty of their existence, or renders it doubtful. For as God cannot make things to exist, and not to exist at the same time, though their existence depends upon his power, so neither can he make things to have such relations, and yet not to have such relations at the same time, though their relations depend upon his will.