_Shewing that all the |mutability| of our tempers, the |disorders| of our passions, the |corruption| of our hearts, all the |reveries| of the imagination, all the |contradictions| and |absurdities| that are to be found in human life, and human opinions, are in effect the mutability, disorders, corruption, and absurdities of |human reason|._
IT is the intent of this chapter to shew, that altho’ common language ascribes a variety of faculties and principles to the soul, imputing this action to the blindness of our _passions_, that to the inconstancy of our _tempers_; one thing to the heat of our _imagination_, another to the coolness of our _reason_; yet, in strictness of truth, every thing that is done by us, is the action and operation of our reason, and is to be ascribed to it, as the sole principle from whence it proceeded, and by which it is governed and effected.
And the different degrees of reason are in men, as the different degrees of love and aversion; as the different degrees of wit, parts, good nature, or ill nature, are in man.
And as all men have naturally more or less of these qualities, so all men have naturally more or less reason: and the bulk of mankind are as different in reason, as they are in these qualities.
As love is the same passion in all men, yet is infinitely different; as hatred is the same passion in all men, yet with infinite differences; so reason is the same faculty in all men, yet with infinite differences.
And as our passions not only make us different from other men, but frequently and almost daily different from ourselves, loving and hating under great inconstancy; so our reason is not only different from the reason of other men, but is often different from itself; by a strange inconstancy, setting up first one opinion, and then another.
So that when we talk of _human reason_, or a reason _common_ to mankind, we talk of as _various_, _uncertain_, and _unmeasurable_ a thing, as when we talk of a _love_, an _aversion_, a _good nature_, or _ill nature_, common to mankind; for these qualities admit of no variation, uncertainty, or mutability, but such as they directly receive from the _reason_ of mankind.
For it is as much the reason of man that acts in all these tempers, and makes them to be just what they are, as it is the reason of man that demonstrates a mathematical proposition.
Was our reason steady, there would be just the same steadiness and regularity in our tempers; did not reason fall into follies and absurdities, we should have nothing foolish or absurd in our love or aversion. For every humour, every kind of love or aversion, is as strictly the _action_ or _operation_ of our reason, as judgment is the act of our reason.
And the tempers and passions of a child, differ only from the tempers and passions of a man, as the reason of a child differs from the reason of man.
So that our passions and tempers, are the natural real effects of our reason, and have no qualities, either good or bad, but such as are to be imputed to it.
A laudable good nature, or a laudable aversion, is only reason acting in a _certain manner_: a criminal good nature, or a criminal aversion, is nothing else but reason acting in another certain manner.
But still it is reason, or our understanding that is the _only agent_ in our bad passions, as well as good passions; and as much the _sole agent_ in all our passions and tempers, as in things of mere speculation.
So that the state of reason in human life, is nothing else but the state of human tempers and passions; and right reason in morality, is nothing else but right love, and right aversion.
All _that_ therefore which we commonly call the weakness, blindness, and disorder of our _passions_, is in reality the weakness, blindness, and disorder of our _reason_. For a right love, or wrong love, denotes only reason acting in a _certain, particular_ manner.
So that if any thing can be said of love, aversion, good nature, or ill nature, as common to mankind; the same may be said of reason, as common to mankind.
For the distinction of our reason from our passions, is only a distinction in language, made at pleasure; and is no more real than the _desire_ and _inclination_ are really different from the _will_. All therefore that is weak and foolish in our passions, is the weakness and folly of our reason; all the inconstancy and caprice of our humours and tempers, is the caprice and inconstancy of our reason.
It is not properly _avarice_ that makes men sordid; it is not _ambition_ that makes them restless; it is not _bribery_ that makes men sell their consciences; it is not _interest_ that makes them lye, and cheat, and perjure themselves. What is it therefore? Why it is that _absolutely perfect_ faculty, which our author sets up as the _unerring_ standard of all that is _wise_, _holy_, and _good_; it is _reason_, the _use of reason, human reason_, that does all this.