And therefore if this argument is to be admitted, it leads directly to _atheism_, and brings us under a greater necessity of rejecting divine providence, on the account of its mysteries, than of rejecting a revelation that is mysterious in any of its doctrines. And if, God cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he requires any thing of us, that our reason cannot prove to be necessary; surely he cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he over-rules our persons and affairs, and disappoints our counsels, makes weakness prosperous, and wisdom unsuccessful, in a _secret_ and _invisible_ manner, and for reasons and ends that we have no means of knowing.
* There is nothing therefore half so mysterious in the Christian revelation, as there is in that _invisible_ providence, which all must hold that believe a God. And tho’ there is enough plain in providence, to excite the adoration of humble and pious minds, yet it has often been a rock of _atheism_ to those, who make their own reason the measure of wisdom.
Again, Tho’ the _creation_ plainly declares the glory, and wisdom, and goodness of God; yet it has more mysteries in it, more things whose fitness, expedience, and reasonableness, human reason cannot comprehend, than are to be found in scripture.
If therefore he reasons right, who says, “If there may be some things in a true religion, whose fitness and expedience we cannot see, why not others: nay, why not the whole; since that would make God’s laws all of a piece? And if the having of these things is no proof of its falshood, how can any things fit and expedient (which no religion is without) be a proof of the truth of any one religion?”¹ _If, I say, this is the right reasoning, then it may be said_, “If there are things in the creation whose fitness we cannot see, why not others: nay, why not the whole; since that would make God’s works of a piece? And if the being of such things as these in the creation, is not a proof of its not being divine, how can the fitness and expedience of any creation prove that it is the work of God?”
¹ First address to the inhabitants of London, Page 57.
Thus does this argument tend wholly to _atheism_, and concludes with the same force against _creation_ and _providence_, as it does against revelation.
Either therefore there is nothing in the work of the creation, whose fitness and expedience cannot be proved; nothing in God’s providence over whole nations, and particular persons, whose fitness and expedience cannot be explained and justified by human reason, or else neither creation nor providence can be ascribed to God.
The credibility of an external divine revelation with regard to human reason, rests wholly upon _such external_ evidence, as is a sufficient proof of the divine interposition. If there be no such external evidence possible; if God has no ways of acting so _peculiar_ to himself, as to be a _sufficient_ proof to human reason of his action; then no revelation can be sufficiently proved to be a divine, external revelation from God.
I appeal therefore to the miracles and prophecies on which Christianity is founded, as a sufficient proof, that it is a divine revelation. And shall here consider, what is objected against the sufficiency of this kind of proof.
1. It is objected, That miracles cannot prove a _false_, or _bad_ doctrine, to be _true_ and _good_; therefore miracles, _as such_, cannot prove the truth of any revelation.
But though miracles cannot prove false to be true, or bad to be good; yet they may prove, that we ought to receive such doctrines, both as true and good, which we could not know to be true and good without such miracles. Not because the miracles have any influence upon the things revealed, but because they are God’s testimony to the truth of that which he reveals.
But our author brings a farther objection against this use of miracles.
“If, _says he_, evil beings can impress notions in mens minds as strongly as good beings, and cause miracles to be done in confirmation of them; is there any way to know to which of the two, notions thus impressed are owing, but from their internal marks of wisdom and goodness?”
This objection supposes, that no miracles, can be a sufficient proof of the divinity of a revelation; because we do not know the extent of that power, which evil spirits have, of doing miracles. But this objection is groundless. For, granting that we do not know the extent of that power which evil spirits may have; yet if we know _enough_ of it to affirm, that the _creation_ is not the work of evil spirits; if we can securely appeal to the creation, as _a sufficient proof_ of God’s action and ♦operation; then we are secure in appealing to miracles, as a sufficient proof of a divine revelation.
♦ “opperation” replaced with “operation”