This writer asks, “How it is consistent with the notion of God’s being universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children, who had equal need of it?” But if they had _equal need_ of it, yet if they were not _equally fit_ for it, but prepared only to have their _guilt_ increased by it, and so be exposed to a greater damnation; then God’s goodness to them is manifest, by withholding such information from them, and reserving it for those that would be made happier by it.
_Judas_, _Pontius Pilate_, and the _Jews_ that called for our Saviour’s crucifixion, had _equal need_ of a Saviour with those that believed in him. _Chorazin_ and _Bethsaida_ wanted the light of the gospel as much as those that received it. And if the rest of the world had been, at that time, as much indisposed for the light of the gospel, as they were, God’s goodness had been, greater to that age, if he had reserved the light of the gospel till a better age had succeeded.
So that this argument, founded on the _equal need_ of all, or former ages, has no force, unless it could be shewn, that the same revelation made to any of these former ages, would have produced all those good effects, which God foresaw would follow, from its being reserved for such a _particular time_ and _state_ of things and persons.
He asks again, “Was it not as easy for God to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, as in any one?” This argument is built upon this supposition, that God does things because they are _easy_, or forbears things because they are _difficult_ to be performed. For it can be no argument, that God ought to have revealed such things to _all_ nations or persons, because it was as _easy_ to him, as to do it to _any one_ nation or person; unless it be supposed, that the _easiness_ of a thing is a reason why God does it, and the difficulty of a thing a reason why he does not do it. But if this supposition be very absurd, then the argument founded upon it must be liable to the same charge.
But if God does things, not because they are easy, but because they are infinitely good and fit to be done, then the reason why God has afforded different revelations, to different ages and persons, is this, that his _manner_ of revealing every thing, might be worthy of his own _fore-knowledge_ of the effects of it, and that every thing that is particular in the _time_ or _manner_ of any revelation, might have its _fitness resulting_ from the _relation_ betwixt a good God and his creatures, whose _changing_ state, _different_ conduct, tempers and actions, are all eternally fore-known by him.
Again, it is objected, that a divine revelation must either be the effect of _justice_, or else of _mercy_ and _free goodness_; but in either of these cases it ought to be _universal_; for justice must be done to all. But if it is the effect of _mercy_ and _free goodness_, this writer asks, “How a being can be denominated merciful and good, who is so only to a few, but cruel and unmerciful to the rest?”¹
¹ Page 401.
It is answered, That there is neither _justice_ in God without mercy, nor _mercy_ without justice; and to ascribe a _revelation_ to either of them separately, in _contradistinction_ to the other, has no more reason in it, than to ascribe the _creation_ separately either to the _wisdom_ or _power_ of God, in contradistinction to the other.
_Secondly_, A divine revelation is not owing barely to the _justice_ or _free goodness_ of God, but to the goodness, mercy, and justice of God, _governed_ and _directed_ by his eternal fore-knowledge of all the effects of every revelation, at any, or all times.
* God ordains a revelation in this, or that manner, time, and place; not because it is a _justice_ that he cannot refuse, not because it is a matter of _favour_ or _free goodness_, and therefore may be given in any manner at pleasure; but because he has the whole _duration_ of human things, the whole _race_ of mankind, the whole _order_ of human changes and events, the whole _combination_ of all causes and effects of human tempers, all the actions of free agents, and all the consequences of every revelation, plainly in his sight; and according to this eternal fore-knowledge, every revelation receives every thing that is _particular_ in it, either as to _time_, _matter_, _manner_, or _place_.
* All complaints therefore about that which is _particular_, or _seemingly_ partial in the time and manner of any revelation, are very unjustifiable; and shew, that we are discontent at God’s proceedings, because he acts like himself, does what is best and fittest to be done, and governs the world, not according to our weak imaginations, but according to his own infinite perfections.